Cook v. Tedrick

4 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Brown

    820 F. Supp. 374 (N.D. Ill. 1993)   Cited 10 times

    In this instance the weight of the credible evidence leads to the conclusion that the transfer to Therese took place in September 1984 and not earlier. That transfer was fraudulent both in fact (because the circumstances show that Edward's intent was to prevent the United States, and perhaps other creditors, from collecting a just debt ( Till v. Till, 87 Ill. App.2d 358, 361, 231 N.E.2d 641, 643 (1st Dist. 1967)) and in law (because all three factors set out in Gendron were unquestionably present). In light of Edward's fraudulent intent and Therese's knowledge of the circumstances (see Alan Drey Co. v. Generation, Inc., 22 Ill. App.3d 611, 317 N.E.2d 673, 680 (1st Dist. 1974)), the transfer must be set aside in full even if Therese were considered to have contributed some value to the Graceland Property at the time of acquisition or during the period of its ownership ( Svalina v. Saravana, 341 Ill. 236, 250, 173 N.E. 281, 286 (1930); Cook v. Tedrick, 338 Ill. App. 573, 579, 88 N.E.2d 515, 518 (4th Dist. 1949)). 9.

  2. Panos Trading, LLC v. Forrer

    2017 Ill. App. 161460 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 1 times

    In Cook, for instance, a central Illinois man shot someone without provocation or mitigating circumstances and days later rendered himself insolvent by selling off his home and all his farmland. Cook v. Tedrick, 338 Ill. App. 3d 573, 574-75, 88 N.E.2d 515, 516 (1949). The circuit court set aside the real estate conveyances as fraudulent and void, and appellate court affirmed the ruling, commenting that the shooter "must have realized that he would have absolutely no defense to a civil action in damages based on his wrongful conduct [against an unarmed person]" and had conveyed the real property "with dispatch to defraud a tort creditor he had grievously injured."

  3. Levy v. Markal Sales Corporation

    311 Ill. App. 3d 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 33 times
    Noting "the concerns expressed by [ Cortez ] regarding the potential of needless litigation," but holding that " the [UFTA] plainly contemplates that such provisional litigation may be necessary under certain circumstances"

    However, this was not always the case. Under prior law, a cause of action accrued when (1) the claimant became a creditor (see Tcherepnin v. Franz, 457 F. Supp. 832, 838-39 (N.D.Ill. 1978) (applying Illinois law); Cook v. Tedrick, 338 Ill. App. 573, 578, 88 N.E.2d 515, 518 (1949)), (2) a judgment was entered establishing the creditor-debtor relationship (Circle Security, 99 Ill. App.3d at 1155-16, 425 N.E.2d at 1287), and (3) the creditor knew or reasonably should have known of his injury,i.e., he knew of the fraudulent nature of the transfer (the "discover rule) (In re Martin, 142 B.R. 260, 265 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1992) (applying Illinois law); In re Lyons, 130 B.R. 272, 278 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1991) (same)). It was possible in certain cases that a cause of action did not accrue until after the judgment was entered, that is where the creditor did not have the requisite actual or constructive knowledge at the time of the judgment's entry. Thus, contrary to Levy's suggestion, the five-year limitation period did not in all cases commence at the time of judgment, and thus was not the benchmark for determining the timeliness of a creditor's claim.

  4. Wilkey v. Wax

    225 N.E.2d 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967)   Cited 35 times
    Finding husband and wife had colluded to defraud judgment creditor by entering into property settlement agreement

    Armed with this knowledge of the shape of things certainly to come, it was not unnatural, as we have said, that they desired to devise some means of holding what they had without regard for the rights of debtor's putative creditor. Apropos is Cook v. Tedrick, 338 Ill. App. 573, 88 N.E.2d 515. There, the debtor without provocation assaulted plaintiff "without a single mitigating circumstance." Debtor there, as here, "realized that he would have absolutely no defense to a civil action for damages based upon his wrongful conduct.