In Zant v. Cook, supra, we granted habeas relief on a 1950 murder conviction that had been used in aggravation in a 1985 death-penalty case. See Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565 ( 340 S.E.2d 843) (1986). On March 3, 1970, Spencer pled guilty to one count of rape, two counts of assault with intent to rape, two counts of kidnapping, one count of assault with intent to murder and two counts of motor vehicle theft.

This is well within constitutional requirements. See Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 571 (11) ( 340 SE2d 843) (1986) (holding that, in general, absolute disparities under ten percent satisfy constitutional requirements). Humphreys also urges this Court to take both absolute and comparative disparity into account when considering smaller population groups such as Hispanic persons.

The trial court correctly found that an under-representation of a cognizable group by 6.04 percentage points is generally not unconstitutional, and Edwards has not argued in this appeal that the composition of his grand jury list was unconstitutional. See Ramirez v. State, 276 Ga. 158, 159-160 (1) (b) ( 575 SE2d 462) (2003); Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 692-693 (1) ( 532 SE2d 78) (2000); Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 571 (11) ( 340 SE2d 843) (1986) ("As a general proposition, absolute disparities under 10% usually are sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements."). However, the Unified Appeal Procedure ("U.A.P.") sets the limit for under-representation of a cognizable group at five percentage points, and it presumes that white persons are a cognizable group.

Cook v. State 255 Ga. 565, 573 (11) ( 340 S.E.2d 843) (1986). A prima facie case requires that the defendant show that a distinctive group or recognizable class in the community has been excluded from the jury list.

The record shows that there was only a 3.4 percent racial disparity as to the grand jury and a zero percent racial disparity as to the traverse jury. Such disparities would be sufficient to withstand any attack that might be made. Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 570 (11) ( 340 S.E.2d 843) (1986); Unified Appeal Procedure, Rule II (A) (6). Therefore, appellant has not shown a reasonable probability that the denial of his motion rendered his trial unfair.

2. There is no merit to Taylor's contentions that the grand and traverse juries were improperly impanelled or that the method of establishing the traverse jury was discriminatory.Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 573-574 ( 340 S.E.2d 843) (1986). Nor do we find that the trial court erred in refusing to find a violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 ( 106 S.C. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69) (1986).

There is no merit to Kinsman's argument that his 1976 murder conviction was too old to use in aggravation. As we stated in Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565 (13) (b) ( 340 S.E.2d 843) (1986): The age of a conviction is a matter which the defense may argue in mitigation, but it is no ground for the exclusion of the evidence.

See Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 598 (22) ( 340 S.E.2d 869) (1986). See Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 586 (fn. 11) ( 340 S.E.2d 843) (1986). 34.

(a) Pope's contention that blacks and women have been discriminated against in the selection of grand jury forepersons in Haralson County is answered by Ingram v. State, 253 Ga. 622 (1c) ( 323 S.E.2d 801) (1984). (b) Pope's contention that blacks are unconstitutionally underrepresented on the Cobb County traverse jury list is answered by Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565 (11) ( 340 S.E.2d 843) (1986), wherein we found the underrepresentation of blacks on the Cobb County jury lists, involving the same percentages shown here, to be constitutionally insignificant whether analyzed absolutely or comparatively. As to the remaining groups allegedly underrepresented on the Haralson County grand jury list and on the Cobb County traverse jury list — young persons, single persons, persons having recently moved into the respective counties, the marginally educated, and the unemployed — we find that Pope has failed to establish as a matter of fact that in either county any of these groups are cognizable for purposes of jury selection.

When using the 1990 Census numbers, the absolute disparity of Hispanics on the grand and traverse jury lists when compared with their percentage of the county population was less than 5% and therefore constitutional. See Morrow, supra at 695;Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565 (11) ( 340 S.E.2d 843) (1986) ("As a general proposition, absolute disparities under 10% usually are sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements."). This Court did not reach the question of whether the constitutional analysis was affected by evidence that most of the Hispanics in Hall County are not U.S. citizens and therefore ineligible for jury service.