Evidence that the victim's taking of an arrest warrant would have immediately returned Terrell to jail was relevant to prove that Terrell had a motive to kill the victim, and relevant evidence is not rendered inadmissible simply because it incidently puts the defendant's character in issue. Cook v. State, 221 Ga. App. 831 (3) ( 472 S.E.2d 686) (1996) (evidence that defendant was on parole relevant and admissible to show his motive for robbery). 8. Terrell's arrest was not illegal.

Given the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the work history as irrelevant. See Cook v. State, 221 Ga. App. 831, 834 (4) ( 472 SE2d 686) (1996). Id.

Cook also was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, but that count is not at issue in this appeal.Cook v. State, 221 Ga. App. 831 ( 472 S.E.2d 686) (1996). In November 2000, Cook filed a "Motion to Correct and Set Aside Illegal Sentence," arguing that the recidivist sentencing statute in effect when he committed the armed robbery — OCGA § 17-10-7 — did not allow a sentence of life without parole.

OCGA § 24-2-2. As a general rule, the admission of evidence is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and unless an abuse of that discretion is shown the court's decision will not be disturbed. Cook v. State, 221 Ga. App. 831, 833 (3) ( 472 S.E.2d 686) (1996). See OCGA § 24-2-2.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the victim's personnel records were not relevant to the charges pending against Reese. Cook v. State, 221 Ga. App. 831, 834 (4) ( 472 S.E.2d 686) (1996).Collins v. State, 235 Ga. App. 852 (2) ( 510 S.E.2d 609) (1998).

"While a witness may be impeached on a collateral issue which is indirectly material to the issue in the case, a witness may not be impeached because of a discrepancy as to a wholly immaterial matter." Cook v. State, 221 Ga. App. 831, 834 (4) ( 472 S.E.2d 686) (1996). During the trial, Rutledge testified that on the evening of January 26, he had gone to a hospital in Macon, but was refused entry.

]" Dennard v. State, 263 Ga. 453, 455 (5) ( 435 S.E.2d 26) (1993). See Cook v. State, 221 Ga. App. 831, 832 (1) ( 472 S.E.2d 686) (1996); Frazier v. State, 195 Ga. App. 109, 110 (3) ( 393 S.E.2d 262) (1990). On appeal, a defendant must show "clear prejudice" from denial of a motion to sever.

Therefore, we find no harmful error requiring reversal. Williams v. State, 263 Ga. 135, 136 (2) ( 429 S.E.2d 512); see also Cook v. State, 221 Ga. App. 831, 834 (4) ( 472 S.E.2d 686). 3. Belt's contention that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of a police officer is without merit.

Jessup has further waived this argument by even failing to enumerate the charge as error. See Cook v. State, 221 Ga. App. 831, 834 (5) ( 472 S.E.2d 686) (1996). As regards his conviction for bodily injury, Jessup argues that because there is no evidence that he inflicted any bodily harm upon the victim after the commencement of the alleged kidnapping to South Carolina, bodily harm in connection with the kidnapping was not shown.