Opinion
Nos. 05-05-00281-CR, 05-05-00282-CR
Opinion Filed February 8, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F02-45549-Vq F02-45552-VQ. Affirmed.
Before Justices O'NEILL, FITZGERALD, and LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant appeals convictions for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child. In a single point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to admonish him as to the consequences of his guilty pleas. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgments. The grand jury indicted appellant for two cases of indecency with a child and one case of aggravated sexual assault Appellant initially pleaded not guilty to a jury. At the jury trial, the State presented evidence from the victim, appellant's niece, that appellant began touching her improperly when she was eleven or twelve years old. Appellant's improper touching escalated to aggravated sexual assault by the time the child was twelve or thirteen years old. After appellant "opened the door," the State also presented evidence that appellant sexually assaulted his two other young nieces. After this evidence was presented, the trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether appellant could present evidence of the victim's prior sexual history. After ruling he could not, the parties notified the trial court that they had reached a plea agreement. Specifically, appellant would change his plea to guilty in the aggravated sexual assault case and one of the indecency with a child cases in exchange for the State dismissing the remaining indecency case and recommending eight year sentences in the two remaining cases. The trial court admonished appellant as to the applicable punishment ranges. Appellant indicated that he understood the punishment ranges, that his pleas were knowing and voluntary, and that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty and for no other reason. The trial court accepted appellant's pleas and instructed the jury to find appellant guilty. The jury did as instructed. The trial court then assessed punishment at eight years' confinement in each case in accordance with the plea agreements. In his sole point of error, appellant contends his pleas were not knowing and voluntary because he was not admonished as to the sex offender registration requirement as required by article 26.13(a)(5) of the code of criminal procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2005). Appellant asserts this failure to admonish resulted in a violation of his "federal and state due process rights" and rendered his pleas involuntary. Initially, we note the article 26.13 admonitions are not constitutionally required. Aguirre-Mata v. State, 125 S.W.3d 473, 474 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Thus, appellant has not established a constitutional violation by the failure to admonish. Appellant has, however, established the trial court committed statutory error when it failed to inform appellant of the sex offender registration requirement. Webb v. State, 156 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. filed). Thus, we must determine whether the error affected appellant's "substantial rights." Tex.R.App.P. 44.2(b); Webb, 156 S.W.3d at 655. To warrant reversal for failure to admonish, the record must support an inference that the defendant did not know the consequences of the guilty plea. Burnett v. State, 88 S.W.3d 633, 637 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). A silent record in a failure to admonish case may support such an inference. Id; Webb, 156 S.W.3d at 655. On the other hand, a record that shows the defendant was informed in some manner about the consequences of his plea creates a rebuttable presumption that the appellant knew the consequences. Id. Further, even if the record supports an inference that the defendant was not aware of the consequences of his plea, we will nevertheless affirm if our review of the record supports a conclusion that the defendant would have entered the guilty pleas even if he was aware of the consequences of his plea. Webb, 156 S.W.3d at 656. After reviewing the record in this case, we conclude appellant would have persisted in pleading guilty even if he were fully admonished regarding the registration requirement. Initially, we note that the registration requirement is not punitive, but rather remedial in nature. Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 136 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Thus, a failure to admonish does not necessarily render a plea involuntary. Id. Further, the record shows that during voir dire, in appellant's presence, the trial court instructed the venire that a person on probation for a sex offense is required to register as a sex offender. Thus, appellant was aware, at least in part, of the registration requirement. Finally, appellant only decided to plead guilty after the trial court had admitted extraneous offense evidence that appellant had sexually assaulted two other victims and had ruled against appellant regarding the admissibility of the child's prior sexual history. At the same time, the State agreed to eight year sentences in both cases, in one of which appellant could have received a sentence of up to ninety-nine years or life. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.32 (Vernon 2003). It is thus apparent appellant made his decision to plead guilty because he was unhappy with the trial and had obtained a favorable sentencing recommendation. See Webb, 156 S.W.3d at 657 (concluding defendant would have pleaded guilty notwithstanding failure to admonish where record establishes rationale for guilty plea). After reviewing the record as a whole, we are confident appellant would have pleaded guilty even if he was properly admonished concerning the registration requirement. See id at 656-57. We resolve the sole issue against appellant. We affirm the trial court's judgments.