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Cook v. Pulaski Cnty. Reg'l Det. Facility

United States District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas
Jul 19, 2024
4:23-CV-00938-LPR-BBM (E.D. Ark. Jul. 19, 2024)

Opinion

4:23-CV-00938-LPR-BBM

07-19-2024

MATT COOK PLAINTIFF v. PULASKI COUNTY REGIONAL DETENTION FACILITY; BROWN, Transportation, PCRDF; TURN KEY; and TILLEY, Dr., Medical Provider, PCRDF DEFENDANTS


RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to United States District Judge Lee P. Rudofsky. You may file written objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Recommendation. If you do not file objections, Judge Rudofsky may adopt this Recommendation without independently reviewing all of the evidence in the record. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of fact.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 4, 2023, Plaintiff Matt Cook (“Cook”) filed a pro se Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants—Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility (“PCRDF”), Officer Brown, Turn Key, and Dr. Tilley—violated his constitutional rights. (Doc. 2). An Addendum to the Complaint followed. (Doc. 4). At the time that he filed the Complaint and Addendum, Cook was a pretrial detainee incarcerated in the PCRDF. (Doc. 5 at 1). Cook was subsequently released from incarceration and, in accordance with LOCAL RULE 5.5(c)(2), he notified the Court of his residential address. (Doc. 13).

After Cook demonstrated his eligibility to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court conducted an initial screening of the Complaint and Addendum pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) and noted several deficiencies. (Doc. 18). Cook was given leave to file an Amended Complaint, but he has failed to do so. Id. Accordingly, the Court will proceed with screening and will read the Complaint and Addendum together in conducting its screening. Kiir v. N.D. Pub. Health, 651 F. App'x. 567, 568 (8th Cir. 2016) (unpublished per curiam) (citations omitted).

The PLRA requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or a portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are legally frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b). When making this determination, the Court must accept the truth of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, and it may consider the documents attached to the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011).

II. ALLEGATIONS

Cook claims that, on September 11, 2023, while being transported to a court appearance, the PCRDF bus he was riding in was involved in an accident. (Doc. 2 at 3, 5). According to Cook, the bus driver, Defendant Officer Brown, struck another vehicle and slammed on the brakes. Id. at 5-6. Cook hit his head on “on the wall” and his legs “on the seat in front of [him].” Id. at 6.

After the crash, the bus continued to the courthouse, where Cook was immediately seen by an EMT. Id. at 6-7. Cook told the EMT that his back, ribs, and legs were hurting.Id. at 7. The EMT conducted a brief examination and told Cook to report any changes to the deputy. Id.

At some point, Cook was presented with a Turn Key “refusal of treatment” form, but it is unclear whether he signed the form. Id. After his court hearing, Cook was transported back to PCRDF without any further treatment. See id. at 3, 8, 11.

Once back at PCRDF, Cook was told that he would be taken to the hospital early the next morning. Id. at 11. On September 12, when Cook still had not been taken to the hospital, he complained to non-party Deputy Butler that he had back pain and needed to go to the hospital. Id. at 8. Deputy Butler told Cook that he should have gone earlier in the day when non-party Lieutenant Atwood took another inmate to the hospital. Id. Cook was sleeping when Lieutenant Atwood came to his cell and had “no recollection” of the encounter. Id.

Over the next two days, Cook filed several grievances and sick calls requesting medical treatment. Id. at 8, 11. He also continued to complain directly to non-party PCRDF officials. Id. at 9.

At around 11:30 on the morning of September 13, Cook was seen by a Turn Key nurse. Id. The nurse, who is not named as a Defendant to this action, checked Cook's vital signs and “said she would be back in an hour.” Id. at 9-10. Cook waited in his cell until around 6:00 in the evening when he was finally transported to the hospital. Id. at 10. Once at the hospital, Cook waited several more hours in a holding cell but was never seen by a doctor. Id.

The next morning, September 14, Cook was examined by Defendant Dr. Tilley back at PCRDF. Id. at 11-12. Dr. Tilley checked Cook's vitals and recommended he be transported to the hospital. Id. at 12-13. Cook was back at the hospital by 1:30 that afternoon, but again, he had to wait in a holding cell for several hours. Id. at 13.

Cook was finally seen by a hospital doctor around 9:30 in the evening on September 14. Id. at 14. He was diagnosed with “bruised ribs,” and x-rays were ordered to make sure that he did not have any fractures. Id. at 14-15. He was discharged with prescriptions for Tylenol 3, Flexeril, and a lidocaine patch. Id. at 15. Once back at PCRDF, Cook received two over-the-counter Tylenol and Keppra at pill call instead of the mediation prescribed by the hospital. Id. at 15-16, 20-21.

Cook's final allegation in his Complaint is that his depression and anxiety medication was abruptly discontinued while PCDRF ordered refills. Id. at 22. In the Addendum, Cook reiterates that he is not receiving his mental health medication and further alleges that he is not receiving his prescription medication for his ulcerative colitis. (Doc. 4 at 3, 1-2).

Cook sues Defendants in their individual capacities. (Doc. 2 at 2). For relief, he seeks compensatory damages. Id. at 4.

III. DISCUSSION

To survive pre-service screening under the PLRA, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[L]abels and conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” are insufficient to plead a plausible claim. Id. Further, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted).

However, “[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed,” and courts “should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up; citations omitted); Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Liberally construing Cook's Complaint, he raises claims that he received inadequate medical care while incarcerated in the PCRDF. However, for the following reasons, Cook fails to allege any plausible claim against the named Defendants PCRDF, Officer Brown, Turn Key, or Dr. Tilley.

A. Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility

Cook names the PCRDF itself as a Defendant in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. (Doc. 2 at 1). However, it is well settled that a county detention facility is not a legal entity that can be sued in a § 1983 action. See Owens v. Scott County Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003); LaDeaux v. Woodbury Cnty. Jail, 857 Fed.Appx. 892, 893 (8th Cir. 2021) (unpublished per curiam). Accordingly, Cook fails to state a claim for relief against Defendant PCRDF.

B. Officer Brown

Cook names Officer Brown as a Defendant to this action. (Doc. 2 at 1). In § 1983 actions, government officials are only liable for their “own individual actions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (emphasis added). Cook does not allege that Officer Brown was directly involved in denying him medical treatment or that she was involved in any other constitutional violation. At most, Cook alleges that Officer Brown was negligent while driving the bus that was involved in an accident. Allegations of negligence, even gross negligence, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. McKay v. City of St. Louis, 960 F.3d 1094, 1102 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Cook fails to state a claim for relief against Defendant Officer Brown.

C. Turn Key

Although Cook purports to name Defendant Turn Key in its individual capacity (Doc. 2 at 1-2), Turn Key is a corporate entity that may only be held liable in its official capacity. See Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 590 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). In order to state an official-capacity claim against Turn Key, Cook must allege facts showing that the alleged constitutional violations resulted from a Turn Key policy, custom, or action. Id. Even liberally construed, Cook's Complaint and Addendum contain no such allegations. Accordingly, Cook fails to state a claim for relief against Defendant Turn Key.

D. Dr. Tilley

The final Defendant named by Cook is Dr. Tilley. (Doc. 2 at 1). In order to state a claim against Dr. Tilley based on inadequate medical care, Cook must allege facts showing: (1) he had an objectively serious medical need; and (2) Dr. Tilley knew of but deliberately disregarded that need. De Rossitte v. Correct Care Sols., LLC., 22 F.4th 796, 802 (8th Cir. 2022). Deliberate indifference can be shown in a variety of ways, including “a defendant's decision to take an easier and less efficacious course of treatment,” an intentional delay or denial of access to medical care; “[m]edical care so inappropriate as to evidence intentional maltreatment or a refusal to provide essential care;” or intentional interference with a prescribed treatment. Allard v. Baldwin, 779 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted); Redmond v. Kosinski, 999 F.3d 1116, 1120 (8th Cir. 2021); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).

Cook's only allegation of personal conduct by Dr. Tilley is that Dr. Tilley saw him on the morning of September 14 and immediately recommended that he be transported to the hospital. This is not the kind of action that shows deliberate indifference to Cook's medical needs. Accordingly, Cook also fails to state a claim for relief against Defendant Dr. Tilley.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Cook's Complaint (Doc. 2) and Addendum (Doc. 4) be DISMISSED, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

2. The Court RECOMMEND that the dismissal count as a “strike” for the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

3. The Court CERTIFY, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis appeal from any Order adopting this Recommendation would not be taken in good faith.


Summaries of

Cook v. Pulaski Cnty. Reg'l Det. Facility

United States District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas
Jul 19, 2024
4:23-CV-00938-LPR-BBM (E.D. Ark. Jul. 19, 2024)
Case details for

Cook v. Pulaski Cnty. Reg'l Det. Facility

Case Details

Full title:MATT COOK PLAINTIFF v. PULASKI COUNTY REGIONAL DETENTION FACILITY; BROWN…

Court:United States District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas

Date published: Jul 19, 2024

Citations

4:23-CV-00938-LPR-BBM (E.D. Ark. Jul. 19, 2024)