To that end, the court begins by noting that the plaintiff's claim of liability against the defendant is predicated upon the agency relationship presumed by § 52-182. See Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn.App. 221, 225, 518 A.2d 77 (1986) (explaining that under § 52-182, "when a car is maintained by its owner for the general use and convenience of his or her family, the owner is jointly and severally liable for the negligence of a family member, who, having general authority to drive the car, uses it negligently while embarked on a family purpose") (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the question of the defendant's ownership of the subject vehicle is the lynchpin of the plaintiff's case, both because § 52-182 requires ownership to trigger its agency presumption and because ownership would need to be established for the defendant to owe any duty to the plaintiff.
In his brief, the defendant argues that although the car was registered in his name, he was not the owner of the car because he did not maintain any control of the vehicle, and, therefore, the family car doctrine is inapplicable to the facts of this case. In support of his argument, the defendant relies on Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn. App. 221, 518 A.2d 77 (1986). In Cook, this court recognized that "when a car is maintained by its owner for the general use and convenience of his or her family, the owner is jointly and severally liable for the negligence of a family member, who, having general authority to drive the car, uses it negligently while embarked on a family purpose, that is, for the pleasure or convenience of the family as a unit, or of an individual member of it."
"Thus, the right of the plaintiffs to recover rests on their ability to establish facts which render the family car doctrine applicable, and consequently, the defendant presumptively liable as the owner of such a family car." Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn.App. 221, 225, 518 A.2d 77 (1986). "As [the Supreme Court] explained in the seminal case of Wolf v. Sulik, 93 Conn. 431, 106 A. 443 (1919), the family car doctrine is grounded in the principle that `every man who prefers to manage his affairs through others . . . remains bound to so manage them that third persons are not injured by any breach of legal duty on the part of such others while they are engaged upon his business and within the scope of their authority.
"It has long been settled in Connecticut that when a car is maintained by its owner for the "general use and convenience of his or her family,' the owner is jointly and severally liable for the negligence of a family member, who, having general authority to drive the car, uses it negligently while embarked on a family purpose, that is, for the pleasure or convenience of the family as a unit, or of an individual member of it. Thus, the right of the plaintiffs to recover rests on their ability to establish facts which render the family car doctrine applicable, and consequently, the defendant presumptively liable as the owner of such a family" Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn. App. 221, 225, 518 A.2d 77 (1986). "This rule is grounded in the belief that one who chooses to conduct his or her activities through others is nonetheless required to conduct them so that third parties are not injured by a breach of any legal duty on the part of those acting for the principal while they are acting on behalf of and within the scope of authority granted by the principal.
The doctrine requires " that the driver has received general authority from the owner to use the car for a family purpose, that is, for the pleasure or convenience of the family or a member of it." Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn.App. 221, 228, 518 A.2d 77 (1986). " Applicability of the family car doctrine is dependent upon the connection that the member of the household has with the car.
The doctrine requires " that the driver has received general authority from the owner to use the car for a family purpose, that is, for the pleasure or convenience of the family or a member of it." Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn.App. 221, 518 A.2d 77 (1986). " Applicability of the family car doctrine is dependent upon the connection that the member of the household has with the car.
" (Emphasis in original.) Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn.App. 221, 225, 518 A.2d 77 (1986). "This rule is grounded in the belief that one who chooses to conduct his or her activities through others is nonetheless required to conduct them so that third parties are not injured by a breach of any legal duty on the part of those acting for the principal while they are acting on behalf of and within the scope of authority granted by the principal.
Under the provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-182, proof of certain familial relationships between the operator and owner of a motor vehicle creates a rebuttal presumption that the owner gave the operator general authority to operate the car. Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn. App. 221, 226, 518 A.2d 77 (1986). The statute is procedural; it creates only a presumption of fact and does not affect or create substantive rights.
(ECF No. 89-1 at 69.) Further, she has not submitted any evidence to support the inference that she had a right to register the vehicle, such as a certificate of registration for the Range Rover. See Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn. App. 221, 226 (1986)(observing that an "owner is any person holding title to a motor vehicle" and "[i]n the case of a privately owned car, [the definition of owner] has been applied through the certificate of registration. The certificate, in particular person's name and identifying a particular vehicle, warrants a finding of ownership of that vehicle by the person in whose name the car is registered.")(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
" (Citation omitted.) Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn. App. 221, 226, 518 A.2d 77 (1986). Registration of a car constitutes "`a public declaration of ownership.'. . . [H]owever . . . this declaration is [not] conclusive as to title.