Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-12138-RWZ.
June 23, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Plaintiffs, who are all prisoners at MCI Cedar Junction, filed suit against defendants in October 2003, alleging numerous civil rights and other federal law violations. One named defendant is Clark Color Lab, Inc. ("Clark"), which is a private business that provides photo processing services. Plaintiffs identify Clark as a "co-conspirator of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections Defendants," based upon the fact that "prison officials promoted the photo services of [Clark]." (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 142). Plaintiffs Sean Milliken, Francis Hannon, and Wayne Crosby claim that they sent original photographs to Clark and requested certain photo services, and that the services were never provided and the photographs never returned. They claim that they sent letters to Clark and complained to prison officials, but received no response. (Id. ¶¶ 143-45). Based upon these facts, plaintiffs allege a violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq., as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and seek reimbursement of $10,000 each from Clark. Clark moves to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and plaintiffs, who are proceeding pro se with respect to their claims against this defendant, oppose. The motion is allowed.
Plaintiffs originally filed suit pro se. The court subsequently appointed counsel, but limited that appointment to plaintiffs' claims against the state defendants. (See Order for Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel, March 14, 2005, at 2). Counsel eventually filed an amended complaint on behalf of plaintiffs. (Am. Compl., Docket #76). That complaint, however, pertains only to the state defendants. Accordingly, that portion of plaintiffs' original complaint concerning Clark survives, and the instant motion is accordingly addressed to the original complaint.
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal for failure to state a claim where "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Baxter v. Conte, 190 F. Supp. 2d 123, 126 (D. Mass. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding the motion to dismiss, I accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor, but do not credit "bald assertions" or "unsupportable conclusions." Chongris v. Bd. of Appeals of Town of Andover, 811 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1987). Pro se complaints are generally construed with greater liberality, but a court is not required to "conjure up implied allegations." Baxter, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A plaintiff alleging RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d) must establish that the defendant intended to further an endeavor that, "if completed, would satisfy all the elements of a substantive criminal offense [i.e., substantive RICO violation]."United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 90 (1st Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts suggesting that Clark intended to further a criminal endeavor and conspired with Department of Corrections officials. The complaint states only that "prison officials promoted the photo services of [Clark]," and then concludes in summary fashion that Clark was "involved in a conspiracy with Department of Corrections officials to extort inmates." (Compl. ¶¶ 142-45). Such "bald allegations" cannot form the basis of a cognizable legal claim. Plaintiffs' opposition offers only further conclusory statements. (Pls.' Opp. 3, 6), but it too fails to identify specific facts from which an inference of criminal intent or conspiracy might be drawn. Accordingly, plaintiffs' RICO conspiracy claim is fatally flawed.
For similar reasons, plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails. Section 1983 prohibits only state actors from violating rights guaranteed under federal law. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002-03 (1982). A private actor is liable only when "jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982). The fact that prison officials promoted Clark's photo processing services cannot support an inference that Clark was "jointly engaged" with state officials in violating plaintiffs' rights. See, e.g., Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 1004-05 ("Mere approval of . . . the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to [render the private party a state actor for § 1983 purposes]."). Plaintiffs' opposition likewise provides no grounds for finding Clark to be a state actor, as it simply restates plaintiffs' assertions of conspiracy. (Pls.' Opp. 7-8). Accordingly, plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against Clark fails.
Clark's motion to dismiss (#57 on the docket) is allowed on all claims.