Opinion
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a).
Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding.
Before CANBY, BRUNETTI, and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Mark Edwin Cook ("Cook") appeals the dismissal of his complaint against Washington State Department of Corrections officials ("Defendants") alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Cook, a pro se incarcerated inmate, asserts first that, as a prisoner, he worked for Defendants without being paid the minimum wage required by the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. We have repeatedly held that incarcerated inmates who work for prison-run industries and are required to work as a term of their confinement are not "employees" for purposes of the FLSA and thus are not entitled to the federal minimum wage. See Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir.1993) (en banc); Burleson v. California, 83 F.3d 311, 313 (9th Cir.1996); Morgan v. MacDonald, 41 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir.1994). Thus, the district court did not err in denying Cook's FLSA claim as frivolous.
Cook's second claim is that, by deducting 30 percent of his wages to fund a mandated savings account, a victim compensation account, and to pay for the cost of incarceration, Defendants deprived him of his protected property interest in his wages in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Cook, however, has failed to articulate how he is being deprived of any property interest in violation of due process. Washington State statutes explicitly govern the amount of deductions to be made from inmates' wages and for what purposes these deductions are to be applied. See Wash. Rev.Code § 72.09.111. Even reading his briefs and pleadings liberally because he is a pro se litigant, see Maisano v. Welcher, 940 F.2d 499, 501 n. 2 (9th Cir.1991), Cook simply never states what part of the process he claims is defective. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing this claim as frivolous.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Cook's motion for appointment of counsel in light of the low likelihood of success on the merits and his ability to articulate his claims adequately pro se. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir.1991).
AFFIRMED.