" Baldwin v. Happy Herman's Inc., 122 Ga. App. 520 ( 177 S.E.2d 814). Since the last day for filing the answer and other defensive pleadings expired thirty days after February 22, 1968, and Mrs. Martin filed no pleadings until on and after December 10, 1970, Code Ann. § 3-810, providing for the extension of the limitation period with respect to counterclaims and cross claims until the last day upon which the answer or other defensive pleadings should have been filed, does not operate to extend the period of limitation prescribed by Code Ann. § 3-1004, which is otherwise applicable to cross claims. Cook v. Jackson, 107 Ga. App. 251 (2) ( 129 S.E.2d 553); Robinson v. Bomar, 122 Ga. App. 564 (5) ( 177 S.E.2d 815). Since the cross claim here was not filed within the period prescribed by Code Ann. § 3-1004, as tolled and extended by the order in the declaratory judgment action, the trial court properly struck it. 2.

The cases have uniformly held that if process now required by Code Ann. § 81-201 is issued under such prayer, it is defective and subject to a motion to quash. E.g., Malcom v. Knox, 81 Ga. App. 579 ( 59 S.E.2d 542); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Hollomon, 95 Ga. App. 602 ( 98 S.E.2d 177); McCoy v. Romy Hammes Corp., 99 Ga. App. 513 (1) ( 109 S.E.2d 807); Lee v. Wade, 104 Ga. App. 375 ( 121 S.E.2d 694); Cook v. Jackson, 107 Ga. App. 251 (1) ( 129 S.E.2d 553). See, Leverett, Hall Christopher, Ga. Procedure Practice 33, § 2-15 (1957 and Atkinson's 1963 Supp.). All of these cases state that the defective prayer is subject to amendment, as was done here, or is cured by judgment. Even the complete lack of a prayer for process is amendable. Crown Laundry v. Burch, 205 Ga. 211 (1) ( 53 S.E.2d 116), distinguishing Nicholas v. British Amer. Assur. Co., 109 Ga. 621 ( 34 S.E. 1004) relied on by defendant.