Insofar as the liability of the City of Crowley is concerned, the trial court was correct in holding the City of Crowley free from liability. It is well settled that a municipality is not liable for the acts of third parties who place obstructions in a public way or otherwise cause defects in a sidewalk, unless and only when the City is guilty of negligence by failing within a reasonable time after it has notice, actual or constructive, of the existence of the defective condition, to repair it. Lee v. Baton Rouge, 243 La. 850, 147 So.2d 868 (1963); Cook v. Shreveport, 134 So.2d 582 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1961) (Cert. den. 1962), and cases cited therein.
" The plaintiff-appellant has cited the cases of Long v. American Ry. Express Company, 150 La. 184, 90 So. 563 (1921); Cook v. City of Shreveport, 134 So.2d 582 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1961); Haindel v. Sewerage and Water Board, 115 So.2d 871 (La. App. 4th Cir., 1959). In all of the above cases, some affirmative act of negligence was committed by the defendant governmental body.
"The jurisprudence of this state is well established to the effect that to fulfill his obligation of proving causal connection between damages sustained and defendant's alleged negligence, plaintiff must produce evidence which excludes, with a fair amount of certainty, every other reasonable hypothesis excepting the one relied on by the plaintiff." In Cook v. City of Shreveport, La. App., 134 So.2d 582, the Court held that uncorroborated loss of earnings and uncorroborated medical and drug bills must, upon timely objection, be disallowed. In Champagne v. Hearty, La. App., 76 So.2d 453, the Court held that an uncorroborated medical bill would not, when challenged, support a claim for medical expenses.
Plaintiffs' right to recover must rest upon proof of the existence of defects and dangers arising from the municipality's use of the neutral ground in question, which defects and dangers were known or should have been known to the city. See Louisiana Civil Code Articles 2315, et seq; Waggoner v. City of Minden (La.App., 2 Cir., 1943) 16 So.2d 150; Haindel v. Sewerage Water Board (Orl.App., 1959) 115 So.2d 871; Cook v. City of Shreveport (La.App., 2 Cir., 1961) 134 So.2d 582. We find the testimony to be in irreconcilable conflict.
Youngblood v. Newspaper Production Company, Inc., La. App. 2 Cir., 158 So.2d 432. In any case, a municipality is not liable for damages resulting from a patently dangerous defect in a sidewalk unless it had notice, either actual or constructive, of the existence of the defect and failed within a reasonable time to correct it. St. Paul v. Mackenroth, supra; and Cook v. City of Shreveport, La. App. 2 Cir., 134 So.2d 582. The facts and surrounding circumstances of each individual case control in determining whether, for the purposes of imposition of liability upon a municipality, a sidewalk defect was patently and obviously dangerous and was in the nature of a trap.
"It is well settled in the jurisprudence of this State that an action ex delicto does not lie against a municipality for offenses or quasi offenses committed by its agents or employees while engaged in performance of purely governmental functions." Barnett v. City of Monroe, La. App. (2d Cir.), 124 So.2d 249, 252 and cases cited therein; Cook v. City of Shreveport, La. App. (2d Cir.), 134 So.2d 582; see also the many authorities on this proposition cited in Franks v. City of Alexandria, La.App., 128 So.2d 310, 316. "The appellants recognize the aforesaid as a rule well established in the jurisprudence of this state and concede that where a police officer such as Hendrix, engaging in the performance of the duties as such, commits a tort, the municipality, as his employer, is not liable in damages therefor because of its immunity from such liability." Barnett v. City of Monroe, supra. It is only when this immunity from tort liability is waived by authorization of the Legislature that a municipality may be held liable in tort for negligent acts of its agents or employees. Franks v. City of Alexandria, supra.
Its failure to repair it under these circumstances renders the City negligent and liable to plaintiff for his injuries resulting therefrom. Lee v. City of Baton Rouge et al. [ 243 La. 850], 147 So.2d 868; Cook v. City of Shreveport [La.App.], 134 So.2d 582; White v. City of Alexandria [La.App.], 35 So.2d 810. "The fact that Gorton, in the operation of his business on the abutting property had trucks driving over the sidewalk for over twenty years, his testimony that the damage to it occurred during this period, that his trucks contributed to it, and that he failed to repair or have the City repair the damage so caused, renders Gorton and his insurer liable for the injuries of plaintiff resulting therefrom.
Our courts have, however, recognized the universal exception to this rule that a municipality is liable for negligence in failing to keep its streets and sidewalks in repair. Cook v. City of Shreveport (La.App., 2 Cir., 1961) 134 So.2d 582 (and cases cited therein.) If the defect or dangerous condition is attributable to negligent acts of the municipality or its employees then, of course, the question of whether the city received notice of the dangerous condition is of no importance. Stated another way, it is only in cases where the alleged negligence is the failure of the municipality to remedy a dangerous condition not caused by its own negligent acts that the question of notice of such condition becomes relevant.
However, contributory negligence is an affirmative defense and the defendant must bear the burden of proving it. Cook v. City of Shreveport, La.App., 134 So.2d 582. Under the facts presented, was plaintiff contributorily negligent?
" As authority for the position, counsel cited Cook v. City of Shreveport, La.App., 134 So.2d 582, wherein a municipality was not required to pay court costs in the suit against it for personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff and, in accordance with the above quoted statute, was assessed only with the stenographer's cost. However, the exemptions provided by this statute are not applicable in expropriation proceedings wherein the State or political subdivisions under LSA-R.S. 19:12, providing: