Opinion
CR-2022-0927
05-03-2023
Curtis Jerome COOK v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al.
Curtis Jerome Cook, pro se, appellant. Steve Marshall, att’y gen., and Matthew J. Ward, asst. att’y gen., for appellee.
Appeal from Morgan Circuit Court No. CV-22-18, Charles B. Elliott, J. Curtis Jerome Cook, pro se, appellant.
Steve Marshall, att’y gen., and Matthew J. Ward, asst. att’y gen., for appellee.
ORDER
Curtis Jerome Cook appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Morgan Circuit Court in favor of the Alabama Department of Corrections ("the DOC") and other respondents on Cook’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, Cook challenged his ability to earn correctional incentive good time under former § 14-9-3, Ala. Code 1975, which was repealed in 2015. The circuit court dismissed the petition, and Cook appealed.
It is well settled that this Court must treat an action according to its substance and not its style. See Ex parte Deramus, 882 So. 2d 875 (Ala. 2002). Although styled as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Cook was challenging the DOC’s decision to prohibit him from earning correctional incentive good time. There is no liberty interest in earning good time. See Collins v. Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 982 So. 2d 1078 (Ala 2007). The Alabama Supreme Court has held that a writ of certiorari filed in the Montgomery Circuit Court is the proper means by which an inmate may challenge the DOC’s decision regarding an inmate’s ability to earn good time. Ex parte Boykins, 862 So. 2d 587 (Ala 2002) (holding that a petition for a writ of certiorari is the proper means by which an inmate may challenge the DOC’s decision that an inmate is not entitled to good time). See also Ex parte Woods, 941 So. 2d 259 (Ala. 2006) (holding that a petition for a writ of certiorari is the proper means to challenge the DOC when its actions have resulted in the loss of no liberty interest). Accordingly, the Morgan Circuit Court should not have acted on the petition and should have transferred the petition to the Montgomery Circuit Court.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand this case to the Morgan Circuit Court for that court to set aside its order on Cook’s petition and to transfer the petition to the Montgomery Circuit Court to be treated as a petition for a writ of certiorari. The certificate of judgment shall be issued forthwith.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Windom, P.J., and Kellum, McCool, and Cole, JJ., concur. Minor, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.
MINOR, Judge, concurring in the result.
Curtis Jerome Cook appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Morgan Circuit Court in favor of the Alabama Department of Corrections ("the Department") and other respondents on what Cook styled as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In the petition, Cook challenged the Department’s decision to prohibit him from earning correctional incentive good time. Thus, Cook’s petition sought a writ of certiorari, not habeas corpus. Ex parte Boykins, 862 So. 2d 587, 592 (Ala. 2002). See also Ex parte Deramus, 882 So. 2d 875, 876 (Ala. 2002) ("This Court has stated that it is ‘committed to the proposition that it will treat a motion (or other pleading) and its assigned grounds according to its substance.’ King Mines Resort[, Inc. v. Malachi Min. and Minerals], 518 So. 2d [714] at 718 [(Ala. 1987)]; see also Lockhart v. Phenix City Inv. Co., 488 So. 2d 1353 (Ala. 1986), and Sexton v. Prisock, 495 So. 2d 581 (Ala. 1986). Further, the Court has held that ‘[t]he substance of a motion and not its style determines what kind of motion it is.’ Evans v. Waddell, 689 So. 2d 23, 26 (Ala. 1997)."). Under § 6-3-9, Ala. Code 1975, the proper venue for Cook’s petition is the Montgomery Circuit Court. Thus, Cook filed his petition in the wrong venue. This Court, by order, reverses the Morgan Circuit Court’s judgment and remands the case to that court for it to transfer the petition to the Montgomery Circuit Court.
There is precedent for this Court’s decision. See Edwards v. State, 866 So. 2d 609 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003), and Pinkard v. State, 859 So. 2d 449 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). Nothing is said in those cases, however, about whether the State argued that venue was improper, and, from all that appears in those decisions, this Court sua sponte brought up the issue of venue.
So far as I can determine, Edwards and Pinkard are the only decisions of this Court in which it has sua sponte reversed a judgment based on improper venue under § 6-3-9. Those decisions appear to have treated venue as a jurisdictional requirement, something that later decisions reject. Ex parte Culbreth, 966 So. 2d 910, 912 (Ala. 2006) (Venue "can be waived, and any objection to improper venue is waived if not timely raised."); Ex parte Daniels, 941 So. 2d 251, 259 n.4 (Ala. 2006) ("Our decision in this case should not be construed as interpreting § 6-3-9 to disallow the waiver of a claim of improper venue under that Code section. See Ex parte Tanksley, 418 So. 2d 94 (Ala. 1982) (holding that under the facts of that case the plaintiff’s particular conduct and belated request to transfer the case waived the issue of improper venue). Instead, the facts of this case simply do not demonstrate that the issue of improper venue was waived.").
The Department did not challenge venue in the Morgan Circuit Court and has not challenged it on appeal. Thus, I do not think it necessary for this Court to reverse the judgment and remand the case based on improper venue. Even so, because precedent exists for this Court’s action, I concur in the result.
Given a request to do so or under the appropriate circumstances, this Court should consider the continuing validity of Edwards and Pinkard.