( Buduson v. Curtis, supra; Joseph v. McVeigh, 285 App. Div. 386, 391; Boffe v. Consolidated Tel. Elec. Subway Co., 171 App. Div. 392, affd. 226 N.Y. 654; Conway v. City of New York, 148 App. Div. 915, affd. 208 N.Y. 567; Crapo v. City of Syracuse, 183 N.Y. 395; Barnes v. City of Brooklyn, 22 App. Div. 520; see, also, Mulligan v. City of New York, 273 App. Div. 152; Matter of Mulligan v. County of Westchester, 272 App. Div. 927.)
(Barnes v. City of Brooklyn, 22 App.Div. 520; Crapo v. City of Syracuse, 183 N.Y. 395; Conway v. City of New York, 139 App.Div. 446, affd. 208 N.Y. 567; Boffe v. Consolidated Tel.s&sElec. Subway Co., 171 App.Div. 392, affd. 226 N.Y. 654.) The determination of this appeal depends entirely upon whether or not the Legislature by its enactment of section 50-e so changed the rule enunciated in the above-cited cases as to require that the time period for filing a notice of claim as a condition precedent to an action for wrongful death should thereafter be computed from the date of death.
(See, e.g., Crapo v. City of Syracuse, 183 N.Y. 395; Conway v. City of New York, 139 App.Div. 446, affd. 208 N.Y. 567; Bernreither v. City of New York, 123 App.Div. 291, affd. 196 N.Y. 506, and Barnes v. City of Brooklyn, 22 App.Div. 520, 521.) In these cases, it is true, the statutes generally required that the notice of claim against the municipality be filed within fixed period 'after such cause of action shall have accrued', and that the notice should also contain a statement of intention to sue, which is no longer a requirement (see General Municipal Law, § 50-e, subd. 4).
It is urged, however, that section 6, in terms, merely afforded a remedy for injuries to person or property, and therefore was never intended to embrace a claim for wrongful death. The difficulty with that contention is, that it ignores the construction placed by the Court of Appeals, in at least three decisions, upon a statute in all respects sui generis, namely — ( Titman v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 125 N.Y. 729, unanimously affirming 57 Hun 469, on the opinion of JUSTICE WILLARD BARTLETT; Crapo v. City of Syracuse, 183 N.Y. 395, and Conway v. City of New York, 208 N.Y. 567, unanimously affirming 148 App. Div. 915, on the opinion of Justice CLARKE on the first appeal in the action, 139 App. Div. 446). All three cases distinctly held that a statute imposing liability on certain municipalities for damages to person or property caused by the negligence of the city, embraced an action for wrongful death. The ruling of the Court of Appeals, above cited, is fortified by the construction placed by the Bench and Bar of this State for more than half a century upon another sui generis statute, chapter 700 of the Laws of 1881, which imposed liability on towns for the neglect of commissioners of highways in the care of town roads.