Opinion
01-27-2016
Allison CONWAY, appellant, v. ELITE TOWING & FLATBEDDING CORP., et al., respondents.
Gash & Associates, P.C., White Plains, N.Y. (Gary Mitchel Gash and Brian J. Isaac of counsel), for appellant. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Glen S. Feinberg and Laura E. Dolan of counsel), for respondents.
Gash & Associates, P.C., White Plains, N.Y. (Gary Mitchel Gash and Brian J. Isaac of counsel), for appellant.
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Glen S. Feinberg and Laura E. Dolan of counsel), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lefkowitz, J.), dated December 24, 2014, as denied that branch of her motion which was to compel the defendants to provide further disclosure of the anticipated testimonies of their expert witnesses.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to compel the defendants to provide further disclosure regarding the anticipated testimonies of their expert witnesses (see Foley v. American Ind. Paper Mills Supply Co., 222 A.D.2d 401, 402, 635 N.Y.S.2d 515 ; Nedell v. St. George's Golf & Country Club, 203 A.D.2d 121, 612 N.Y.S.2d 842 ). The defendants' expert disclosure statements sufficiently disclosed in reasonable detail the subject matter and the substance of the facts and opinions on which the experts were expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for their opinions (see CPLR 3101[d][1][i] ; Mary Imogene Bassett Hosp. v. Cannon Design, Inc., 97 A.D.3d 1030, 1032, 949 N.Y.S.2d 229 ; Cocca v. Conway, 283 A.D.2d 787, 788, 725 N.Y.S.2d 125 ; see also Hoberg v. Shree Granesh, LLC, 85 A.D.3d 965, 926 N.Y.S.2d 578 ; Gagliardotto v. Huntington Hosp., 25 A.D.3d 758, 759, 808 N.Y.S.2d 430 ). Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, there is no requirement that the expert set forth the specific facts and opinions upon which he or she is expected to testify, but rather only the substance of those facts and opinions (see Mary Imogene Bassett Hosp. v. Cannon Design, Inc., 97 A.D.3d at 1032, 949 N.Y.S.2d 229 ; Barrowman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 252 A.D.2d 946, 946–947, 675 N.Y.S.2d 734 ; Foley v. American Ind. Paper Mills Supply Co., 222 A.D.2d at 402, 635 N.Y.S.2d 515 ; Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 176 A.D.2d 700, 701, 574 N.Y.S.2d 790 ; Renucci v. Mercy Hosp., 124 A.D.2d 796, 797, 508 N.Y.S.2d 518 ).
BALKIN, J.P., CHAMBERS, COHEN and HINDS–RADIX, JJ., concur.