Opinion
23-3047
12-09-2024
CARMITA JESIBEL RIVAS-DE CONTRERAS, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted December 5, 2024[**] Pasadena, California.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A208-173-859.
Before: BYBEE, IKUTA, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Carmita Jesibel Rivas-De Contreras petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal of an immigration judge's (IJ) denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the agency's factual findings for substantial evidence, and we review legal questions de novo. Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020).
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency's conclusion that the gang's conduct directed toward Rivas-De Contreras and her sons was not on account of her membership in a particular social group-even assuming her particular social group was cognizable-but rather, that the gang was motivated by financial gain and criminal activity. Rivas-De Contreras testified that the gang demanded money from her and that they wanted her sons to join the gang. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) ("An alien's desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground."); cf. Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that resistance to a gang's recruitment efforts, by itself, does not constitute a political opinion for purposes of establishing a protected ground), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). She does not point to any record evidence that would compel a conclusion contrary to the agency's finding that she cited "no evidence that the gang members were motivated by an underlying animus against [her] family." The BIA properly concluded that the lack of a nexus to a protected ground is fatal to Rivas-De Contreras's claims for asylum and statutory withholding of removal. See Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357-60 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining the motive standard applicable to asylum and withholding of removal).
Because the BIA's decision is based on the nexus determination, we do not consider Rivas-De Contreras's other arguments. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) ("As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.").
2. Substantial evidence supports the agency's denial of Rivas-De Contreras's application for CAT relief. To receive CAT protection, Rivas-De Contreras must establish that "it is more likely than not that . . . she would be tortured if removed." 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a). "Evidence of past torture is relevant (though not alone sufficient) in assessing a particular petitioner's likelihood of future torture." Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2022). In denying CAT relief, the agency found no evidence of past torture, and the record does not compel the conclusion that Rivas-De Contreras was "tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official in [El Salvador]." Park v. Garland, 72 F.4th 965, 980 (9th Cir. 2023).
Although the country conditions evidence that Rivas-De Contreras cites demonstrates gang activity and government corruption in El Salvador, the record does not show that Rivas-De Contreras faces a particularized risk of future torture. See Lopez v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2018). The record does not compel us to conclude that Rivas-De Contreras is more likely than not to be tortured if removed to El Salvador.
PETITION DENIED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).