Opinion
A156972
12-30-2019
In re Ju. H., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. CONTRA COSTA CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M.H., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super Ct. Nos. J150164, J1501065)
Appellant M.H. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights regarding two of her children, Ju. H. and D.H., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother argues the juvenile court erred in finding her parental relationship with them was not so beneficial as to except them from termination of mother's parental rights under section 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B). We conclude the court did not err and affirm.
Three of mother's four children have first names that begin with the letter "J." To protect their privacy, we shall refer to them only by the first two letters of their first names and their last initials, i.e., Ju. H., Jo. H., and Je. H.
All references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise noted.
BACKGROUND
I.
The Initial Proceedings
In October 2015, respondent Contra Costa County Bureau of Children and Family Services (Bureau) filed a section 300 petition in Contra Costa County Superior Court on behalf of mother's four children, 16-year-old Jo. H. and 10-year-old Je. H., who are not subjects of this appeal, and the two subjects of this appeal, eight-year-old Ju. H. and five-year-old D.H. The Bureau asserted multiple allegations regarding mother and the children's presumed father under section 300, subdivision (b).
Father is not a party to this appeal. We discuss his circumstances and case only to the extent they are relevant to our resolution of mother's appeal.
In its jurisdictional report, the Bureau indicated mother and her four children lived together in a house in Antioch, California. There had been previous referrals to the Bureau regarding mother, who had a history of mental illness, and her children. Most recently, the Bureau had received a report that mother was emotionally abusing Je. H., who had reportedly stolen things from school (her fifth school in six years), was socially isolating herself, hoarding food and other items in her backpack, and was wearing a jacket all the time, causing concern that she might be cutting herself.
The Bureau requested that the Antioch Police Department conduct a health and safety check of mother's home. Police subsequently informed the Bureau that they were detaining the children. The Bureau investigated and found that mother and the children were living in unsafe and unsanitary conditions. Floor areas in the living room, master bedroom, master bathroom and kitchen of the home, as well as the stairs leading up to the second floor of the home, were covered in what appeared to be "smeared, ingrained dry animal waste." The social worker observed Ju. H. and D.H. sitting on this smeared animal waste in the living room and saw D.H. touch it and then put his fingers in his mouth and nose. The exposed parts of Ju. H.'s, Je. H.'s and D.H.'s bodies appeared stained with dark coloring resembling dirt. The sink basin of the master bathroom had animal waste on it and the bathroom toilet was filled to the top with urine and human waste. The social worker witnessed mother yell at Je. H. and D.H. that the Bureau's intervention was their fault because they did not clean up after themselves.
Je. H., Ju. H. and D.H. were removed from the home and placed in foster care. Jo. H. ran away before he could be detained. In the course of their removal, Je. H. was heard telling D.H., "[D]on't worry, this is just like when mom left us alone for a week to look for work but this time someone will take care of us." Both Ju. H. and Je. H. told the Bureau that mother sometimes left them alone in a hotel room for one or two days. Ju. H. said her mother usually just yelled at her when she got in trouble. D.H. had a speech delay, was highly distracted and appeared unable to focus when interviewed.
At a November 2015 jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court sustained amended allegations by the Bureau that mother allowed the children to live in unsafe and unsanitary conditions and that her mental health issues had "from time to time" placed the children at serious risk of physical and emotional harm. The court admonished the parents not to discuss the case with the children, among other things.
In its disposition report, the Bureau wrote that mother and father married in 2002. They were no longer together, and mother had a restraining order against father. The family had a significant history with the Bureau, which had received one or more referrals about the family in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. Many of these involved the unsanitary condition of mother's home, the neglect and emotional abuse of the children and/or issues regarding mother's mental health. One referral led to a case in which there was a successful reunification.
The Bureau reported that the children had a loving relationship with, and seemed to be bonded to, mother, and their visits with her were positive. Mother maintained contact with the Bureau but insisted the referral regarding Je. H. was "unjust" and denied emotionally abusing her.
In a December 2015 inspection, the Bureau found some improvement in the condition of mother's home, and mother acknowledged the need for more cleaning. She said the state of the home was an ongoing problem because she had physical problems that prevented her from cleaning. Indeed, she had been diagnosed with a medical condition that impaired her ability to bend at the waist, walk and stand continuously and manipulate items above a certain weight. Mother was of the view that her "one true need" was assistance in maintaining the home due to her physical disability.
The Bureau, unable to find one foster home for all detained three children, placed Je. H. and Ju. H. in one home and D.H. in another. Mother's oldest child, Jo. H., remained at large and a juvenile warrant had been issued for him. Mother admitted being in phone contact with him. She also said she happened to see him in the community and was giving him money, and that he feared being abused in foster care. Jo. H., who previously had attended home school, was not enrolled in any school in the school district.
At the March 2016 disposition hearing, the court ordered that Je. H., Ju. H. and D.H. be removed from the parents' physical custody. The court ordered reunification services and a case plan for mother, which included that she successfully complete an intensive co-parenting course and demonstrate learned insight and skills; stay free from illegal drugs and engage in random drug testing; demonstrate the ability to maintain a clean, healthy and safe home; complete individual psychological counseling and a mental health assessment; complete regularly scheduled visitations; and establish a positive parental relationship with the children.
II.
Events During the Reunification Services Period
Initially, mother's progress in her case plan was slow. The Bureau reported that it took her approximately one year to engage in her case plan objectives. It also criticized her judgment in interacting with her children. It further reported that mother violated court orders. When Jo. H. was at large, the court prohibited her from allowing him to be present on visits, then unsupervised, involving Ju. H. and D.H. D.H. subsequently disclosed that Jo. H. had babysat him while his mother went out to play bingo. Mother also violated the court's order that she not discuss the case with the children. When confronted about some of her actions, mother insulted the social worker and accused the court and the Bureau of keeping her children from her. The Bureau also reported that she was unable to accept responsibility for her present family circumstances, instead blaming, among others, the foster homes, social worker and lawyer who were attempting to normalize her children's lives.
Mother's relationships with her children were positive, though not without problems. In January 2017, the Bureau reported that mother had not always parented in a thoughtful manner and had missed three therapeutic family therapy sessions with D.H. Nonetheless, the children "definitely ha[d] a bond" with mother, were having positive visits with her and indicated they wanted to return to her home. Because of these bonds and some positive changes mother had made in her life, the Bureau recommended, and the court ordered, further reunification services for her (but not for father). Jo. H. had returned to mother's home, and the court ordered a family maintenance plan for him.
Ju. H. was developmentally on track and attending school regularly. She needed some guidance about appropriate social behaviors and about bathing herself, had acted out in an after-school program, and seemed "reflective" about the reasons why the children were out of the home. The foster parent or the Bureau were addressing these issues.
D.H. had received significant dental work and his speech delay was being assessed by his school. He was slightly behind academically. He had transitioned "well" into his foster home. He was upset after contact with his mother, but was able to " 'bounce back.' "
III.
Termination of Mother's Reunification Services
The court terminated mother's reunification services in June 2017 after 18 months of services had been provided. Although no evidence was presented at the 18-month status review hearing, the Bureau filed two reports with the court in preparation for the hearing.
In its first report, prepared in March 2017, the Bureau wrote that both Ju. H. and D.H. were developmentally on track. Ju. H. was doing well in school and D.H. was receiving weekly speech therapy. He had had "a very rough time adjusting to being placed out of the home away from his mother," but had improved. He had acted out in school, but was no longer displaying behavioral issues at school and was with a foster family that was happy to have him in their home.
The Bureau also reported positively about mother. It wrote that she had "made the necessary effort" for family reunification to be ordered, and it recommended she be offered family maintenance services. Mother had "completed almost all of her Case Plan," was learning in weekly family therapy sessions how to better communicate with the children and had done well with them in overnight visits. She had made an effort to change some of her problematic behaviors, had gained insight into what the children needed and had changed her priorities towards her children for the better. She had made the progress hoped for, although it had taken her longer to engage in her case plan than desired. The Bureau was not concerned that she might be using or abusing illegal substances and recommended that random drug testing be discontinued.
Mother's home was "found to be clean yet slightly cluttered." She was receiving disability and was unable to perform physical labor, but she had recently had the children clean the house before they returned to their foster care placements. Mother was confident that with the help of continued family therapy she could gradually guide the children into acclimating to the changes and to her new expectations for them. She also had made it "abundantly clear" to all of her children that school was essential to their future, lived two blocks from schools for Je. H., Ju. H. and D.H., and had gotten Jo. H. in school.
However, the Bureau reversed itself in May 2017, when it filed a memorandum with the court recommending termination of mother's reunification services and the scheduling of a section 366.26 hearing for Ju. H. and D.H. This change was prompted by events that occurred in April 2017. Early that month, D.H.'s caregivers reported that mother had taken D.H., Ju. H. and Je. H. to spend a night at mother's new boyfriend's home in Sacramento. They further reported that D.H. said he had seen a gun on a dresser in the boyfriend's bedroom and had asked mother about it. She had told him, "just don't touch the red button." The Bureau's social worker had not been informed about this overnight visit.
The Bureau's recommendations applied to Je. H. also. However, Je. H. subsequently engaged in problematic behaviors that required special attention. Her case was not a part of the subject section 366.26 hearing and it is not a part of this appeal. We only discuss her case as it is relevant to the resolution of this appeal.
The Bureau's social worker confronted mother about this incident. Mother responded, "I can lay up in anyone's bed that I want to, I layed up with their father in his bed so what is the difference." The social worker told mother the visit was inappropriate, including because the Bureau lacked information about the boyfriend, and asked mother about the gun. Mother said it was just a BB gun; when the social worker responded that D.H. should not have access to any gun, mother became verbally abusive and hung up. When the social worker later called mother to say that the Bureau needed to do a background check on her boyfriend before allowing another overnight visit, mother became angry and hung up again.
Mother also violated the Bureau's instructions that she not go to the boyfriend's home with the children until the Bureau completed a background check of him. The worker learned that mother took Ju. H. and again stayed at the boyfriend's home, and then lied to the social worker about doing so. The Bureau's background check showed the boyfriend had been convicted five times for having a concealed weapon, three of which were felony convictions.
The Bureau also reported that Je. H. was engaging in a pattern of problematic behaviors at school and had been suspended many times in the recent past. Mother had not been supportive or encouraging of Je. H., opining only that her acting out was because she needed to be home with mother.
The Bureau added in this second report that mother had never taken responsibility for the allegations involving her children, instead having "blamed her husband, her children, the Bureau, the Courts, the teachers in each prospective child's schools, and this worker. The inability to make the necessary changes to give her children a safe, clean, loving environment in which to grow has still escaped [mother]." Furthermore, "[t]he children have been expected to lie for their mother so that she 'covers herself['] in any wrongdoing."
At the 18-month status review hearing, the court adopted the Bureau's recommendation to terminate mother's family reunification services. The court thought it was clear that "mother [loved] her children very dearly." However, the family had a lengthy child welfare history, and mother was "not able to comport herself in a constructive, healthy, way when navigating . . . conflict with other people, including her children . . . and . . . the children had been present and subjected to way too much of it." The court thought the children's behavioral issues and struggles were a direct result of mother's inability to comport herself in a healthy and constructive manner and, although the children loved mother very much, the court did not think they could be safely returned to her care. It ordered termination of services, set a section 366.26 hearing for October 4, 2017, and ordered supervised visitations between mother and the children for a minimum of one hour twice a month.
IV.
Termination of Mother's Parental Rights
For the section 366.26 hearing scheduled for October 4, 2017, the Bureau reported that D.H.'s current foster caregivers, a married couple living in Brentwood, California with two daughters ages twelve and nine, loved D.H. and were very committed to him. During his year with them, he had made "great strides in many areas of his life," had decreased his tantrums and destructive behavior, looked happy and relaxed in the placement and was doing very well in school. Ju. H. was also placed with these caregivers, who offered her a placement in July 2017 after her previous caregiver had recommended she be moved because Je. H. was engaging in problematic behaviors. Ju. H. was having a hard time during some of her monthly visits with mother, who would make negative comments and was "very vocal" in telling the children she was not at fault for their circumstances. Ju. H. was "fiercely loyal" to mother and expressed sentiments similar to her mother's, such as, " 'This is not my mother's fault' " and " 'my mom said she has done everything but we still can't go home.' "
The foster caregivers were interested in adopting D.H. and in adopting Ju. H. if she was agreeable to it. The Bureau requested a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing, so it could evaluate the most appropriate permanent plan for Ju. H. and D.H.
The court continued the section 366.26 hearing multiple times, and the Bureau recommended adoption as the permanent plan. During this interim period, mother again demonstrated her willingness to violate court orders. The court ordered that she not discuss the case during visits and prohibited electronic or telephone contact between the parents and children. However, the Bureau informed the court that mother continued during visits to encourage the children to think they would be coming home, causing them confusion, and that mother for a time had communicated by phone with Je. H. (as did father, who also threatened Je. H., causing her distress) before telling Je. H. these communications had to stop.
Also during this interim period, mother filed a section 388 petition, alleging that she merited additional reunification services because of a change in circumstances. Among other things, she alleged without presenting any evidence that her boyfriend did not have a criminal record, that she had started an outpatient drug treatment program and that Je. H.'s problematic behaviors were because she was losing her family. The Bureau opposed the petition, repeating that the boyfriend had a criminal record and contended that Je. H.'s most recent behaviors occurred around the time she disclosed that her father had been sexually assaulting her since she was six years old. At a hearing which mother did not attend, the court found there were no changes in circumstances that warranted an evidentiary hearing on mother's section 388 petition and denied it.
The evidence indicates that over the approximately one year of continuances, Ju. H. and D.H. continued to improve in their behaviors, became increasingly connected to their foster parents and ultimately favored being adopted. In an October 2018 addendum report, the Bureau indicated that Ju. H. and D.H. "continue to do well in their concurrent placement. Their caregivers are well-equipped to meet the children's need for a stable home and are committed to adopting both children." Both children were attending weekly therapy sessions and "Ju. H.'s therapist spoke very positively about Ju. H.'s outlook and perception of her personal situation with the foster parents. Ju. H. does have worries about her Mom but she understands that the proposed permanent plan is adoption . . . ." D.H.'s therapist reported that D.H. referred to his caregivers as "Mom and Dad," was able to focus on matters during the sessions and seemed "to be a happy little boy" with "a good outlook on his life so far." The Bureau stated, "Over the past two years, [D.H.] has shown tremendous growth academically and behaviorally under the consistent care of these caregivers. . . . Both children have thrived since being place in this home and have been offered many opportunities to engage in activities such as sports, music lessons and camps."
As for the children's visits with mother, the Bureau reported there had been difficulty reaching mother to begin arranging visits, although this problem was eventually resolved. She had attempted to have regular supervised visits, but cancelled one each in August, September and October 2018. The quality of the visits was "inconsistent with a loving reunion. [Mother] remains seated on the sofa . . . and is not observed to attempt any physical interaction, loving embrace, or hugs with the children." She was "unresponsive to attempts by the children to have physical contact [and] does not reciprocate i.e. hugs or loving embraces." Mother also was "verbally critical of the children and the foster parents regarding what goes on in their placement." The Bureau stated that during the case parents had "not always been consistent or continued visitation."
The Bureau also opined that the children's relationship with their parents did not outweigh the benefits of adoption. It observed that the children had not been in their parents' care for over three years and thought the parents had "not occupied a parental role in the children's lives for a significant period of time." The family had a lengthy history with the Bureau and had "not been able to mitigate the issues that caused the children to be removed." On the other hand, the children needed and deserved permanency.
The court held the section 366.26 hearing on the January 16, 2019. Mother was not present. Through her counsel, she objected to termination of her parental rights regarding Ju. H. and D.H. but did not offer any evidence.
Counsel for both children recommended termination of mother's parental rights. D.H.'s counsel stated that, although D.H. "wavers a bit," she thought it was in his best interest to terminate parental rights and move towards adoption. Ju. H.'s counsel indicated Ju. H. also "has wavered back and forth," but that she was "ready to move forward." She was connected to her biological family and did not want to hurt her mother's feelings, but indicated to her counsel that she wanted to be adopted on a different day than D.H. because it would be like a second birthday. Her counsel thought this sentiment suggested Ju. H. was ready to embrace adoption. Counsel also thought Ju. H.'s foster family was taking "excellent care" of her and had a home that was suitable for both children.
The Bureau's social worker reported Ju. H. had told her therapist the day before the hearing that "she would not oppose adoption" and had told the social worker "she's fine with it." D.H. had told the social worker he wanted to be with his foster "mom and dad" and was happy with them.
The court terminated mother's (and father's) parental rights regarding Ju. H. and D.H. Before doing so, it addressed the parental beneficial relationship exception because of the strength of the connections mother had with Ju. H. and D.H. The court acknowledged the love and connection between mother and the children. However, it thought that with adoption as the permanent plan, the children would "have an opportunity to get this lack of stability behind them and to be able to let go and move forward in a safe, loving, warm environment." Furthermore, while the children cared deeply about her, they had been out of mother's care for years and she no longer played a parental role with them. D.H. referred to his caregivers as "mom and dad," and Ju. H. needed stability and structure, which mother was never able to give her in a home "where there was a good deal of neglect and a lot of upheaval." These benefits outweighed the "downside of terminating the relationship with the mom."
The court also addressed the sibling relationship exception, which mother does not raise in this appeal.
Mother filed a timely appeal from the court's order terminating her parental rights regarding Ju. H. and D.H.
DISCUSSION
Mother's sole contention is that the juvenile court erred by not applying the parental beneficial relationship exception to the termination of her parental rights regarding both Ju. H. and D.H. We disagree.
If the juvenile court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely a child will be adopted, as the court did here regarding Ju. H. and D.H., it must terminate a parent's parental rights and order the child placed for adoption unless it determines that a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) One such exception is when the court "finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child" because a parent has "maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) A parent seeking to avoid the termination of parental rights bears the burden of proving this exception applies. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.)
The child's benefit from continuing the parent-child relationship means " 'the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.' (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) The juvenile court 'balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.' (Ibid.) 'If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated.' (Ibid.)
" 'The exception must be examined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child bond. The age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the "positive" or "negative" effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.' ([In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th] at pp. 575-576.)" (In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 124.)
"Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. The significant attachment from child to parent results from the adult's attention to the child's needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. [Citation.] The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. [Citation.] The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
Many appellate courts have reviewed juvenile courts' rulings on the parental beneficial relationship exception for substantial evidence. (See, e.g., In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) Recently, however, courts have divided over which of three similar standards to apply. As our colleagues in Division One of this district recently noted, "[I]n our own First District, we have variously found a juvenile court's decision in this regard reviewable for abuse of discretion (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351), for substantial evidence ([In re] G.B. [(2014)] 227 Cal.App.4th [1147,] 1166), and, most recently, by a combination of the two. (In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68, 76 [applying substantial evidence standard to 'the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship'; applying abuse of discretion standard to whether that relationship provides 'a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child'].)" (In re Caden C. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 87, 106, review granted July 24, 2019, S255839.) Division One decided to apply the standard that was a hybrid of the substantial abuse and abuse of discretion standards. (Ibid.)
We shall apply this hybrid approach. We agree that our task involves the review of " 'a "quintessentially" discretionary decision, which calls for the juvenile court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the child of adoption.' [Citations.] Intrinsic to a balancing of these interests is the exercise of the court's discretion, properly reviewable for abuse." (In re Caden C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 106.) We note, however, that our decision would be the same under any of the standards of review that courts have applied.
We conclude that mother has not established that her parental relationships with Ju. H. and D.H. were so significant and positive that they outweighed the benefits the children would receive from adoption under the circumstances of this case. Regarding the first prong of this exception—regular visitations—the record indicates mother had regular visitations with the children for most of the approximately three-year duration of the case. Toward the end of the case in 2018, the Bureau reported difficulty contacting mother to arrange supervised visits and that, even after contact was made, mother missed one visit each for three months in a row, August, September and October 2018. The fact that mother had become less regular in her visitations with the children for three months after her services were terminated is not, in our view, dispositive.
However, as for the second prong—whether the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents—there is substantial evidence that as of the section 366.26 hearing, mother's relationships with Ju. H. and D.H. were neither very positive nor parental. Mother at times acted negligently towards the children during visitations throughout the three years of the case. This includes when she allowed Jo. H. to babysit D.H. in violation of visit rules so that she could play bingo; took the children on overnight visits with a new boyfriend who kept a gun out in his home and had multiple criminal convictions; continued to talk with the children about the case during visits in violation of the court's order; was during her visits in 2018 "unresponsive" to the children's attempts to have physical contact, such as hugs or embraces; and was "verbally critical of the children and the foster parents regarding what goes on in their placement." It also includes her misleading statements to the children that she would be taking them home, which caused them confusion and distress.
The Bureau also indicated that mother continued to display a lack of insight and at times engaged in the kind of problematic conduct that led in significant part to the initiation of the dependency case. The Bureau reported that mother never fully took responsibility for her problematic conduct, denied that she had been emotionally abusive towards Je. H. (which was the basis for the initial referral) and quickly turned angry and insulting towards the Bureau's social worker when challenged, such as about her cavalierly taking the children to stay overnight at her new boyfriend's home. This evidence, coupled with mother's history of referrals and already having been in and out of the dependency system, supports the reasonable inference that her relationships with her children would continue to be fraught and that she would continue to expose the children to instability in their young lives.
For all of these reasons and because, by the time of the section 366.26 hearing in January 2019, the children had been removed from mother's custody for more than three years, during which time a significant number of her visits with them were supervised, the court could reasonably conclude that she had not acted consistently in a parental role with the children for some time.
There was also substantial evidence that Ju. H.'s and D.H.'s removal from mother's care and placement with their foster care givers was a very positive development. The children's emotional health and school performances had improved significantly, and they were happy in the care of foster care givers who had provided them with a safe, stable and loving home and appropriate parental guidance. For example, the Bureau reported in November 2018, "Over the past two years, [D.H.] has shown tremendous growth academically and behaviorally under the consistent care of these caregivers. . . . Both children have thrived since being placed in this home and have been offered many opportunities to engage in activities such as sports, music lessons and camps." Terminating mother's parental rights would free Ju. H. and D.H. to be adopted into a permanently stable and loving home, since by all indications they were going to be promptly adopted by their foster care givers. D.H., who had lived with the family for over two years, already called his caregivers "mom and dad" and both he and Ju. H. indicated a willingness to be adopted.
The present circumstances are similar to those found in In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183 (L.S.). There, two children, ages six and eight, already the subjects of section 300 petitions, were removed from their parents' custody because of safety concerns about the family's homelessness. (L.S., at p. 1188.) The children disclosed that their parents had told them to lie about where they had been staying, and it was also discovered that the parents had relapsed in their use of methamphetamine. (Id. at pp. 1188-1189.) The parents' subsequent visits with the children were problematic because, although the parents acted appropriately in many visits, in some they were "highly emotional and . . . would complain and argue in front of the minors" and "had an ongoing problem with talking about the case or other adult matters at visits." (Id. at p. 1189.) This caused the children to have "difficulty after visits, being more emotional and less cooperative." (Ibid.)
The juvenile court denied reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing. Evidence was presented at the hearing that mother had regained her sobriety, was engaging in substance abuse programs, was attending all visits, and was acting appropriately at the beginning and end of these visits. (L.S., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 1191.) The children consistently said they wanted to go home, but also were well-connected to their placement. (Ibid.) The court found mother had a "significant" bond with one of the children and the children had a strong bond between them that would require the same result for them both. (Id. at p. 1192.) Nevertheless, the court concluded that mother's bond did not outweigh the children's need for permanence and stability and terminated parental rights. (Ibid.)
The appellate court rejected the parents' contention that the juvenile court should have applied the parental beneficial relationship exception. It concluded that the bond between mother and her children "did not constitute a substantial positive emotional attachment," including because the mother lacked insight into age-appropriate communication with her children about such matters as the dependency case and, "[w]hile visits had many positive aspects, there were also negatives." (L.S., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200.) These negatives included the children's behavioral problems after the visits and the parents' conduct during the visits, including their inconsistent handling of the children's outbursts, their talking about the case and other adult matters in front of the children and their poor judgment. (Ibid.) The court concluded, "To avoid termination of parental rights, it is not enough to show that a parent-child bond exists. The quality of the bond must also favor continued contact. Here, the overall relationship between the parents and the minors did not show a positive emotional attachment and was marked by parental indifference to the minors' core needs for structure and stability. As a result, the benefit of continued contact did not outweigh the minors' needs for permanence and stability. The court did not err in finding the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply." (Ibid.)
Here, as in L.S., the bonds between mother and Ju. H. and D.H. were undoubtedly significant. Nonetheless, as did the L.S. court, the court here could reasonably conclude from the evidence that mother's relationships with the children were problematic and in some respects interfered with their development and needs for the reasons we have discussed, even after more than 18 months of reunification services and the passage of three years since the children's removal from mother's home. Furthermore, mother was not acting parentally towards the children. Terminating mother's parental rights would very likely lead to the children being adopted in a home in which they were happy and that was loving, stable and well-suited to their needs.
Mother attempts to distinguish L.S. by noting that the children there were about two years younger than Ju. H. and D.H. at the time of their section 366.26 hearing and that their parents were not allowed reunification services, suggesting these differences indicated a less significant time for the parents and their children to bond. We disagree. These differences do not establish the parents in that case were less bonded to their children, especially when we consider that in the present case the family's history was littered with referrals to the Bureau and a previous removal of the children from the home.
Mother also cites In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68 and In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, in which appellate courts reversed juvenile court determinations that the parental beneficial relationship exception did not apply. However, these cases involved much more consistently positive parental relationships than those in the present case. None of the circumstances discussed in those cases included a parent who at times acted negligently towards her children during visitations, repeatedly defied orders and instructions about these visitations to the children's detriment, missed multiple visits in the months preceding the section 366.26 hearings and treated the children coldly during the visits she did attend during that time, and who had as extensive a history with a child services agency as mother had here. For these reasons, the cases mother cites are easily distinguishable.
In short, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the parental beneficial relationship exception did not apply here.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's rulings appealed from are affirmed.
/s/_________
STEWART, J. We concur. /s/_________
RICHMAN, Acting P.J. /s/_________
MILLER, J.