Opinion
No. 3D19-1473
03-18-2020
CONTINENTAL MOTORS, INC., Appellant, v. William LOSNER and Doylene Losner, Appellees.
Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner, and Douglas E. Winter (Washington, DC); Wicker Smith O'Hara McCoy & Ford, P.A., and Alyssa M. Reiter (Fort Lauderdale); Skinner Law Group, and Laurie A. Salita (Malvern, PA) and Will S. Skinner (Woodland Hills, CA), for appellant. The Ferraro Law Firm, P.A., and Leslie B. Rothenberg, Mathew D. Gutierrez and James L. Ferraro, Jr., for appellees.
Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner, and Douglas E. Winter (Washington, DC); Wicker Smith O'Hara McCoy & Ford, P.A., and Alyssa M. Reiter (Fort Lauderdale); Skinner Law Group, and Laurie A. Salita (Malvern, PA) and Will S. Skinner (Woodland Hills, CA), for appellant.
The Ferraro Law Firm, P.A., and Leslie B. Rothenberg, Mathew D. Gutierrez and James L. Ferraro, Jr., for appellees.
Before EMAS, C.J., and SCALES and GORDO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Banco de los Trabajadores v. Cortez Moreno, 237 So. 3d 1127, 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (explaining: "A Florida court may exercise ‘specific’ jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in those cases in which it is alleged that the nonresident defendant commits any of the specific acts enumerated in [section 48.193(1)(a)1.-9., Florida Statutes], so long as the cause of action arises from that enumerated act committed in Florida"); Rudel v. Rudel, 111 So. 3d 285, 289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (acknowledging that a trial court's determination of jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo; however, to the extent such a determination is based on findings of fact, those findings are reviewed under a standard of competent, substantial evidence) (citing Machtinger v. Inertial Airline Servs., Inc., 937 So. 2d 730, 734-35 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) ); § 48.193(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2018) (providing that a person, whether or not a citizen or resident of Florida, submits himself or herself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Florida for any cause of action arising from his or her act of "[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state"); § 48.193(1)(a)6.a.-b., Fla. Stat. (2018) (providing that a person, whether or not a citizen or resident of Florida, submits himself or herself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Florida for any cause of action arising from his or her act of "[c]ausing injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an act or omission by the defendant outside this state, if, at or about the time of the injury, either: a. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state; or b. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use"). See also Highland Stucco and Lime Prods., Inc. v. Onorato, 259 So. 3d 944, 950 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (observing: "The constitutional prong of the analysis requires the trial court to consider whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the state so that the exercise of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Venetian Salami [Co. v. Parthenais], 554 So. 2d 499 at 502 (Fla. 1989) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945) ). In this connection, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant's contacts with the forum state are: (1) related to the cause of action or gave rise to it; (2) involve some act by which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business within the forum; and (3) the defendant's act is such that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in that forum state"); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir 2013) (holding: "In specific personal jurisdiction cases, we apply the three-part due process test, which examines: (1) whether the plaintiff's claims ‘arise out of or relate to’ at least one of the defendant's contacts with the forum; (2) whether the nonresident defendant ‘purposefully availed’ himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefit of the forum state's laws; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the first two prongs, and if the plaintiff does so, ‘a defendant must make a ‘compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the first two prongs, and if the plaintiff does so, ‘a defendant must make a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ") (internal citations omitted.)