Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Symons

16 Citing cases

  1. Weintraut v. Comm'r

    T.C. Memo. 2016-142 (U.S.T.C. Jul. 27, 2016)   Cited 1 times

    We further conclude in the alternative that, in making that determination, the Indiana Supreme Court would use the same type of analysis that the Court of Appeals used in Boyer, 587 F.3d at 793, with respect to the Indiana UFTA. That is to say, the Indiana Supreme Court would use the equitable "'flexible principle [under the Indiana UFTA] that looks to substance, rather than form, and protects creditors from any transactions the debtor engages in that have the effect of impairing their rights, while ensuring that the debtor can continue to do business and assuring third parties that transactions done with the debtor at arm's length will not be second-guessed.'" Id. (quoting Baird, supra, at 153-154); see also Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Symons, 817 F.3d 979, 993 (7th Cir. 2016) ("[A] basic precept of fraudulent-transfer doctrine * * * [is] substance trumps form." (citing Boyer, 587 F.3d at 793)).

  2. United States v. Witkemper

    No. 1:18-cv-00873-JRS-TAB (S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2021)

    Therefore, an argument that the debtor does not technically own the transferred asset under the IUFTA is unavailing, because "fraudulent conveyance doctrine . . . is a flexible principle that looks to substance, rather than form." Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Symons, 817 F.3d 979, 993 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Boyer v. Crown Stock Distrib., Inc., 587 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted)).82.

  3. Chatz v. World Wide Wagering, Inc.

    413 F. Supp. 3d 742 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

    As the Seventh Circuit has put it, "the corporate form may be disregarded where one corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs so conducted that it is a mere instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation." Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Symons , 817 F.3d 979, 993 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). That description fits the Trustee's allegations as to Coast to Coast as hand in glove.

  4. Johnke v. Espinal-Quiroz

    Case No. 14-cv-6992 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2017)   Cited 2 times
    In Johnke v. Espinal-Quiroz, No. 14-CV-6992, 2017 WL 3620745, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2017), the plaintiffs made an argument nearly identical to the one here when they sought to hold “Steel Warehouse Company LLC liable as a motor carrier under the theory that Steel Warehouse Inc. is an empty shell and that Steel Warehouse Company LLC is its alter ego” in the aftermath of a multi-vehicle accident.

    Similarly, under Indiana law, the corporate form "may be disregarded where one corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs so conduct that it is a mere instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation." Continental Cas. Co. v. Symons, 817 F.3d 979, 993 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Smith v. McLeod Distrib., Inc., 744 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indiana courts consider the Aronson factors, which include: undercapitalization, absence of corporate records, fraudulent representation by corporation shareholders or directors, use of the corporation to promote fraud, injustice or illegal activities, payment by the corporation of individual obligations, commingling of assets and affairs, failure to observe required corporate formalities, or other shareholder acts or conduct ignoring, controlling, or manipulating the corporate form.

  5. Wine & Canvas Dev. LLC v. Weisser

    Case No. 1:11-cv-01598-TWP-DKL (S.D. Ind. Jul. 7, 2017)

    property; (7) little or no consideration in return for the transfer; and (8) a transfer of property between family members.Continental Casualty Co. v. Symons, 817 F.3d 979, 988 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Otte v. Otte, 655 N.E.2d 76, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)). Muylle argues that WNC's transfer of the Mark bears seven of these badges of fraud.

  6. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. S.B.C. Flood Waste Sols.

    113 F.4th 768 (7th Cir. 2024)

    As laid out above, there were multiple material misrepresentations in SBC Flood's insurance applications—and that remains so without wading into any alter ego analysis, which is "a highly fact-intensive inquiry." Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Symons, 817 F.3d 979, 993 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 525 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing the potential evidentiary difficulties in finding companies are alter egos of one another at summary judgment).

  7. Salem v. Egan

    No. 19-2477 (7th Cir. Mar. 10, 2020)   Cited 7 times

    The district court weighed all of this evidence before concluding that Salem is domiciled in Illinois, and Salem has identified no mistake that might override the considerable deference this court accords when reviewing for clear error. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Symons, 817 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2016). Salem merely asks this court to reweigh the evidence in his favor—a request this court is not permitted to entertain.

  8. Architectural Iron Workers' Local No. 63 Welfare Fund v. Legna Installers Inc.

    22 C 5757 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2023)   Cited 2 times

    Furthermore, as explained by Plaintiffs, their requests for banking information may indicate common operations through the use of the same bank account or line of credit, authorized signatures, or transactions between Defendants. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Symons, 817 F.3d 979, 996 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Indicia of common identity, excessive fragmentation, or single business enterprise corporations may include, among other factors, the intermingling of

  9. Smith v. Kleynerman

    647 B.R. 196 (E.D. Wis. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    Dye v. United States , 360 F.3d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 2004). The clear error standard is "highly deferential," Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Symons , 817 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2016), and it "does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently," Anderson v. Bessemer City , 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). If the bankruptcy court's account of the evidence is "plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, we will not reverse its factual findings even if we would have weighed the evidence differently."

  10. Turner v. Lam Research Corp.

    22 C 810 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 20, 2022)

    To the extent Turner premises his personal jurisdiction or venue arguments on a piercing the corporate veil theory, the question of whether to pierce the corporate veil for purposes of jurisdiction or anything else normally is a highly fact intensive inquiry. Continental Casualty Co. v. Symons, 817 F.3d 979, 993 (7th Cir. 2016); Chicago District Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v.