In review of this case, it is the duty of this court to draw every legitimate inference possible in favor of the appellee. In Continental Insurance Co. v. Richard, 267 Ark. 673 [ 268 Ark. 671], 596 S.W.2d 332 (1980) our court stated: . . . The Court on Appeal is required to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding of the Commission, and give the testimony its strongest probative value in favor of the order of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission. The issue on appeal is not whether this court would have reached the same results as the Commission on this record, or whether the testimony would have supported a finding contrary to the one made; the question . . . is whether the evidence supports the finding which the Commission made.

The amendment to this statute in 1971 allowed certain persons in executive positions to waive coverage, but the implication is clear — the statute is designed for permissive waiver of coverage by executives and it does not confer employee status on such executives automatically. Whether a corporate officer is an employee for the purposes of the act is to be determined by the nature of the work and the circumstances of each case. Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Kirby, 6 Ark. App. 198, 639 S.W.2d 529 (1982); Continental Insurance Company v. Richard, 268 Ark. 671, 596 S.W.2d 332 (Ark.App. 1980). While we have no cases on this point, it would seem that under 81-1302, one claiming eligibility for coverage as a sole proprietor or partner, would not automatically be covered by simply electing coverage, but in a particular case would have to show that he was in fact an employee.

In Moppin, as in Roach, the claimant was not living with the deceased employee at the time of his death. The language used in Roach and Moppin was carried forward in the subsequent cases of Continental Insurance Co. v. Richards, Adm'r, 268 Ark. 671, 596 S.W.2d 333 (1980); Porter Seed Cleaning, Inc. v. Skinner, 1 Ark. App. 230, 615 S.W.2d 380 (1981); Bankston v. Prime West Corporation, 271 Ark. 727, 610 S.W.2d 586 (Ark.App. 1981). This line of cases has made it clear that "at least in situations where the surviving spouse or child is living apart from the deceased at the time of his death" the test of "wholly dependent" is met by proof of that legal status and that "actually dependent" does not require a showing of total dependence.

[Emphasis added.] This Court has quoted the above section with approval in Continental Ins. Co. v. Richard, 268 Ark. 671, 596 S.W.2d 332 (Ark.App. 1980), and Benefield Real Estate v. Mitchell, 269 Ark. 607, 599 S.W.2d 445 (Ark.App. 1980). We believe that the standard we have applied to corporate officers is likewise applicable to the executive officers of associations, at least where the sole question is whether the officer is an "employee".

The case at bar presents a close question and the evidence is certainly sufficient to support a finding for the appellant, but the commission has found otherwise. As we said in Continental Ins. Co. v. Richard, Admx., 268 Ark. 671, 596 S.W.2d 332 (Ark.App. 1980): The issue on appeal is not whether this court would have reached the same results as the Commission on this record, or whether the testimony would have supported a finding contrary to the one made; the question here is whether the evidence supports the findings which the Commission made. Herman Wilson [Lumber] Co. v. Hughes, 245 Ark. 168, 431 S.W.2d 487 (1968).

The opinion of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. In the third case decided following the 1976 amendment, Continental Insurance Company v. Richard, 268 Ark. 671, 596 S.W.2d 332 (Ark.App. 1980), the Court dealt with a situation where the decedent regularly contributed to the support of his mentally deficient child. The Court stated:

The source of Dameon's support was from a person other than the decedent. The case of Continental Ins. Co. v. Richard, 267 Ark. 673, 596 S.W.2d 332 (Ark.App.1980) can be distinguished from the instant case because there was undisputed testimony that the decedent in the Continental case regularly contributed to the support of his child. Appellant Dameon, having the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that there existed at the time of the employee's death either (1) actual support or (2) a reasonable expectation of support, has failed to sustain his burden of proof and for that reason we would affirm the decision of the Commission in denying dependency benefits to him.

But to say that when there is doubt remaining as to factual issue, and the doubt has been caused by conflicting or equivocal testimony, the resolution of that doubt by the commission must always favor the claimant, is to rob the commission of its fact-finding function which is definitively prescribed by the statute and not to be deprived by us. This court has had occasion to use both the "substantial evidence" standard of review and the "liberal construction" standard of statutory interpretation in the same case. Continental Insurance Co., et al. v. Richard, Adm'x, 268 Ark. 671, 596 S.W.2d 332 (Ark.App. 1980). They are not inconsistent when applied to their respective, proper areas of concern.

All that is required is a showing of actual support or a reasonable expectation of support. Id.SeealsoRoach, supra; Doyles Concrete Finishers v. Moppin, 268 Ark. 167, 594 S.W.2d 243 (1980); and Continental Insurance Co. v. Richard, 268 Ark. 671, 596 S.W.2d 332 (Ark.App. 1980). In this case, both mothers presented credible testimony that they had applied for, but that the decedent never paid, formal child support for his minor children.