Continental Finance, Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co.

16 Citing cases

  1. Adco Service, Inc. v. Graphic Color Plate

    137 N.J. Super. 39 (Law Div. 1975)   Cited 3 times

    Other grounds are urged which need not be considered, since I have concluded that the attorneys are entitled to priority over the lien of the United States. The complexity of the problem of the order of priority between federal tax liens and liens created by state law is amply demonstrated by the opinions in Continental Fin. Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal, 100 N.J. Super. 327 (Law Div. 1968), aff'd 105 N.J. Super. 406 (App.Div. 1969) aff'd 56 N.J. 148 (1970), for reasons other than those set forth in the trial court. Legal writing on the subject has been profuse.

  2. Penetryn International, Inc. v. United States

    391 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.J. 1975)   Cited 5 times

    In determining the priority of a federal tax lien over competing liens there has consistently been applied the "choate lien test". Continental Finance, Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., Inc., 100 N.J. Super. 327, 241 A.2d 853 (Law Div. 1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 148, 265 A.2d 536 (1970). A choate state created lien takes priority over later federal tax liens.

  3. Granata v. Broderick

    446 N.J. Super. 449 (App. Div. 2016)   Cited 73 times   2 Legal Analyses

    Her claim was validated with the judge's quantum meruit award, at which time OKS's prior recorded lien attached. See Cont'l Fin., Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 56 N.J. 148, 152, 265 A. 2d 536 (1970) (value of company's accounts receivable could not have been fixed or ascertained at time of recording of lien, but when they did materialize, they became property of party to which prior recorded lien immediately attached). Although the exact amount of Acciavatti's fee was unknown at the time of the OKS filing, its lien was sufficiently specific and perfected, as the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien were all established.

  4. In re Modular Structures, Inc.

    27 F.3d 72 (3d Cir. 1994)   Cited 39 times
    Remanding under similar circumstances "to determine if any other factors might establish that any part of the funds were ‘owed’ to [the defaulting contractor]"

    The question, then, is whether Modular is owed the funds retained by the Salvation Army. Under New Jersey law, "[a] contract right becomes an account as performance is made under the contract." Continental Fin., Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 100 N.J. Super. 327, 241 A.2d 853, 860 (Law Div. 1968), aff'd, 105 N.J. Super. 406, 252 A.2d 417 (App. Div. 1969), aff'd, 56 N.J. 148, 265 A.2d 536 (1970). Thus, if the contract is not performed, nothing comes into existence upon which a lien could attach.

  5. Centex Construction Company v. Kennedy

    332 F. Supp. 1213 (S.D. Tex. 1971)   Cited 8 times

    However, there is abundant scholarly authority for the inference that Congress intended to protect security interests in "contract rights." See Harvard Law Review, supra, and the various articles on the subject which are cited in Continental Finance, Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 56 N.J. 148, 265 A.2d 536 and the references in such opinion to House Report No. 1884, Aug. 24, 1966, and Senate Report No. 1708, Oct. 11, 1966, regarding the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. Based upon the history of the act as it wended its way through the Congress, it seems plausible that the act would recognize as being property in existence, any binding contract which may involve future payments yet "unearned by performance."

  6. Alessio Azzari, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    136 T.C. 178 (U.S.T.C. 2011)

    See, e.g., Am. Inv. Fin. v. United States, 476 F.3d 810 (10th Cir.2006); Shawnee State Bank v. United States, 735 F.2d 308 (8th Cir.1984); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir.1972); Penetryn Intl., Inc. v. United States, 391 F.Supp. 729 (D.N.J.1975); Distrib. Prods., Inc. v. Albert Enourato & Co., 34 AFTR 2d 5690, 74–2 USTC par. 9697 (D.N.J.1974); Contl. Fin., Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 56 N.J. 148, 265 A.2d 536 (N.J.1970). The manner in which section 6323(c) assigns priority with regard to accounts receivable is illustrated by examples in the regulations:

  7. Alessio Azzari, Inc. v. Commissioner

    136 T.C. 178 (U.S.T.C. 2011)

    See, e.g., Am. Inv. Fin. v. United States, 476 F.3d 810 (10th Cir. 2006); Shawnee State Bank v. United States, 735 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1984); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1972); Penetryn Intl., Inc. v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.J. 1975); Distrib. Prods., Inc. v. Albert Enourato & Co., 34 AFTR 2d 5690, 74-2 USTC par. 9697 (D.N.J. 1974); Contl. Fin., Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 265 A.2d 536 (N.J. 1970). The manner in which section 6323(c) assigns priority with regard to accounts receivable is illustrated by examples in the regulations:

  8. In re Ralls Associates, Inc.

    114 B.R. 744 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1990)

    Centex, at 1215. In addressing Continental Finance, Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 56 N.J. 148, 265 A.2d 536 (1970) the court notes that although that court found the federal lien had priority "it seems clear from the opinion that Continental Finance did not, in trying to fix a security interest in the future accounts receivable, treat them as `contract rights' under the Uniform Commercial Code." If the accounts receivable had arisen from a contract between debtor and its customers which existed before the end of the 45 day period then there might be rights in existence.

  9. Iowa Fair Plan v. U.S. Internal Revenue Dept

    257 N.W.2d 626 (Iowa 1977)   Cited 5 times

    * * * The moment the fire occurred, the agreement to indemnify embodied in the policies ripened into a chose in action in favor of the insured, which constituted "property or right to property" to which the previously inchoate tax lien immediately attached. See also Randall v. Colby, 190 F. Supp. 319, 326-327 (N.D. Iowa 1961); Continental Finance, Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 100 N.J. Super. 327, 241 A.2d 853 (1968), affirmed 105 N.J. Super. 406, 252 A.2d 417 (1969), affirmed 56 N.J. 148, 265 A.2d 536 (1970). Both liens had attached to Charles Gerhart's property before the Gerhart building was destroyed by fire on August 21, 1973.

  10. Wyoming Timber Products Co. v. Crow

    500 P.2d 683 (Wyo. 1972)   Cited 4 times

    As to the relative force of federal and state authorize liens, attention must of course be directed to the federal statutes along with other applicable law. Defendants criticize the trial court because it "ignored the Internal Revenue Code and found that the tax lien was inferior in priority to the title of Appellee [plaintiff]" and quote the provisions of 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323 (a), (c) and (h) (1). Although defendants recognize that these provisions have no application to previously vested rights, they maintain that in the instant situation the chattel mortgage of August 12, 1960, could not have been perfected or choate, if at all, until 1966 when the timber was cut, relying upon and quoting from Continental Finance, Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 100 N.J. Super. 327, 241 A.2d 853, 858, a case which is not precedent, it having been decided by an intermediate court and later appealed, the controlling decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court appearing at 56 N.J. 148, 265 A.2d 536. Moreover, under the facts there both the terms of the commercial code and 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323 were applicable, not true here. Without question, under the federal laws existing before the 1966 amendment of 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323, a competing lien in order to prevail against a federal tax lien must be definite as to identity of lienor, amount of the lien, and the property to which it attached; but we are convinced that plaintiff satisfactorily established these matters.