Michigan courts have also defined the word "claim" as "`a demand of a right or alleged right; a calling on another for something due or asserted to be due,'" Central Wholesale Co v Chesapeake O R Co, 366 Mich. 138, 149; 114 N.W.2d 221 (1962), quoting Allen v Bd of State Auditors, 122 Mich. 324, 328; 81 N.W. 113 (1899), and "more than a notice of loss; it must include a demand for payment of damages," Dawlen Corp v New York Central R Co, 328 Mich. 360, 362; 43 N.W.2d 887 (1950). Nonetheless, in Continental Casualty Co v Enco Associates, Inc, 66 Mich. App. 46, 50-51; 238 N.W.2d 198 (1975), this Court refused to "split hairs" over whether a telephone call constituted a "demand for payment" or assertion of a right. Instead, this Court held that when the construction company's architect told the insured that structural faults had been discovered in a parking ramp the insured had designed and that the insured would be held responsible, "a `claim' was made in the ordinary sense of the word." Id.
In Michigan, an insurance claim must convey an intention to hold responsible the entity against whom the claim was filed. See Continental Cas. Co. v. ENCO Assocs., Inc., 66 Mich. App. 46 (1975); Central Wholesale Co. v. Chesapeake & O.R. Co., 366 Mich. 138 (1962).
These courts have implicitly affirmed the validity of "claims made" policies. See Hoyt v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 864, 866-67 (9th Cir. 1979) (what constitutes a claim); Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Lawton-Byrne-Bruner Ins. Agency Co., 701 S.W.2d 737 (Mo.App. 1985) (what constitutes a claim); Troy Stalder Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 206 Neb. 28, 290 N.W.2d 809, 812 (1980) (what constitutes notice); Continental Cas. Co. v. Enco Assocs. Inc., 66 Mich. App. 46, 238 N.W.2d 198, 199 (1975) (to whom must claim be directed). Courts have also had occasion to decline enforcement of "claims made" policies, because of inequities that have arisen in particular cases.
Still other courts did not question the general validity of "claims made" policies, but rather interpreted a variety of policy terms and conditions in determining whether insurance coverage attached. Hoyt v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 864, 866-67 (9th Cir. 1979) (what constitutes a claim); Home Ins. Co. v. A.J. Warehouse, Inc., 210 So.2d 544, 552 (La.App. 1968) (what constitutes prior knowledge); Troy Stalder Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 206 Neb. 28, 290 N.W.2d 809, 812 (1980) (what constitutes notice); Manacre Corp. v.First State Ins. Co., 374 So.2d 1100, 1102 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 1979) (is a claim sufficient notice); Continental Cas. Co.v. Enco Assocs., Inc., 66 Mich. App. 46, 238 N.W.2d 198, 199 (Ct.App. 1975) (to whom must a claim be directed); Lapierre,Litchfield Partners v. Continental Cas. Co., 32 A.D.2d 353, 302 N.Y.S.2d 370 (App.Div. 1969) (what constitutes prior knowledge). Courts have also had occasion to decline enforcement of "claims made" policies, because of inequities that have arisen in particular cases. Cornell, Howland, Hayes Merryfield, Inc. v.Continental Cas. Co., 465 F.2d 22, 24 (9th Cir. 1972) (coverage upheld despite written exclusion because of oral representations of agent made to secure customer's patronage); Stein, Hinkle, Dawe Assocs., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 110 Mich. App. 410, 313 N.W.2d 299 (App.Ct. 1981) (reformation of insurance policy due to agent's abuse of the special relationship which existed between the parties); Heen Flint Assocs. v. Travelers Indem. Co., supra,400 N.Y.S.2d 994, 93 Misc.2d 1 (coverage upheld in situation in which continued coverage with same protection is no longer available to the insured).