1. Code § 114-710, providing the method of appeal from an award of the Workmen's Compensation Board to the superior court, though stricken by § 15 of the Act of 1963 (Ga. L. 1963, p. 141, et seq.), was revived and continues in effect inasmuch as the provision for substitution was held to have been beyond the legislative power and ineffective in Baggett Transportation Co. v. Barnes, 108 Ga. App. 68 ( 132 S.E.2d 229). A different conclusion is not required by Continental Cas. Co. v. Swift Co., 222 Ga. 80 ( 148 S.E.2d 489). 2. Where the employer and employee have agreed upon the payment of compensation for an injury, and have filed the agreement with the board and obtained its approval.
Because the General Assembly, in enacting Ga. L. 1992, p. 2062, § 2, expressly struck what was § 43-34-1 and replaced it with a new § 43-34-1 that was completely unrelated to the prior statute, we conclude the General Assembly intended the striking of the naturopathy statute to take effect independent of the enactment of new § 43-34-1. Continental Cas. Co. v. Swift Co., 222 Ga. 80 ( 148 S.E.2d 489) (1966); Fidelity c. Co. of N. Y. v. Whitehead, 114 Ga. App. 630, 633-635 (1) ( 152 S.E.2d 706) (1966). See also Gunn v. Balkcom, 228 Ga. 802, 804 ( 188 S.E.2d 500) (1972).
We reverse. Ga. L. 1975, p. 1291 was specifically and unqualifiedly repealed by Ga. L. 1976, pp. 1608, 1609, Section 1. Accordingly said 1975 Act is of no force and effect. Continental Cas. Co. v. Swift Co., 222 Ga. 80 ( 148 S.E.2d 489) (1966). Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Ingram and Hall, JJ., who concur in the judgment only.
Prior to Ga. L. 1922, p. 189, amending the Workmen's Compensation Act by enacting the forerunner of the present Code Ann. § 114-403, the injured employee was entitled to the full amount of damages from the tortfeasor and the full amount of compensation payable under the Act; and a settlement by the employee with the tortfeasor did not inure to the benefit of the employer and could not be pleaded by him in bar of compensation. Atlantic Ice c. Corp. v. Wishard, 30 Ga. App. 730 (1, 3) ( 119 S.E. 429). It was only by virtue of the amendment of 1922 that the employee's right to both compensation from the employer and damages from the tortfeasor was circumscribed so that the employer or carrier was entitled to reduce the amount of compensation by the amount of damages recovered. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Crist, 86 Ga. App. 584, 589 ( 71 S.E.2d 910); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Luckey, 46 Ga. App. 593, 595 ( 167 S.E. 907); Atlantic Ice c. Corp. v. Wishard, supra. Cf. Continental Cas. Co. v. Swift Co., 222 Ga. 80 ( 148 S.E.2d 489). Since it is only by virtue of statute that a reduction or credit is authorized, and the terms of the statute have not yet been met, it must follow that the judgment of the lower court denying a credit for sums received in settlement from the tortfeasor was correct.
1. As was asserted in Baggett Transportation Co. v. Barnes, 108 Ga. App. 68 ( 132 S.E.2d 229), the striking down of § 15 of the Act of 1963 (Ga. L. 1963, p. 156) by that decision resulted in leaving Code § 114-710 providing for appeals from the Workmen's Compensation Board to the superior courts in full force and effect. The holding in Continental Cas. Co. v. Swift Co., 222 Ga. 80 ( 148 S.E.2d 489) does not require a different conclusion. See Fidelity Cas. Co. of N. Y. v. Whitehead, 114 Ga. App. 630.