Where a contract read as a whole is amenable to only one reasonable construction, we have no need for application of rules for the resolution of ambiguities against the drafter. Martin Lane Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1013, 1021, 193 Ct.Cl. 203, 218 (1970); Bishop Eng. Co. v. United States, 180 Ct.Cl. 411, 415-16 (1967); Construction Serv. Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 973, 975, 174 Ct.Cl. 756, 760 (1966). Second, specification 13Y is not a general provision dredged up from some obscure corner of the contract.
The decisions of this court teach that a contract amenable to only one reasonable construction, in light of all of its provisions, should be enforced according to its tenor as a whole "without regard to possible ambiguity in only one provision." Bishop Engineering Co. v. United States, 180 Ct.Cl. 411, 415-416 (1967); Construction Service Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 973, 174 Ct.Cl. 756 (1966). In light of all its provisions, plaintiff's contract was amenable to only one reasonable construction, not plaintiff's, and it is accordingly not entitled to recover.
The record made before the Board is the record in this case, and its presence readily permits examination of the counterclaim on its merits. Consideration of the plaintiff's plea to the counterclaim — an accord and satisfaction by the payment of the $14,805 — perhaps logically the first question for disposition, would require a hearing to determine the facts underlying the claimed accord and satisfaction. Compare Cannon Construction Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 F.2d 173, 162 Ct.Cl. 94 (1963) with Construction Service Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 973, 976-978, 174 Ct.Cl. 756, 762-765 (1966). It is appropriate first to examine the merits of the counterclaim.
And, there is a difference between an administrative decision "respecting an equitable adjustment" and a holding that the contractor and the contracting officer have agreed "mutually to settle differences."Compare Corbetta Constr. Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 450, 187 Ct.Cl. 409 (1969); Urban Plumbing Heating Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 382, 187 Ct. Cl. 15 (1969) petition for cert. filed July 25, 1969, No. 389; Construction Service Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 973, 174 Ct.Cl. 756 (1966); Cannon Constr. Co. v. United States, 319 F.2d 173, 162 Ct.Cl. 94 (1963); Tombigbee Constructors v. United States, Ct.Cl. No. 194-65 (Op. of Commr. Schwartz, filed April 1, 1969, p. 27). In their briefs, the parties have assumed that in litigation involving an administrative decision that a claim arising under a contract is barred by accord and satisfaction, the "reviewing court is limited to the administrative record * * *."
In contrast, the misinformation supplied by the Government's drawings in Jefferson Constr. Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 420, 176 Ct.Cl. ___, (July 1966), was more than neutralized by a very specific contract clause which could not be harmonized with the contractor's view of the drawings. The same was true, mutatis mutandis, in Construction Service Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 973, 174 Ct.Cl. ___ (1966), and Randolph Eng'r Co. v. United States, 367 F.2d 425, 176 Ct.Cl. ___ (July 1966). Similarly in Flippin Materials Co. v. United States, supra, 312 F.2d 408, 160 Ct.Cl. 357, the inaccuracy of the borings was indisputably corrected by the field logs which the contractor failed to examine.