Opinion
654575/2019
06-22-2020
Construction & Development Consultants, Inc., and RAYMOND C. MILLER, Plaintiffs, v. Palin Enterprises, PALIN EQUITIES, LLC, 145 MANDD, LLC, and DEAN PALIN, Defendants.
Silverman Acampora LLP, New York, NY (David J. Mahoney of counsel), for plaintiffs. Howard Blum, P.C., New York, NY, for defendants.
Silverman Acampora LLP, New York, NY (David J. Mahoney of counsel), for plaintiffs. Howard Blum, P.C., New York, NY, for defendants. Gerald Lebovits, J.
This motion concerns contract, quasi-contract, and Labor Law claims arising out of consulting services allegedly rendered by plaintiffs Construction & Development Consultants, Inc. (C & D), and Raymond C. Miller to defendant Dean Palin and to defendants Palin Enterprises, Palin Equities, LLC, and 145 MANDD, LLC (collectively Corporate Defendants). Defendants move to dismiss. The motion to dismiss is denied.
BACKGROUND
Corporate Defendants hired Miller in December 2013 to perform consulting services for residential development projects at 10 Huron Street and at 19 India Street, both in Brooklyn. Shortly thereafter, Corporate Defendants informed Miller that unless he formed a corporation, they would no longer retain his services. Corporate Defendants also told Miller that he would be put on the Corporate Defendants' payroll, from which he would be paid $450 per week, and on their group health insurance plan. Miller then incorporated C & D.
Plaintiffs allege that Corporate Defendants retained C & D based on terms and conditions agreed upon during a prior conversation. Those terms included a $250,000 annual consulting fee paid on a weekly basis plus expenses, and payment for Miller's services for the construction and development of the Huron and India projects. Plaintiffs allege that although they performed all the services they were engaged to perform by the Corporate Defendants, neither C & D nor Miller was paid properly for the work they performed.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges five causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) quantum meruit, (3) unjust enrichment, (4) unpaid overtime wages under Labor Law § 650, and (5) failure to provide proper wage statements under Labor Law § 195 (3). Defendants now move to dismiss (albeit without specifying the CPLR provision under which they are moving). The motion to dismiss is denied.
DISCUSSION
Although defendants' notice of motion seeks dismissal of the complaint in its entirety, the supporting motion papers appear to be directed only at plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract.
To state a cause of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege (1) the existence of a valid contract, (2) plaintiff's performance of its obligations under the contract, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) resulting damages (Stonehill Capital Mgt., LLC v Bank of the West, 28 NY3d 439, 448 [2016]; Morris v 702 E. Fifth St. HDFC, 46 AD3d 478, 479 [1st Dept 2007].) This court concludes, on examining both the complaint and defendants' motion papers, that plaintiff's breach-of-contract allegations state a cause of action.
Defendants assert that this claim is overly vague. But they do not specify which aspect of the claim is vague or why they make that assertion. Nor does this court, upon reading the complaint, find it overly vague. Defendants also assert that the complaint improperly groups all defendants together, without specifying which defendant is responsible for which wrongful act. But plaintiffs are permitted to allege that all of the defendants (both the Corporate Defendants and Dean Palin individually) were involved in each of the wrongs that plaintiffs allege occurred, and are therefore all liable on each cause of action.
Defendants also contend that plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged the existence of a valid contract because the complaint merely alleges that plaintiffs "were retained by the Corporate Defendants," without "refer[ring] to any specific contract by date or otherwise." (NYSCEF No. 3 at 2 [internal quotation marks omitted].) But the complaint clearly alleges that a contract existed, identifies the relevant terms of the contract, and specifies which contractual obligations were allegedly breached by defendants. These allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage.
Finally, defendants assert that the vacatur and discharge of two mechanics' liens obtained against defendant 145 Mandd, LLC both (i) indicates that only 145 Mandd retained plaintiffs, and (ii) that the vacatur and discharge of the liens defeats plaintiffs' breach of contract claim against the other defendants. This court disagrees. That the liens in question state that plaintiffs were employed by 145 Mandd does not without more demonstrate that only 145 Mandd employed plaintiffs, as defendants suggest. Defendants also do not explain or provide authority for why vacatur of a mechanic's lien against a company necessarily defeats a separate, subsequent claim against that company for breach of contract. Nor do the orders vacating the mechanics' liens set forth reasons for the vacatur that might undermine plaintiffs' contract claims against 145 Mandd.
Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied as to plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim. Given this court's holding on that claim, plaintiffs' causes of action for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment are dismissed as duplicative. Defendants' motion papers do not attack plaintiffs' Labor Law causes of action as pleaded in the complaint; this court accordingly does not address those claims here.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.