Constellation Bank N.A. v. Binghamton Plaza

5 Citing cases

  1. Town of Plattekill v. Ace Motocross, Inc.

    87 A.D.3d 788 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)

    In the interim, Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Initially, we find no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court's denial of defendants' cross motion to amend their answer, inasmuch as the proposed counterclaim is plainly lacking in merit ( see Gersten-Hillman Agency, Inc. v Heyman, 68 AD3d 1284, 1289; Constellation Bank v Binghamton Plaza, 237 AD2d 854, 855). It is well settled that a municipality may enact a zoning law that eliminates prior nonconforming uses in a "reasonable fashion" ( Matter of 550 Halstead Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town/Vil. of Harrison, 1 NY3d 561, 562; see Matter of Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v Weise, 51 NY2d 278, 287), such as by providing for an "amortization period" to allow a party to recoup expenditures by continuing the nonconforming use for a designated period of time ( see Village of Valatie v Smith, 83 NY2d 396, 400; Matter of Cioppa v Apostol, 301 AD2d 987, 989). As noted above, plaintiffs zoning law includes such a provision ( see Town of Plattkill Zoning Law § 110-54 [C] [2]), under which defendants could have applied to the ZBA for a determination of their status as a prior nonconforming use and authorization to continue operations for up to 10 years — the precise relief sought in their proposed counterclaim. Nevertheless, they did not do so.

  2. Town of Plattekill v. Ace Motocross Inc.

    87 A.D.3d 788 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)

    In the interim, Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Initially, we find no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court's denial of defendants' cross motion to amend their answer, inasmuch as the proposed counterclaim is plainly lacking in merit ( see Gersten–Hillman Agency v. Heyman, 68 A.D.3d 1284, 1289, 892 N.Y.S.2d 209 [2009]; Constellation Bank N.A. v. Binghamton Plaza, Inc., 237 A.D.2d 854, 855, 655 N.Y.S.2d 664 [1997] ). It is well settled that a municipality may enact a zoning law that eliminates prior nonconforming uses in a “reasonable fashion” ( Matter of 550 Halstead Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Town/Vil. of Harrison, 1 N.Y.3d 561, 562, 772 N.Y.S.2d 249, 804 N.E.2d 413 [2003]; see Matter of Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise, 51 N.Y.2d 278, 287, 434 N.Y.S.2d 150, 414 N.E.2d 651 [1980] ), such as by providing for an “amortization period” to allow a party to recoup expenditures by continuing the nonconforming use for a designated period of time ( see Village of Valatie v. Smith, 83 N.Y.2d 396, 400, 610 N.Y.S.2d 941, 632 N.E.2d 1264 [1994]; Matter of Cioppa v. Apostol, 301 A.D.2d 987, 989, 755 N.Y.S.2d 458 [2003] ).

  3. Hassan v. Schweizer

    277 A.D.2d 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 7 times

    We begin by observing that "[a]lthough leave to amend pleadings should be freely granted (CPLR 3025 [b]), we do not generally infringe upon a trial court's exercise of its discretion on this issue" (Mente v. Wenzel, 158 A.D.2d 775, 777, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 701). We have declined to disturb Supreme Court's exercise of its discretion in denying such applications based upon findings of inordinate and unjustified delay in bringing the motion or undue prejudice (see, e.g., Jones v. Story, 241 A.D.2d 853, lv dismissed, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 853; Constellation Bank v. Binghamton Plaza, 237 A.D.2d 854; Jacobsen v. Amedio, 218 A.D.2d 872;Herrmann v. Bilka, 166 A.D.2d 756; Mente v. Wenzel, supra). In this case, we are not privy to Supreme Court's rationale in denying the motions because the court's oral decision is not transcribed in the record. Under these circumstances, as the applicable standard of review requires deference to the motion court, we will not disturb its order denying the applications to amend unless it is evident that there could have been no proper basis for the decision.

  4. National Management Corporation v. Adolfi

    277 A.D.2d 553 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 18 times
    Affirming stay issued by Supreme Court because "goals of preserving judicial resources and preventing an inequitable result are properly served"

    The Federal action does not constitute a legal bar to the foreclosure action, either under an election of remedies theory (see, Marine Midland Bank v. Lake Huntington Dev. Group, 185 A.D.2d 395, 396; see also, RPAPL 1301) or as a prior pending action under CPLR 3211 (a) (4) (see, White Light Prods. v. On the Scene Prods., 231 A.D.2d 90, 93). Since these affirmative defenses lack merit, Supreme Court erred insofar as it granted leave to assert them (see, e.g., Constellation Bank v. Binghamton Plaza, 237 A.D.2d 854, 855). Plaintiff's remaining contentions, including its request for a bond pending the stay, have been considered and rejected. Needless to say, the mortgage remains as a lien on defendants' residence until the foreclosure action is resolved.

  5. Seaman Corp. v. Binghamton Savings Bank

    243 A.D.2d 1027 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)   Cited 17 times

    IBM-CU appeals. "Leave to amend pleadings is a discretionary matter which is generally favorably exercised in the absence of prejudice or surprise or unless it appears that the proposed amendment plainly lacks merit" ( Constellation Bank v. Binghamton Plaza, 237 A.D.2d 854, 855). We initially find that Supreme Court incorrectly determined that IBM-CU's claim for conversion was without merit.