Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Peppers

22 Citing cases

  1. Financeamerica Corp. v. Drake

    154 Ga. App. 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 13 times
    In Financeamerica, the court refused to follow Consolidated Credit Corporation v. Peppers, 144 Ga. App. 401, 240 S.E.2d 922 (1977), insofar as it gave retroactive effect to the permissible charges on loans used in Ga. Code Ann. § 25-315(b).

    CARLEY, Judge. This case again presents for review the propriety of our decision in Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Peppers, 144 Ga. App. 401 ( 240 S.E.2d 922) (1977). The sole issue in that Industrial Loan Act (ILA) case was the meaning of the phrase "face amount of the contract" (hereinafter, FAC) as used in Code Ann. § 25-315 (b). The phrase is used in both subsections (a) and (b) of Code Ann. § 25-315, setting forth the permissible charges on loans governed by the ILA. "Every licensee hereunder ... may charge, contract for, collect and receive interest and fees ... as hereinafter provided: (a) Charge, contract for, receive and collect interest at a rate not to exceed eight per cent. per annum of the face amount of the contract, whether repayable in one single payment or repayable in monthly or other periodic installments.

  2. Lee v. Beneficial Finance Co.

    159 Ga. App. 205 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 5 times

    See Shelley v. Liberty Loan Corp., 153 Ga. App. 47, supra. The meaning of FAC as that phrase is used in Code Ann. § 25-315 (b) relating to the loan fee was first specifically addressed in Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Peppers, 144 Ga. App. 401 ( 240 S.E.2d 922) (1977). It was there held that FAC has the same meaning in both subsections (a) and (b) of Code Ann. § 25-315, "the amount necessary for a borrower to borrow in order to obtain the amount desired."

  3. Briscoe v. First Nat. Bank c. Co.

    307 S.E.2d 767 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 1 times

    " Face amount of the contract has been defined as "the amount necessary for a borrower to borrow in order to obtain the amount desired." Consolidated Credit Corp. of Athens v. Peppers, 144 Ga. App. 401, 404 ( 240 S.E.2d 922). Where, as in the case sub judice, the loan is repayable in 18 months or less and as the interest is discounted pursuant to OCGA § 7-3-14 (1) (formerly Code Ann. § 25-315 (a) (Ga. L. 1955, pp. 431, 440; 1964, pp. 288, 291; 1975, pp. 393, 394; 1977, p. 288; 1980, p. 509)) the face amount of the contract is also synonomous with the total payback amount of the loan. Robbins v. Welfare Finance Corp., 95 Ga. App. 90, 95 ( 96 S.E.2d 892); Consolidated Credit Corp. of Athens v. Peppers, 144 Ga. App. 401, 403, supra. For further discussion see Finance America Corp. v. Drake, 154 Ga. App. 811 ( 270 S.E.2d 449), which overruled the retroactive effect of Consolidated Credit Corp. of Athens v. Peppers, 144 Ga. App. 401, supra.

  4. Southern Discount Co. v. Ector

    152 Ga. App. 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 4 times

    Held: 1. There is no dispute that under such cases as Carter v. Swift Loan c. Inc., 148 Ga. App. 358 ( 251 S.E.2d 379) and Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Peppers, 144 Ga. App. 401, 404 ( 240 S.E.2d 922), the loan fee was incorrectly and excessively computed. By brief the plaintiff has conceded "the subject loan agreement between the parties is substantially identical to that considered in Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Peppers, 144 Ga. App. 401."

  5. Landmark Finance Corp. v. Cox

    2 B.R. 739 (S.D. Ga. 1980)   Cited 4 times

    The validity of the contracts was never raised by the parties. Sua sponte the Bankruptcy Judge inquired whether the loan complied with the Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Consolidated Credit Corporation v. Peppers, 144 Ga. App. 401, 240 S.E.2d 922 (1977). On this issue Judge Coolidge said:

  6. Ector v. Southern Discount Co.

    484 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ga. 1979)   Cited 1 times

    These general policies disfavoring the exercise of pendent jurisdiction are particularly pertinent in this case where the state issues are difficult and unsettled. Plaintiff Ector alleges that the loans involved in this litigation violated the Georgia Industrial Loan Act ("GILA"), 25 Ga. Code Ann. § 315. Plaintiff relies on Consolidated Credit Corporation v. Peppers, 144 Ga. App. 401, 240 S.E.2d 922 (1977), to support that contention. Under 25 Ga. Code Ann. § 315(b), a lender may charge a fee of eight percent on the first $600 of the "face amount of the contract" and four percent on any excess.

  7. Ideal Loan Finance Corp. v. Little

    457 S.E.2d 274 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)

    A motion to set aside a default judgment pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) may be brought on the basis that the underlying loan contract was usurious. See Consolidated Credit Corp. c. v. Peppers, 144 Ga. App. 401 ( 240 S.E.2d 922) (1977), overruled on other grounds, Financeamerica Corp. v. Drake, 154 Ga. App. 811, 813 ( 270 S.E.2d 449) (1980).Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

  8. Moore v. Household Finance Corporation

    287 S.E.2d 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)

    Household Finance Corporation sued A. R. Moore on a loan contract governed by the Georgia Industrial Loan Act (GILA) Code Ann. Chapter 25-3. Moore answered, claiming the contract is void because of a violation of the GILA. Household Finance's motion for summary judgment was granted by the trial court and Moore appeals. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment because the loan fee on the note was excessive under the holding in Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Peppers, 144 Ga. App. 401 ( 240 S.E.2d 922) (1977), and the contract was void as a matter of law. The total payback figure on the contract in question is $2,880; the interest is $543.48; and the maintenance charge on the loan for 36 months is $72. Calculating the loan fee pursuant to the provisions of Code Ann. § 25-315 (b), the maximum amount to be charged is $114.58. Appellee charged a loan fee of $136.32 which is clearly excessive.

  9. Scroggins v. Whitfield Finance Co.

    157 Ga. App. 655 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)

    Under our decision in Financeamerica Corp. v. Drake, 154 Ga. App. 811 ( 270 S.E.2d 449) (1980), there was no violation of Code Ann. § 25-315 (b) in the amount of the loan fee charged by appellee. Although an excessive amount may have been charged under the holding in Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Peppers, 144 Ga. App. 401 ( 240 S.E.2d 922) (1977), the contract was executed in May, 1976 prior to Peppers; and under Financeamerica Corp., Peppers will not be applied retroactively. In addition, the trial court correctly found that the notes in question complied with Code Ann. § 25-315 where they provided specifically for a pro rata rebate of interest upon default and acceleration by the lender.

  10. Sanders v. Liberty Loan Corporation

    276 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)

    The case has been remanded to this court for "such further action ... as may be necessary to give effect to the [Supreme Court] opinion filed in this case." In the previous appearance of this case, we held that appellee had violated the provisions of the Georgia Industrial Loan Act (Ga. L. 1955, pp. 431-455 as amended (Code Ann. Chs. 25-3, 25-99)) for the reasons set forth in Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Peppers, 144 Ga. App. 401 ( 240 S.E.2d 922) (1977). Accordingly, we found the loan contract null and void.