Opinion
No. 2-127 / 00-0984.
Filed March 13, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, DAVID REMLEY, Judge.
Appellant appeals from the district court ruling that he relinquished his rights of homestead. AFFIRMED.
Antone-Lawrence: Kubik, pro se, Traer, for appellant.
Chad Frese of Fairall, Fairall, Kaplan, Hoglan, Condon Freese, Marshalltown, for appellee.
Considered by MAHAN, P.J., and MILLER and HECHT, JJ.
Antone Lawrence Kubik appeals from the district court ruling that he relinquished his rights of homestead pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 561 (1999). We affirm.
On October 28, 1993, a judgment was entered against Kubik in the amount of $281,118.18. On May 3, 1996, Kubik conveyed the ten-acre subject property to Hilltop Trust by warranty deed recorded the same date. Said deed contained the following language:
Each of the undersigned hereby relinquishes all rights of dower, homestead and distributive share in and to the described premises.
A sheriff's sale of the property was subsequently set, and Kubik filed a motion to quash. A hearing was held on said motion, and a ruling was filed June 3, 1999, determining that Kubik had waived all rights of homestead when he deeded the property to Hilltop Trust. Additional litigation ensued culminating in a hearing on Kubik's motion to set aside sheriff's sale. On May 16, 2000, the district court ruled as follows:
Defendant conveyed his homestead to Hilltop Trust on May 3, 1996 and relinquished all rights of homestead in the Warranty Deed recorded that same date in the office of the Tama County Recorder. Notwithstanding the fact that Defendant reacquired the subject property on February 10, 2000, five days prior to the sheriff's sale, the subject property became subject to the lien of the judgment entered October 28, 1993 since that judgment was for debts contracted prior to the reacquisition of the subject property. The proceeds from the sale of the former homestead were not reinvested within a reasonable time. There was no evidence that Defendant has any other property liable to execution.
Defendant's contention that the unrecorded instrument conveying a life estate in the subject property from Hilltop Trust to Defendant dated at a time proximate to May 3, 1996, avoids the lien of the judgment is without merit. First, the purported conveyance is not recorded. Second, if the conveyance of a life estate from Hilltop Trust to Defendant predated the May 3, 1996 deed, the May 3, 1996 deed from Defendant to Hilltop Trust which relinquished homestead would have conveyed all of Defendant's rights in the property, including but not limited to homestead, to Hilltop Trust. If the conveyance of the life estate from Hilltop Trust to Defendant is dated after May 3, 1996, the lien of the judgment attached to the life estate interest due to the gap in ownership.
Kubik contends that said ruling is not in compliance with Iowa Code chapter 561. We reject this contention. We agree with the reasoning set forth in the district court ruling dated May 16, 2000 and affirm on this issue.
Kubik next argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction over him. Specifically, he alleges that Antone-Lawrence: Kubik expatriated from the corporation known as the United States and declared his sovereignty. He argues that since he cancelled his birth certificate and social security number the "Cancellatura of Foreign Instruments renders these documents null and void ab initio." He contends fraud was perpetrated by the United States corporation and the State of Iowa corporation in that the actions and ruling of the district court were against the "straw man" Tony Kubik and not against Antone-Lawrence: Kubik.
We determine Kubik's challenge to the jurisdiction of the court to be without merit. An objection to personal jurisdiction may be waived unless raised at the first opportunity and within a reasonable time. State ex rel. Houk v. Grewing, 586 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). Kubik never raised this issue before the district court even though he personally appeared several times. Such action constitutes a waiver of this issue. State v. Dumier, 433 N.W.2d 338, 339 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989).
In the event that Kubik's claim could be interpreted as a challenge to the district court's subject matter jurisdiction, we conclude such a subject matter jurisdiction claim would also be without merit. The district court has subject matter jurisdiction over disputes involving Iowa Code chapter 561.