Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SPR 076423
Haerle, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Lynda Beck (appellant) appeals from the trial court order granting the motion to quash of respondent Lytton Band of Pomo Indians (the Tribe). She contends that the trial court erred in concluding that, under the doctrine of Indian sovereign immunity, it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Tribe. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the trial court.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Delano Antonio Gonzalez, also known as Anthony Beck (Beck), was nineteen years old in 2005, when conservatorship proceedings were brought by his mother, appellant Lynda Beck. Beck is autistic and has significant learning delays. He functions at the level of a seven-year-old child, and does not have the skill to manage large sums of money. He receives one-on-one supervision twenty-four hours a day, supervision coordinated by his mother.
Beck has two sources of income: SSI benefits and benefits provided by the North Bay Regional Center. Beck is also an enrolled member of the Lytton Rancheria (the Tribe) and is eligible for all benefits available to tribal members, although it is not clear from the record what those benefits might be.
In November 2005, appellant was appointed conservator of Beck’s estate.
A few months later, in March 2006, appellant obtained an order from the Sonoma County Superior Court directing the Tribe to transfer all monies held by the Tribe on Beck’s behalf into an account at Bank of America.
In May 2006, appellant filed a first amended petition to “place money in a blocked account with Bank of America” as well as a “request for temporary letters of conservatorship of the estate, placement of funds being held by Lytton Rancheria to be placed in the attorney/client trust account.”
A hearing on this petition was held on May 17, 2006. At that time, the court re-appointed appellant as Beck’s conservator. The court also ordered that “all monies being held by the Lytton Rancheria . . . be transferred to the Attorney/Client trust account of Kneisler, Schondel & Hubbs to be held in trust until further order of the Court . . . .” The court ordered Beck to file an accounting in June 2006, regarding the transfer of these monies.
Appellant’s attorney wrote to the chairperson of the Lytton Rancheria, Margie Mejia, and asked her to transfer “all monies being held in trust for [Beck]” to the firm’s trust account. As of June 9, 2006, Mejia had not responded to this request. Appellant requested that the court compel Mejia’s attendance at the next hearing.
The court issued a “notice to appear citation” to Margie Mejia, “individually and as Chairwoman for the Lytton Band of Pomo Indians of the Lytton Rancheria” asking her to appear and “provide any legal reason . . . why you failed to follow this court’s Order to transfer all monies held by the Lytton Rancheria, in trust for [Beck] to [appellant] . . . .”
Mejia and the Tribe responded by filing a motion to quash service of the citation to appear and a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. The court granted this motion. This timely appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. General Principles of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
“ ‘ “Indian tribes are domestic dependent nations that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories. As an aspect of this sovereign immunity, suits against tribes are barred in the absence of an unequivocally expressed waiver by the tribe or abrogation by Congress.” [Citation.] . . . [¶] “It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez [1978] 436 U.S. 49, 58. (Internal quotations omitted.)’ ” (Warburton/Buttner v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1182.) In this case, there is no argument that the Congress has established the Tribe’s immunity in this matter. However, appellant makes a number of arguments about why the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity does not bar the trial court from assuming subject matter jurisdiction over the Tribe. We address these contentions below.
B. Tenth Amendment Exception to Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
Appellant argues that the State has an interest, under its parens patriae powers, in protecting persons with mental or physical deficiencies. She asserts that this interest is protected by the Tenth Amendment and that it trumps the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. We disagree.
In general, “tribal immunity is a matter of federal law and thus only Congress can alter immunity limits through ‘explicit legislation.’” (Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court (2006) 40 Cal.4th 239, 253. (Agua Caliente).) “ ‘Congress has consistently reiterated its approval of the immunity doctrine [citations]’ ” and, in so doing, has demonstrated its “ ‘desire to promote the “goal of Indian self-government, including its ‘overriding goal’ of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 254.) Nevertheless, both our Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have expressed reservations about the broad reach of this doctrine (id. at pp. 251-253), and the United States Supreme Court has “recognized the common law evolution of certain limitations on tribal exercise of regulatory and judicial jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 254.)
One such limitation was carved out in Agua Caliente. In that case, the Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) was given the authority to sue the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians in order to enforce the Political Reform Act (PRA). In articulating this exception, the court pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has never “held that the federal common law doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity trumps state authority when a state acts in political ‘ “matters resting firmly within [its] constitutional prerogatives. [Citation.]” ’ [Citations.]” (Agua Caliente, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 259.) Concerned that “[a]llowing tribal members to participate in our state electoral process while leaving the state powerless to effectively guard against political corruption,” the court held that “the guarantee clause, together with the rights reserved under the Tenth Amendment, provide the FPPC authority under the federal Constitution to bring suit against the Tribe in its enforcement of the PRA.” (Ibid.)
Beyond providing us with an extended discussion of the parens patriae doctrine, appellant has not pointed to any case in which that doctrine has been held to originate in either the Tenth Amendment or the guarantee clause or to have anything to do with the state acting in a political matter within its “constitutional prerogatives.” (Agua Caliente, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 259.) Nor do we know of any such authority. Accordingly, we reject this argument.
C. “Great Harm” to Conservatee
Appellant argues that we should create an exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine because its application in this matter will cause “great harm” to Beck. We disagree both with the suggestion that such an exception exists and, further, that there has been any showing of such harm.
As respondents point out, in the absence of congressional authorization or a tribe’s waiver of the doctrine, courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over Indian tribes. (Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1368 and Pan American Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians (9th Cir. 1989) 884 F.2d 416, 418.) Because it is a jurisdictional matter, the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not dependent on the equities of the matter before a court. (Warburton/Buttner v. Superior Court, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1182 [“It must be recognized that ‘sovereign immunity is not a discretionary doctrine that may be applied as a remedy depending on the equities of a given situation.’ ”]; see also Ute Distribution Corp. v. Ute Indian Tribe (10th Cir. 1998) 149 F.3d 1260, 1267.)
The single case cited by appellant in support of its argument to the contrary, Redding Rancheria v. Superior Court (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 384, 389-390 is inapposite. Redding Rancheria stands for the unremarkable proposition that “an Indian tribe and its commercial entity are immune from an ordinary tort suit arising outside of Indian country.” (Id. at p. 386.) The tort suit at the center of Redding Rancheria was brought by a woman who “alleged she was working as a bartender at a Redding hotel, attending to a party ‘for defendant Win River [Casino] and its employees, who had booked one of the facility’s banquet rooms[.]’ ‘[O]ne or more’ of the employees threw gifts into the crowd, and a package struck her, causing injury. She framed the complaint in terms of negligence, assault and battery.” (Ibid.) Although the court recognized that the bartender might find it unfair that she could not sue the Indian tribe in state court for throwing gifts at her, the court nevertheless held, in language appellant simply omits from its discussion of this case, “Any change or limitation of the doctrine (e.g., to exclude off-reservation tort suits) must come from Congress.” (Id. at p. 390.) The court also pointed out that “[a]ny unfairness here is largely a product of plaintiff’s litigation tactics. Although the Tribe provides a mechanism to resolve civil suits, literally by means of a hearing before the sovereign, the tribal council, plaintiff refused to follow this procedure.” (Ibid.)
Here, appellant has shown no change in the immunity doctrine as expressed through federal legislation that would permit it to litigate against the Tribe. Accordingly, we must reject this argument.
In addition, even if an “equity” exception did exist, there is no evidence in this record to support appellant’s claim that “great harm” is occurring to Beck because the Tribe has refused to turn over control of the monies it holds on Beck’s behalf to the conservator beyond appellant’s bald statement that this is the case.
D. Application to “Suit” Brought Against Tribe
Appellant next argues that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity applies only to “suits” brought against Indian tribes and, because no “suit” has been filed in this action, the doctrine does not apply. In support of this argument, defendant cites the definition of “suit” contained in Black’s Law Dictionary, a century-old United States Supreme Court case, Kohl v. U.S. (1875) 91 U.S. 367, and the California Code of Civil Procedure, sections 20 through 22. There is nothing remarkable about any of these definitions of the term “suit,” which means, more or less, a proceeding in which a person or persons seeks in court some sort of redress for an injury or the enforcement of a right. None of these authorities, however, persuades us that appellant’s effort to enforce a state court order compelling the Tribe to transfer tribal monies held by it in trust for Beck is not in fact subject to the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.
As we noted above, the doctrine of tribal immunity precludes a state court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over an Indian tribe. Therefore, the relevant question is not whether the matter before the court is a “suit,” but whether the court is being asked to exercise subject matter jurisdiction. Certainly, here, the enforcement of a court order against the Tribe would require the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, something that is clearly not permissible under this doctrine.
Nor is it the case that In re Marriage of Purnel (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 527 suggests a different result. In that case, the court’s effort to enforce a child support judgment against a Native American was authorized under Public Law 280 (18 U.S.C § 1162, et seq.), a federal statute that permits states such as California criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over individual Indians. This statute does not, however, confer state court jurisdiction over Indian tribes. (Bryan v. Itasca County (1976) 426 U.S. 373; Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering (1986) 476 U.S. 877; Long v. Chemehuevi Indian Reservation (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 853, 856.)
Appellant also attempts to analogize tribal sovereign immunity to that of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The scope of state sovereign immunity is in no way implicated in this case and, therefore, this analogy is unhelpful.
E. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
We do not agree with appellant’s argument that the tribe waived its sovereign immunity by certain actions of its chairperson, Margie Mejia. In general, sovereign immunity can be waived only by one who has the authority to do so. (Hydrothermal Energy Corp. v. Fort Bidwell Indian Community Council (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 489, 496 (Hydrothermal Energy Corp.).) Thus, in Hydrothermal Energy Corp., the court held that a tribal chairwoman could not waive the tribe’s sovereign immunity because the Tribe had not expressly delegated that duty to her in its governing documents. Similarly, here, the Tribe’s governing documents do not give its chairwoman the authority to waive its sovereign immunity.
Appellant, however, contends that certain language in the Tribe’s constitution amounts to the grant of such power to its Chairwoman. The language appellant cites refers to the Tribe’s chairperson as the “tribe’s official representative and agent in all matters when the Tribal Counsel [sic] is not in session.” This language, however, does not constitute an express delegation of the ability to waive the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, a delegation that, to be effective, must be specific. (Hydrothermal Energy Corp., supra, 170 Cal.App.3dat p. 496.)
Given that Mejia does not have the authority to waive the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, it follows that none of the actions taken by her constitute such a waiver. Therefore, a letter Mejia sent to the Superior Court expressing concerns with the proposed Conservator does not constitute a waiver of tribal immunity. And certainly such a letter does not constitute a general appearance in this action on the part of the Tribe, there being no evidence that the tribe filed any pleading with the court other than through a special appearance in which it sought to quash the order to show cause and citation to appear it had been served with.
Similarly, two other documents – a Certification of Conservator dated December 3, 2004, and the Tribe’s Financial Benefits Eligibility Ordinance – do not contain an express waiver of sovereign immunity or constitute a general appearance by the Tribe. Neither refers to sovereign immunity and neither is a document that was filed with the court in such a way as to constitute a general appearance.
F. Preemption Analysis
Citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission (1973) 411 U.S. 164, 172 (McClanahan), Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico (1989) 490 U.S. 163, 176 (Cotton Petroleum), and California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987) 480 U.S. 202, 216 (Cabazon Band), appellant contends that we should “balance the interests involved” using a preemption analysis and “recognize state authority if it does not interfere with federal or tribal interests . . . .” None of these cases, however, supports appellant’s argument that this analysis is appropriate here.
In McClanahan, the state sought the authority to tax individual Indians. The Tribe was not a party to the case and the tribe’s sovereign immunity was not an issue. (McClanahan, supra, 411 U.S.at p. 172.) In Cotton Petroleum, a similar effort to tax an individual – in this case a non-Indian operating on Indian lands – was involved and the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity was never invoked. (Cotton Petroleum, supra, 490U.S. 163.) In Cabazon Band, the court refused to permit the State to regulate the tribe’s gaming activities under Public Law 280 which, the court held, was inapplicable to this case. (Cabazon Band, supra, 480 U.S. 202.)
Appellant also cites Agua Caliente, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 248 in support of her contention that, under a preemption analysis, the trial court may assume subject matter jurisdiction over the Tribe. Agua Caliente, however, involved a “narrow” abrogation of sovereign immunity, one involving “only . . . cases where California, through its Fair Political Practices Commission, sues an Indian tribe for violations of state fair political practice laws.” (Id. at p. 261.) Not only is Agua Caliente inapplicable here, but the court did not, ultimately, reach its decision using a preemption analysis.
G. Applicability of Public Law 280
Appellant argues that the trial court may assume jurisdiction over the Tribe under Public Law 280. This argument, however, rests on a misreading of that statute. Public Law 280 is a federal statute that gives states criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over individual Indians. It does not in any way confer such jurisdiction over Indian tribes. (Bryan v. Itasca County, supra, 426 U.S. 373, Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, supra, 476 U.S. 877, Long v. Chemehuevi Indian Reservation, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at p. 856.) Therefore, appellant’s arguments based on Public Law 280 simply miss the mark.
Nor does In re Marriage of Jacobsen (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1187 convince us otherwise. In re Jacobsen did not involve a tribe’s sovereign immunity but, rather, whether a court could make per capita distributions of an individual tribal member’s physical possessions. This case has nothing to do with the court’s jurisdiction over the tribe, and therefore, is inapplicable to this matter.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal to respondent.
We concur: Kline, P.J., Lambden, J.