If not, we must next consider whether a ยง 489 claimant nonetheless has a constitutional right to a jury trial. See Conservation Dep't v Brown, 335 Mich 343, 346; 55 NW2d 859 (1952). We examine the statute first because, depending on our resolution of the statutory issue, we may not need to reach the constitutional question.
If not, we must next consider whether a ยง 489 claimant nonetheless has a constitutional right to a jury trial. See Conservation Dep't v. Brown, 335 Mich. 343, 346, 55 N.W.2d 859 (1952). We examine the statute first because, depending on our resolution of the statutory issue, we may not need to reach the constitutional question.
The Michigan Constitution provides that the โright of trial by jury shall remain....โ Const. 1963, art. 1, ยง 14. โThus the right to trial by jury is preserved in all cases where it existed prior to adoption of the Constitution.โ Conservation Dep't v. Brown, 335 Mich. 343, 346, 55 N.W.2d 859 (1952). Further, the โconstitutional guaranty applies to cases arising under statutes enacted subsequent to adoption of the Constitution, which are similar in character to cases in which the right to jury trial existed before the Constitution was adopted.โ
" Conservation Department v Brown, 335 Mich. 343, 346; 55 N.W.2d 859 (1952), noted that the right to jury trial in Michigan has been "preserved in all cases where it existed prior to the adoption" of the above-mentioned provisions of the Michigan Constitutions. As indicated in Hastings, supra, there was no common-law right to maintain an action against the state, and consequently there was no common-law right to a jury trial in such instances.
And, of course, the scope of the rules governing summary disposition are also supported โ if not compelled โ by the right to a jury trial in civil cases. See, generally, Conservation Dep't v Brown, 335 Mich 343, 346-347; 55 NW2d 859 (1952), and Dunn v Dunn, 11 Mich 284, 286 (1863). Accord Byrd v Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coop, Inc, 356 US 525, 537-538; 78 S Ct 893; 2 L Ed 2d 953 (1958).
Previously, in 1952, this Court took a much more straightforward approach to the same phrase when trying to determine whether a particular statute provided for a right to a trial by jury. Conservation Dep't v. Brown, 335 Mich 343, 346; 55 NW2d 859 (1952). The Court stated, "The statute under which these . . . proceedings were brought is silent on the subject of a jury.
We thus must look for the meaning of "the right of trial by jury" before 1963, as understood by those learned in the law at the time. See Conservation Dep't. v. Brown, 335 Mich 343, 346; 55 NW2d 859 (1952). Considerable insight into this scope of this right, both historically and as it was understood in the first half of the twentieth century, is provided in the encyclopedic article on this issue in the 1918 Harvard Law Review by Harvard Law professor Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by jury and the reform of civil procedure, 31 Harv L R 669 (1918).
E Defendants argue that the Court of Appeals constitutional conclusion is contrary to Conservation Dep't v. Brown, 335 Mich. 343; 55 N.W.2d 859 (1952). In Brown, this Court held that trial by jury was not required by the constitution in a statutorily created in rem forfeiture action brought against the defendant's property under 1948 CL 300.14.
The right to trial by jury is preserved in all cases where it existed prior to the adoption of the constitution. Friedman v Dozowc, 412 Mich. 1, 60; 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981), citing Conservation Dep't v Brown, 335 Mich. 343; 55 N.W.2d 859 (1952). [f]airness to the parties litigant demands that the jury should be free from bias and prejudice in all cases, and that they enter upon the trial of the cases with the single desire and purpose of doing equal and exact justice between the parties, and that according to the law and the evidence given them in open court. . . . [ Theisen v Johns, 72 Mich. 285, 292; 40 N.W. 727 (1888), citing Monaghan v Agricultural Fire Ins Co, 53 Mich. 238, 246; 18 N.W. 797 (1884).]
Const 1963, art 1, ยง 14, preserves the right of jury trial only in causes of action which were part of the common law prior to its adoption. See Conservation Dep't v Brown, 335 Mich. 343, 346; 55 N.W.2d 859 (1952). The procedure suggested here would not involve a cause of action in the usual sense of that term, and certainly not one predating the Michigan Constitution.