Had the construction crew consciously realized what the voltage was, it is said, it would have exercised greater care than it did to avoid the line's proximity. See Conowingo Power Co. v. State of Maryland, 4 Cir., 120 F.2d 870. Electricity is a dangerous thing and can work harm of such gravity upon one who comes into unintended contact with it, that power companies, rightly, have been required to exercise a very high degree of care to safeguard those whose lawful pursuit exposes them to the risk of inadvertent contact with the power lines.

Yet, the Company's employees energized the wires without giving notice to anyone. Cf. Conowingo Power Co. v. State of Maryland, 120 F.2d 870 (C.A., 4th); Southern Pacific Co. v. McCready, 47 F.2d 673 (C.A., 9th); Ashby v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 195 A. 887 (Pa.). And notwithstanding the lowest service wire was only 29 inches above the roof, the dead-ends were not insulated, nor were they protected against accidental contact by enclosure or otherwise. Cf. Section 1113 of the Safety Code. These factors, namely, the proper location of the wires, their effective insulation or enclosure if the location were where people, lawfully and legally, were likely to go, whether for work, business or pleasure, and whether notice should have been given by the Company when it energized the wires were proper ones, under the facts of this case, for the jury's consideration in determining whether due and proper diligence, under the circumstances, had been exercised by the Company in the transmission of an agency with such dangerous and elusive propensities as electricity.

The courts generally, including those of Indiana, have recognized that electricity is a dangerous force and that a person or company handling it is bound not only to know the dangers incident thereto but is obliged in its use to exercise a degree of care commensurate with its danger. Ayrshire Coal Co. v. Wilder, 75 Ind. App. 137, 129 N.E. 260; Smith v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 4 Cir., 74 F.2d 647; Conowingo Power Co. v. State of Maryland, 4 Cir., 120 F.2d 870, 873; Perrone v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 2 Cir., 136 F.2d 941, 943. Whether defendants' standard of conduct in the use of this known dangerous agency was such as might be expected of a person of ordinary prudence or whether they failed in this respect and were consequently guilty of negligence were questions properly to be determined by the triers of the facts.

The case is controlled by the law of Maryland, where the accident occurred. That law has been stated in many cases in the Court of Appeals of Maryland and in the Fourth Circuit, including Cumberland v. Lottig, 95 Md. 42, 51 A. 841 (1902); State, to use of Bahner v. Consolidated Gas, etc. Co., 159 Md. 138, 150 A. 452 (1930); Conowingo Power Co. v. Maryland, to use of Marshall, 120 F.2d 870 (4 Cir. 1941); Manaia v. Potomac Electric Power Company, 268 F.2d 793 (4 Cir. 1959), cert. den. 361 U.S. 913, 80 S.Ct. 255, 4 L.Ed.2d 183 (1959); Eastern Shore Public Service Co. v. Corbett, 227 Md. 411, 177 A. 2d 701 (1962); Southern Maryland Electric Coop. v. Blanchard, 239 Md. 481, 212 A. 2d 301 (1965); Driver etc. v. Potomac Electric Power Company, 247 Md. 75, 230 A. 2d 321 (1966).          The distances prescribed by the National Electric Safety Code are not directly applicable in this case, but they are helpful in considering the question of primary negligence.

ven the duty to anticipate such danger, the nature of the obligation to exercise care commensurate with the risk was explained succinctly by Justice (then Judge) Proctor in Rapp v. Public Service CoordinatedTransport, Inc., 15 N.J. Super. 305, 312 (App.Div. 1951), aff'd 9 N.J. 11 (1952): "When permission is given to suspend along a public highway a wire, so charged with electricity as to be dangerous to the public if they come in contact with it, this permission entails a duty to give reasonable warning of such danger." See also, Beck v. Monmouth Lumber Co., 137 N.J.L. 268, 270, 274 (E. A. 1948); compare, e.g., Black v. PublicService Electric Gas Co., supra, 98 N.J. Super., at 373; Nevis v. Pacific Gas Electric Co., 266 P.2d 213 (Cal.Ct.App.), aff'd 43 Cal.2d 626, 275 P.2d 761 (Cal.Sup.Ct. 1954); Fairbairn v. American River Electric Co., 179 Cal. 157, 175 P. 637 (1918), and the same case on an earlier appeal, 170 Cal. 115, 148 P. 788 (1915); Conowingo Power Co. v.State of Maryland, 120 F.2d 870, 873 (4 Cir. 1941); Gladdenv. Missouri Public Service Company, 277 S.W.2d 510, 515 (Mo.Sup.Ct. 1955); Chatfield v. New York State Gas ElectricCorp., 57 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup.Ct. 1944); Kingsport Utilities,Inc. v. Brown, 201 Tenn. 393, 299 S.W.2d 656 (1955); Rogers v. City of Chattanooga, 39 Tenn. App. 176, 281 S.W.2d 504 (1954). There can be no closing of the eyes to the hundreds of cases appearing in the reports of our sister states around the country where death or serious injury arose out of contact or near contact between high rise mechanical equipment and uninsulated wires carrying deadly current.

Brown v. New York Cent. R. Co., D.C. E.D.Mich., 53 F.2d 490, 491, affirmed 63 F.2d 657, certiorari denied 290 U.S. 634, 54 S.Ct. 52, 78 L.Ed. 551; Conowingo Power Co. v. State of Maryland, 4 Cir., 120 F.2d 870, 875; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 111. The trial court found that "sometime prior to the damage referred to [the anti-freeze solution] was poured in the crankcase of the three pieces of equipment.

The appellant was therefore liable for injury to Stapleton caused by its negligent omission to advise him of his tubercular condition. Prosser on Torts, § 38, pages 185-188 (1955 Ed.); Restatement of Torts, § 325; Perrone v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 2 Cir., 1943, 136 F.2d 941, 943; Conowingo Power Co. v. State of Maryland, 4 Cir., 1941, 120 F.2d 870, 874. There remains the question of whether Stapleton's cause of action was barred by the one year statute of limitations applicable to actions for personal injury in Tennessee.

There was no evidence that Martin took any action or refrained from taking any action in the design, manufacture or testing of the critical wing splice in reliance upon Northwest's inspection. Where one undertakes an act which he has no duty to perform, and another reasonably relies upon that undertaking, the act must generally be performed with ordinary care. See Conowingo Power Co. v. State of Maryland, 4 Cir., 1941, 120 F.2d 870, 874. Cf. Restatement of Law of Torts, § 325. That, however, is not this case. There was no evidence that Martin relied in any way upon the inspections made by Northwest, with respect to the airplanes generally or the wing joint in particular.

Monroe v. San Joaquin Light Power Corp., 42 Cal.App.2d 641, 109 P.2d 720; Mares v. New Mexico Public Service Co., 42 N.M. 473, 82 P.2d 257; Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Compton, 39 Ariz. 491, 8 P.2d 249; Miller v. Suburban Power Co., 41 Ohio App. 70, 179 N.E. 202. Conowingo Power Co. v. State of Maryland, 4 Cir., 120 F.2d 870; Mares v. New Mexico Public Service Co., 42 N.M. 473, 82 P.2d 257. Lozano v. Pacific Gas Electric Co., 70 Cal.App.2d 415, 161 P.2d 74; Oklahoma Gas Electric Co. v. Wilson, 172 Okla. 540, 45 P.2d 750; Troidle v. Adirondack Power Light Corp., 252 N.Y. 483, 169 N.E. 654.

His neglect to give warning of any danger amounted to an assertion that the wire was clear. Elias v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 226 N.Y. 154, 123 N.E. 73; Conowingo Power Co. v. Maryland, 4 Cir., 120 F.2d 870; Ashby v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 328 Pa. 474, 195 A. 887; Restatement Torts, § 303, § 325 and § 345. The records of the railroad for February 20, 1942, indicated that the wire was de-energized at the precise moment when the accident is said to have happened.