Opinion
No. 88-1424.
March 1, 1989. Rehearing Denied April 7, 1989.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Palm Beach County, Richard B. Burk, J.
Harry G. Carratt of Morgan, Carratt and O'Connor, P.A., and Joe Hubert of Hubert Tompkins, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
Spencer M. Sax and Louise E. Tudzarov of Sachs Sax, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellee.
In our view, the trial court erred in awarding Ocean Terrace North Condominium Association, Inc. (Ocean Terrace) the sum of $61,452.00 from the registry of the court. Since the money had been deposited in Case No. 86-4052 CL O in the registry of the court for a specific condition and contingency which had not occurred, the trial court erred in releasing the funds to satisfy a judgment entered in another case, No. 86-8640 CA LB.
Ocean Terrace brought two separate cases against Connor Realty, Inc. (Connor). The first case, No. 86-4052 CL O, concerned a "lien" on condominium units for failure to pay the association past due assessments and the second case, No. 86-8640 CA LB, was for breach of warranties in the construction of the condominiums. In order for the lis pendens to be discharged in Case No. 86-4052 CL O, Connor posted a bond in the amount of $120,000.00 in the court registry.
Before Case No. 86-4052 CL O was concluded, the trial court in the breach of warranties case entered final judgment in the amount of $61,452.00. Ocean Terrace then motioned the trial court in Case No. 86-4052 CL O to withdraw funds from the court registry to satisfy the judgment entered in Case No. 86-8640 CA LB. The trial court granted this motion on May 5, 1988, approximately three months before judgment was entered in Case No. 86-4052 CL O.
The bond must be construed in light of the court's order establishing it. Baer v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 130 F. 94 (5th Cir. 1904). In the instant case, the bond should be construed as being conditioned on a judgment of a lien on the condominium units since that is to what the court's order pertained. Thus, the trial court erred in releasing the funds from the bond on the lien case to satisfy a judgment entered in another case that was not related to the lien dispute.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
LETTS, J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with opinion.
I think the trial judge acted with eminent good sense under the peculiar circumstances of this case. The appellee has two (2) money judgments against the appellants, one for $61,452.00 entered on January 29, 1988, and not superseded or stayed, and the other for $116,226.00 entered on August 14, 1988, and not superseded or stayed. In each case it is the appellee that is legally entitled to be paid and the appellants that are legally obligated to pay. Only money damages are awarded in the judgments, no equitable relief or liens having been sought or awarded. Under these circumstances I see no error in the trial court permitting the appellee to satisfy the earlier money judgment out of the appellants' money placed in the registry of the court to protect the appellee.
If some equitable claim or lien rights were in question, I might agree with the majority. However, since money owed is money owed, I do not see how the appellants can avoid paying the appellee on the first money judgment by claiming that the money in the court registry can only be paid to appellee to satisfy the second judgment. In reality, the appellee is the only one who suffers by the release of funds since its security has been reduced. No additional security or lien rights were sought by, or granted to appellee to replace the disbursed funds. In short, since the same parties are involved, and the claims are only for money damages I see no error by the trial court in allowing appellee to collect a part of its debt from the appellants out of funds put up to secure another debt owed to appellee.
In addition, in an agreed order entered on October 17, 1988, the trial court ordered the balance of the money in the registry of the court to be disbursed to the appellee in further satisfaction of the judgments obtained against the appellants. This action effectively moots this appeal. By our reversal we are putting $61,452.00 back in the court registry, only to have the trial court then order those funds paid to appellee for money damages still owed.