Opinion
1782CV1126 1882CV1119
05-17-2019
Dan CONNOLLY v. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF BOSTON, a Corporation Sole et al.[1] Paul Connolly Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, a Corporation Sole et al.[2]
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Elaine M. Buckley, Justice of the Superior Court
These consolidated actions seek redress for sexual abuse allegedly committed by the late Father Brian Gallagher on the plaintiffs, brothers Dan and Paul Connolly, as young boys. The plaintiffs claim defendants Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, a corporation sole, (RCAB); Missionary Society of St. Columban (Columban Fathers); and others are liable, under several tort theories, for the abuse so alleged.
The matter is before the Court now on motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) by both RCAB and Columban Fathers (hereinafter sometimes, defendants). The defendants move to dismiss the counts pleaded against them, respectively, for vicarious liability and ratification with respect to Gallagher’s alleged conduct, and breach of fiduciary duty. After hearing, each motion is allowed in part and denied in part.
Columban Fathers had also moved to dismiss the vicarious liability counts pleaded against it in Count XVI of each plaintiff’s operative complaint, but both plaintiffs have since dismissed those respective counts pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(i). Specifically at issue are the following: in Dan Connolly’s First Amended Complaint and in Paul Connolly’s Complaint are, as alleged against RCAB, Count I (vicarious liability for conduct of Gallagher), Count II (ratification), and Count VI (breach of fiduciary duty); and, as alleged against Columban Fathers, Count VIII (vicarious liability for conduct of Gallagher), Count IX (ratification); and Count XIII (breach of fiduciary duty).
1. Background
The plaintiffs identify the following facts as material to the claims at issue.
Under rule 12, the Court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations, including facts alleged upon "information and belief," as true. See, e.g., Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 379, 382 & 383 n.5 (2014). The Court expressly declines to consider the materials, as outside of the pleadings, which the plaintiffs offered at the motion hearing.
Gallagher was ordained as a Columban Fathers’ priest in 1952 in Ireland, his home country, and remained a Columban Fathers’ priest until his death on November 5, 2014. From approximately 1953 to 1973, Gallagher was assigned by Columban Fathers to serve in various positions in Japan. The plaintiffs allege, upon "information and belief," that Gallagher sexually abused many minor boys while ministering for the Columban Fathers. The plaintiffs also allege, upon "information and belief," that Columban Fathers transferred Gallagher out of Japan because of his sexual abuse of young boys there.
In 1973, Columban Fathers transferred Gallagher to the United States. The plaintiffs allege that, prior to that year, the Columban Fathers, including certain yet to be identified individuals, "were aware or reasonably should have been aware" of Gallagher’s serial sexual abuse of young boys.
Beginning in or about 1973, Columban Fathers assigned Gallagher to a residence house/seminary it owned and operated in the town of Milton, Massachusetts (Columbans’ Milton House or Milton House). The Columbans’ Milton House was used primarily to house members of the Columban Fathers located in the area. The plaintiffs allege, upon "information and belief," that Gallagher was in charge of the Milton House.
With the permission of Gallagher, in 1976 RCAB assigned Father Paul Shanley to the Columbans’ Milton House location as his residency and ministry position. Shanley, under the auspices of RCAB, established the Exodus Center there as a retreat for "troubled homosexual" men, where they could receive counseling and lodging. Individuals who have identified as sexual abuse victims of Shanley allege he sexually abused them at RCAB’s Exodus Center during that time period. Shanley was later criminally convicted of sex abuse of minor boys.
RCAB was responsible for the hiring, training, retention, assignment, and supervision of priests who were its employees "and/or agents" and who served as priests at the Archdiocese of Boston (Archdiocese) churches and other facilities within the Archdiocese. The plaintiffs allege that, in or about the same time period Gallagher and the Columban Fathers allowed RCAB and Shanley to operate the Exodus Center, RCAB and/or the Columban Fathers authorized or allowed Gallagher to represent himself as a priest and/or chaplain "and/or agent" of the Archdiocese, to wear the clerical clothing and vestments of a Roman Catholic priest, to say Masses and administer the sacraments recognized by the Roman Catholic Church, to teach and counsel its parishioners, including minors, on behalf of the Archdiocese, and otherwise to exercise the rights, duties, privileges and responsibilities of a priest and/or chaplain of the Archdiocese.
During this period, St. Mark’s Parish in the Dorchester section of the city of Boston was a Catholic parish of the Archdiocese. It was also Shanley’s home parish and one with which he was "well-connected." Gallagher was assigned by the Columban Fathers and/or RCAB to serve as a priest of St. Mark’s Parish, or was permitted to act as if he had been so assigned. Gallagher often said Mass. there, performed other priestly duties there, and/or at other churches or rectories of the Archdiocese nearby.
During this period, St. Joseph’s Nursing Care Center in Dorchester was a nursing care facility maintained by RCAB. The Columban Fathers and/or RCAB assigned Gallagher to be the chaplain at this facility or permitted him to act as if he had been so assigned.
The plaintiffs allege RCAB and Columban Fathers granted Gallagher and other priests "extraordinary" power and control over parishioners, and particularly over children such as the plaintiffs. RCAB and Columban Fathers allegedly "cloaked" Gallagher "in an aura of credibility, plausibility and legitimacy as a priest who could be trusted around children and contributed to empowering [him] to commit acts of sexual abuse against children." According to the plaintiffs, by "aiding in the agency" of Gallagher, RCAB and Columban Fathers "imbued" him "with unchecked power to sexually abuse Catholic boys."
At relevant times during this period, each of the plaintiffs was a minor child living with their parents in Dorchester. They and their families were active members of St. Mark’s Parish, where the plaintiffs and their other brothers were altar servers. Each plaintiff and his siblings attended the St. Mark’s Parish elementary school, and their mother worked in the rectory of St. Mark’s Parish. At relevant times, two of the plaintiffs’ other brothers had jobs as dishwashers at St. Joseph’s Nursing Cate Center. Gallagher, in his capacity as a priest of St. Mark’s Parish and/or as the chaplain of St. Joseph’s Nursing Care Center, was a regular visitor to the plaintiffs’ family home.
In or about 1973-1975, Gallagher sexually assaulted Paul Connolly; the assaults included rape.
In or about 1976, in the kitchen of the plaintiffs’ family home, Gallagher isolated Dan Connolly and sexually assaulted him by putting his hands down Dan’s pants, and fondling his genitalia and repeatedly inserting his fingers into Dan’s rectum. During this same period, Gallagher isolated Dan in the backyard of the plaintiffs’ home and sexually assaulted him in the same manner. During this same period, Gallagher took Dan into Gallagher’s parked car and sexually assaulted him. Dan was in the back seat with no pants or shirt on. Gallagher was in the front seat with his penis and testicles exposed. Gallagher reached back and touched Dan. During this same period, Gallagher took Dan alone into a basement and sexually assaulted him. Gallagher tied Dan’s hands and wrists with wires and took Dan’s pants off.
The plaintiffs allege, on "information and belief," that at the time of Shanley’s assignment to the Exodus Center, RCAB was aware, "or reasonably should have been aware," that he was a sex abuser of young boys, because, starting in 1967, RCAB had received numerous reports concerning sex abuse of minors perpetrated by Shanley. The plaintiffs additionally allege, on "information and belief," that certain yet to be identified individuals, employees "or agents" of RCAB, were aware, "or reasonably should have been aware," that Gallagher was sexually abusing young boys while he was assigned to and performing ministry positions at St. Mark’s Parish and St. Joseph’s Nursing Care Center. The plaintiffs further allege, on "information and belief," that certain yet to be identified individuals, employees "or agents" of Columban Fathers were aware, "or reasonably should have been aware," that Gallagher was sexually abusing young boys while he was assigned to the Columbans’ Milton House and working in ministry positions at St. Mark’s Parish and St. Joseph’s Nursing Care Center.
2. Discussion
The standard of review governing the defendants’ motions is well settled. In considering a motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint, "as well as any favorable inferences that reasonably can be drawn from them," Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 379, 382 (2014), quoting Galiastro v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 164 (2014), but disregards "legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations," id., quoting Leavitt v. Brockton Hosp., Inc., 454 Mass. 37, 39 n.6 (2009). For a claim to survive a rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations of fact, when taken as true, must reasonably permit the inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct so claimed. See Polay v. McMahon, supra .
In their respective operative pleadings, the plaintiffs have asserted substantively identical claims as each other, including as to the counts at issue here for vicarious liability and ratification with respect to the alleged actions of Gallagher, and for breach of fiduciary duty. With modest factual differences, those counts also allege substantively identical claims against the defendants. The Court therefore considers them together, and addresses them in turn.
a. Counts I & VIII (Vicarious Liability)
In Counts I and VIII of their respective complaints, each of the plaintiffs alleges claims against RCAB and Columban Fathers on a theory that they each were vicariously liable for Gallagher’s tortious conduct. As the Supreme Judicial Court has explained, "[l]iability on those grounds ‘is the proposition that an employer, or master, should be held vicariously liable for the torts of its employee, or servant, committed within the scope of employment.’ " Petrell v. Shaw, 453 Mass. 377, 384 (2009), quoting Dias v. Brigham Med. Assocs., 438 Mass. 317, 319-20 (2002). The plaintiffs in part claim Gallagher committed sexual assaults against them "while acting within the scope of his employment" with both RCAB and Columban Fathers. The Court disagrees.
While the complaints do allege that Gallagher committed sexual assaults while employed by, or otherwise acting as an agent of, the defendants, there is no factual basis in the complaints from which reasonably to infer this tortious conduct fell within "the scope" of that employment or agency, as the plaintiffs argue. Indeed, courts in Massachusetts and elsewhere consistently have rejected substantively identical claims. See, e.g., Petrell v. Shaw, supra, and cases cited. After all, "[t]he scope of employment test asks the question: is this the kind of thing that in a general way employees of this kind do in employment of this kind." Kansallis Fin. Ltd v. Fern, 421 Mass. 659, 665 (1996).
To be sure, unauthorized conduct, or even an intentional tortious or criminal action, does not, for that reason, necessarily fall outside the scope of employment, see Restatement (Second) of Agency § 231 (1958) ("An act may be within the scope of employment although consciously criminal or tortious"), but some alignment must exist between the challenged conduct and the purpose of the employment or interests of the employer, see, e.g., id., and cases cited, see also, e.g., McIntyre ex rel. Estate of McIntyre v. United States, 545 F.3d 27, 45-47 (2008) (FBI agent’s leak of informant’s identity); Maimaron v. Commonwealth, 449 Mass. 167, 176 (2007) (police officer’s violation plaintiff’s civil rights through committing torts of assault and battery and false arrest). The salient consideration is not the conduct in isolation, but in the context of the agency or employment. Conduct falls outside scope of employment where it is "different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(2) (1958); Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 422 Mass. 563, 568 (1996), quoting from Wang Labs., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 398 Mass. 854, 859 (1986); Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 408 Mass. 393, 404 (1990). The factual content of the plaintiffs’ complaints does not reasonably permit inferring any sort of congruence between the rape and other sexual assaults Gallagher allegedly committed and the purpose of his employment as a priest and chaplain, or other interests of RCAB or Columban Fathers.
The plaintiffs’ resort to "apparent agency" and "aided-in-agency" theories of establishing vicarious liability is unavailing, and for essentially the same reasons.
In regard to the former, the plaintiffs are correct that liability may be vicariously imposed upon a principal where "the authority is only apparent," Kansallis Fin. Ltd. v. Fern, supra at 665. Under settled law, apparent authority "results from conduct by the principal which causes a third person reasonably to believe that a particular person ... has authority to ... make representations [or otherwise act as the principal’s] agent." Hudson v. Massachusetts Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 386 Mass. 450, 457 (1982) (first omission in original), quoting from W.A. Seavey, Agency § 8D, at 13 (1964). See Kansallis Fin. Ltd. v. Fern, supra. Accordingly, "[a]pparent authority is not established by the putative agent’s words or conduct, but by those of the principal," Rubel v. Hayden, Hardin & Buchanan, Inc., 15 Mass.App.Ct. 252, 255 (1983), "at the time" of the relevant transaction or representation. See Theos & Sons, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 431 Mass. 736, 745 (2000).
However, as observed by the Supreme Judicial Court, "there is little fairness in saddling the principal with liability for acts that a reasonable third party would not have supposed were taken on the principal’s behalf," Kansallis Fin. Ltd. v. Fern, supra. And, on the facts alleged by the plaintiffs here, no reasonable person could have so supposed that the rape and other sexual assaults Gallagher is claimed to have committed on young boys were acts taken on behalf of RCAB or Columban Fathers. No case holding cited by the plaintiffs is to the contrary.
The plaintiffs’ aided-in-agency theory presents a closer question, but still falls short on the facts alleged. The plaintiffs base this theory on section 219 of the Second Restatement of Agency, supra . In relevant part, under section 219(2)(d), a master may be "subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment," if "the servant ... was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation." The plaintiffs point out that some courts have upheld the imposition of vicarious liability on an employer under this Restatement section, under particular circumstances, for, e.g., sexual assaults committed outside the scope of the employee’s employment. See Spurlock v. Townes, 368 P.3d 1213, 1217 (N.M. 2016), citing and quoting Ayuluk v. Red Oaks Assisted Living, Inc., 201 P.3d 1183, 1199 (Alaska 2009) (in case of corrections officer’s assault of female inmates, observing that aided-in-agency principle may apply to extend vicarious liability, "where an employee has by reason of his employment substantial power or authority to control important elements of a vulnerable tort victim’s life or livelihood").
Although the defendants apparently are correct that no Massachusetts court has expressly recognized this theory or adopted this Restatement section, "[n]o litigant is automatically denied relief solely because he presents a question on which there is no Massachusetts judicial precedent," George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 249 (1971). That said, for the reasons discussed infra, it is problematic to apply this Restatement principle, in the particular factual circumstances alleged in this case.
However, those authorities are not persuasive for two reasons. First, there is conflicting authority in various jurisdictions whether to adopt section 219(2)(d) at all, and, if so, how and to what extent, see, e.g., Pena v. Greffet, 110 F.Supp.3d 1103, 1119-20 (D.N.M. 2015), citing cases. Indeed, there is considerable doubt as to the continuing viability of this doctrine, given that its drafters "abandon[ed it] ... altogether" in the Third Restatement of Agency. See id. at 1115-19 (discussing Restatements). Second, well-reasoned appellate authority has rejected application of section 219(2)(d) in cases involving similar claims of sexual abuse of children by a religious official. See, e.g., Doe v. Newbury Bible Church, 182 Vt. 174, 175 (2007) (answering negative to the certified question: "is a church subject to vicarious liability for the tortious acts of its pastor under the Restatement [Second] of Agency § 219[2][d] if the pastor was allegedly ‘aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation’ with the church?") Of note, the Doe v. Newbury Bible Church decision, supra, expressly distinguished cases, such as that relied upon by the plaintiffs here, where vicarious liability had been imposed under section 219(2)(d) for the actions of a law enforcement officer. See id. at 178-80 (unlike police officer, church pastor is not public actor for whom policy reasons support imposition of liability, does not have authority equivalent to police power, and is not perpetrator with respect to whom victim is "uniquely isolated from the protections of the rule of law").
In sum, the plaintiffs have failed to state facially plausible claims against these defendants based upon the pleaded vicarious liability theories in Counts I and VIII. Those counts therefore must be dismissed pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
a. Counts II & IX (Ratification)
In Counts II and IX of the operative complaints, the plaintiffs claim that RCAB and Columban Fathers, respectively, alternatively are vicariously liable under the theory that they ratified Gallagher’s tortious conduct. "It is a well-established principle that an employer is not only liable for torts committed by its servants acting within the scope of their employment but, ‘by ratification may become responsible for such acts when committed in excess of their authority.’ " Pinshaw v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm’n, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 733, 735 (1992), quoting White v. Apsley Rubber Co., 194 Mass. 97, 99 (1907); Petrell v. Shaw, supra at 384 n.5. The plaintiffs argue that such liability should be vicariously imposed here, citing their allegations to the effect that each defendant was, or should have been, aware of sexual abuse in its parishes, "especially those where Father Shanley operated," including the Columbans’ Milton House. Again, the Court is constrained to disagree.
The fundamental problem with this argument is that liability for ratification of an act is imposed only where a defendant knew or should have known of the specific act in question. In Petrell v. Shaw, for instance, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the theory of liability based upon ratification because, as here, no reasonable inference could be drawn to suggest that the defendant bishop of the diocese "ratified [the parish rector’s] conduct after being made aware of the allegation of [such conduct]." 453 Mass. at 384 n.5 (emphasis supplied). Here, the plaintiffs allege RCAB and Columban Fathers were aware of sexual abuse of children in parishes prior to 1973 generally, and perhaps also of Gallagher’s alleged conduct while in Japan, and of Shanley’s conduct, but there is no allegation either defendant was made aware of Gallagher’s alleged sexual assaults of these plaintiffs specifically, and then failed to make further inquiry or "disavow the unauthorized conduct," Linkage Corp. v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 425 Mass. 1, 18 (1987). In addition; each plaintiff expressly states in his respective complaint that he "did not tell anyone" of the alleged abuse "until 2016."
The Court has not overlooked the representations the plaintiffs’ counsel made at the motion hearing that the plaintiffs have since obtained information which could show such specific awareness of the sexual abuse of the plaintiffs by Gallagher, as well as the defendants’ concomitant failure to address same. The Court cannot consider such information under rule 12(b)(6).
Counts II and IX accordingly must be dismissed pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
c. Counts VIII and XIII (Breach of Fiduciary Duty)
In Counts VIII and XIII of their complaints, the plaintiffs claim RCAB and Columban Fathers, respectively, are liable for having breached fiduciary duties they each owed the plaintiffs. The defendants argue that those counts must be dismissed on the basis that the factual allegations in the complaints fail to establish the existence of a cognizable fiduciary duty. According to the defendants, the holding in Maffei v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 449 Mass. 235 (2007) (Maffei ), precludes the plaintiffs’ fiduciary breach claims, on the basis that the operative complaints here also allege a relationship between the plaintiffs and RCAB and Columban Fathers, "based on no more than their shared religious affiliation," which, Supreme Judicial Court held, "provides no basis to support liability in a civil context," Petrell v. Shaw, supra, at 383, citing Maffei, supra . The Court disagrees.
A fiduciary duty may be created by law, or the fiduciary relationship may "arise from the nature of the parties’ interactions." Doe v. Harbor Schs., Inc., 446 Mass. 245, 252 (2006). Because circumstances that may give rise to fiduciary relationships are thus "so varied," courts have expressly declined to formulate a definition "that could be uniformly applied in every case." Id., quoting Warsofsky v. Sherman, 326 Mass. 290, 292 (1950). "As a general matter, however, a fiduciary duty arises in a context where ‘one reposes faith, confidence, and trust in another’s judgment and advice.’ " Id., quoting from Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, & Tyler, P.C., 107 Mich.App. 509, 515 (1981).
While there is scant Massachusetts case law directly on point, decisions from outside the Commonwealth support inferring the existence plaintiffs’ claimed fiduciary relationship with the defendants. For instance, in Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., a former parishioner accused his former priest of sexual abuse when the parishioner was a teenager, and alleged claims inter alia for breach of fiduciary duty against the defendant Diocese. 196 F.3d 409, 413-16 (2d Cir. 1999) (Martinelli ). A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on that claim, and, in affirming that determination, the Federal Court of Appeals agreed that, "irrespective of the duties of the Diocese to its parishioners generally, the jury could reasonably have found that the Diocese’s relationship with [the plaintiff] ... was of a fiduciary nature," based on the particular evidence that established "his ties to [the priest] and the Diocese’s knowledge and sponsorship of that relationship." Id. at 429. While, to be sure, the specific evidence adduced at trial in that case differed from the facts alleged here, there also are material similarities- including a special relationship of trust and confidence, not just between the plaintiff and the priest but, between the plaintiff and diocese- that imbue the fiduciary duty claims pleaded here with legal plausibility sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See id. at 430. In addition, the court in Martinelli held that the First Amendment did not bar courts deciding such secular civil disputes involving religious institutions, since the claim was brought under State law, and not church law, and a jury would not be required to resolve any disputed religious issues. See id. at 430-32.
The evidence included the abused boy’s considerable involvement with church activities, the Diocese’s knowledge of the priest’s history of, and predilection for, sexually abusing young boys, the Diocese’s knowledge that the priest’s activities put him in close contact with such boys, the boy’s regard for the priest as spiritual and moral authority, and the boy’s parents’ allowance of the boy to participate with the priest and others in activities because the parents trusted the priest "inasmuch as he was a priest." See Martinelli, supra at 429-30.
Similarly, and drawing upon the holding in Martinelli, the Federal District Court in Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. - a case involving a teenage girl’s sexual abuse by a priest- held the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts "to indicate a unique situation that support[ed] a fiduciary duty claim" against Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation and St. Columba Church to survive a motion to dismiss. 309 F.Supp.2d 247 (D.Conn. 2004). Specifically, the court found a fiduciary relationship could be inferred based upon allegations that the plaintiff had participated in activities sponsored by those defendants and consulted with the priest for spiritual and religious counseling, as those defendants had encouraged; the priest had attended dinners at the plaintiff’s family home; those defendants had encouraged the priest to involve himself in the activities in which the plaintiff participated, as well as to have interaction with church members; and those defendants knew or should have known that the priest had impermissibly engaged in a sexual relationship prior to his assignment to the church. See id. at 252-53.
And, drawing upon both those decisions, the Federal District Court in Lewis v. Bellows Falls Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 95 F.Supp.3d 762 (D.Vt. 2015) (Lewis )- a case brought by a former congregant against a church, a minister, and others, alleging the minister had sexually abused the congregant when she was a child- dismissed the plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claims, but held that, to state a facially plausible claim for breach of fiduciary duty in an amended complaint, the plaintiff would have to plead facts supporting (1) the "particulars of [her] ties" to the minister and the defendant church, and (2) the church’s "knowledge and sponsorship of that relationship." Id., at 766, quoting Martinelli, 196 F.3d at 429 (alteration in Lewis ).
The defendant’s reliance upon Maffei broadly to preclude the existence of any fiduciary duty flowing from them to the plaintiffs is misplaced. As courts have held in more factually similar cases, under State civil law and without offending the First Amendment, a plaintiff claiming sexual abuse as a minor by a priest (or similar religious authority figure) may allege a cognizable breach of fiduciary duty claim against a defendant church, diocese, or other such entity, upon sufficiently alleging the "particulars of [the plaintiff’s] ties" to the priest and the associated defendant religious entity, and (2) the defendant. entity’s "knowledge and sponsorship of that relationship." As the plaintiffs argue, their respective complaints contain sufficient factual allegations which, taken as true, reasonably support inferring those components of a plausible fiduciary duty claim.
Counts VIII and XIII accordingly must not be dismissed pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
ORDER
It therefore is ORDERED that:
1. in Norfolk County Superior Court Civil Action No. 1782CV01126, (a) the motion to dismiss filed by defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, a corporation sole, (RCAB), (paper no. 27.0) be, and hereby is, ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part, and (b) the motion to dismiss filed by Missionary Society of St. Columban (Columban Fathers), (paper no. 28.0) be, and hereby is, ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part ;
and therefore further ORDERED that:
in Norfolk County Superior Court Civil Action No. 1884CV00690, (a) the motion to dismiss filed by RCAB (paper no. 15.0) be, and hereby is, ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part, and (b) the motion to dismiss filed by Columban Fathers (paper no. 16.0) be, and hereby is, ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part .