Connolly v. National School Bus Service

115 Citing cases

  1. Hudak v. St. Joseph Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs

    3:18-CV-932 RLM (N.D. Ind. May. 4, 2022)

    A reasonable hourly rate is usually the rate an attorney actually charges for comparable work and should reflect rates charged by other lawyers in the community of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Connolly v. Nat'l Sch. Bus Serv., 177 F.3d 593, 596 (7th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff should provide some evidence of market rates in addition to the attorney's affidavits about their own rates.

  2. Teresa R. v. Madison Metropolitan School Dist

    615 F. Supp. 2d 860 (W.D. Wis. 2009)

    " 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C); see also,People Who Care, 90 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11 (1984)) (in determining market rate court should look to "the rate charged by lawyers in the community of `reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.'"). Furthermore, "`the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence-in addition to the attorney's own affidavits — that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community.'" Connolly v. National School Bus Service, Inc., 177 F.3d 593, 596 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n. 11). If the fee applicant provides such evidence, then the burden shifts to defendant to prove that there is a good reason why a lower rate is essential. Connolly, 177 F.3d at 596 (citations omitted). In this case, plaintiffs submitted two affidavits in support of their rates, one from the attorney and another from a Milwaukee lawyer who also works in the area of special education law.

  3. Small v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp.

    264 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2001)   Cited 113 times
    Holding that the defendants "neutralized" the evidentiary impact of affidavits from other attorneys by citing to recent fee awards

    Plaintiffs' counsel in this case, Ernest T. Rossiello, has previously appealed fee awards to this court. See, e.g., Connolly v. National School Bus Serv., 177 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming reduction of Rossiello's hourly fee from $320 to $285); Uphoff v. Elegant Bath, Ltd., 176 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming reduction of Rossiello's hourly fee from $320 to $280); Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming reduction of Rossiello's hourly fee from $320 to $280). In the present motion for attorney's fees submitted to Judge Hibbler on June 9, 2000, Rossiello sought an hourly rate of $425 for 111 hours of work. He also sought compensation for 10.4 hours spent by his staff, at rates of $260 per hour for Lara A. Walicek, an attorney with eight years' experience who was also a certified public accountant; $230 an hour for Sheni Hajat, an attorney with five years' experience; $137.50 an hour for Joanna M. Kielczewski, an attorney with one year's experience; and $120 an hour for Dina Cavico, a paralegal with 10 years' experience.

  4. Ellis v. Whitewater Auto, Inc.

    662 F. Supp. 3d 971 (E.D. Wis. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    In another case, the district court first modified the lodestar figure, and then reduced the resulting amount by 50% to account for the plaintiff's limited success. Connolly v. Nat'l Sch. Bus Serv., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 1032, 1039 (N.D. Ill. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 177 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999). The court then further reduced the lodestar figure by an additional 33% to account for the plaintiff's "unnecessarily prolonged litigation."

  5. Catalan v. RBC Mortgage Co.

    Case No. 05 cv 6920 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 16, 2009)   Cited 6 times
    Awarding fees nearly 15 times greater than the damage award

    By contrast, where it cannot be said that the results obtained were "excellent," the lodestar figure remains the point of initial departure, but the "district court may then adjust that figure to reflect various factors including the complexity of the legal issues involved, the degree of success obtained, and the public interest advanced by the litigation." Schlacher, 574 F.3d at 856-57; see also Estate of Enoch, 570 F.3d at 823-24 ("The lodestar figure is the `starting point,'" but other factors that properly may bear on the calculus include "whether, in addition to the claims on which plaintiffs prevailed, there are other claims on which they did not prevail," as well as the overall "results obtained in the litigation"); Connolly v. Nat'l Sch. Bus. Svc, Inc., 177 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the court has used a three-part test "in determining the degree of success a plaintiff has obtained": (i) the difference between the actual judgment and the recovery sought, (ii) the significance of the legal issues on which the plaintiff prevailed, and (iii) the public interest at stake in the litigation). And of these factors, "success is the most significant * * * for a judge to consider in deciding what is a reasonable fee."

  6. Bacino v. McDermott

    No. 2:04-CV-134 PPS (N.D. Ind. Sep. 26, 2006)

    "[S]uccess is the most significant of the Hensley factors for a district court judge to consider in deciding what is a reasonable fee." Connolly v. Nat'l School Bus Serv., Inc., 177 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436). If the prevailing party achieves only partial success, a court may reduce the fee award by a percentage.

  7. United States v. Heinrich

    971 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2020)   Cited 5 times

    District judges have broad powers, some of which they may properly delegate to a law clerk, who serves as a "judicial adjunct." Connolly v. Nat'l Sch. Bus Serv., Inc. , 177 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 1999). But a law clerk's "duties and responsibilities are to assist [a] judge in his work, not to be the judge."

  8. Moriarty v. Svec

    233 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2000)   Cited 145 times
    Holding that the district court should consider settlement offers “roughly equal to or more than the total damages recovered by the prevailing party” and “reflect on whether to award only a percentage (including zero percent) of the attorney's fees that were incurred after the date of the settlement offer”

    We have not formulated any mechanical rules requiring that a reasonable attorney's fee be no greater than some multiple of the damages claimed or recovered. See Connolly v. National Sch. Bus Serv., Inc., 177 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1998). However, proportionality concerns are a factor in determining what a reasonable attorney's fee is.

  9. Connolly v. Laidlaw, Inc.

    233 F.3d 451 (7th Cir. 2000)   Cited 1 times

    BAUER, Circuit Judge. We first sampled this attorney's fees case in Connolly v. National Sch. Bus Serv., Inc., 177 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999) (" Connolly I"), an appeal from the district court's award of $23,281.16 to plaintiff's attorney Mr. Earnest T. Rossiello, Connolly v. National School Bus Service, 992 F.Supp. 1032 (N.D.Ill. 1998), who sought some $97,000. Unhappily, we take a second bite. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ("A request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation.

  10. Walker v. City of Milwaukee

    No. 20-CV-487 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 29, 2024)

    (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The fee applicant bears the burden of “produc[ing] satisfactory evidence-in addition to the attorney's own affidavits-that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community.” Connolly v. Nat'l Sch. Bus Serv., Inc., 177 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11 (1984)).