Connellan v. Coffey

21 Citing cases

  1. Falcon v. Memorial Hosp

    436 Mich. 443 (Mich. 1990)   Cited 45 times
    Holding plaintiff claiming lost chance must prove defendant reduced opportunity of avoiding harm

    Cases retaining the more likely than not standard for causation in medical malpractice cases include Alfonso v Lund, 783 F.2d 958 (CA 10, 1986) (applying New Mexico law); Connellan v Coffey, 122 Conn. 136; 187 A 901 (1936); LaBieniec v Baker, 11 Conn. App. 199; 526 A.2d 1341 (1987); Gooding v Univ Hosp Bldg, Inc, 445 So.2d 1015, 1018 (Fla, 1984); Walden v Jones, 439 S.W.2d 571 (Ky, 1978); Anthony v Hosp Service Dist No 1, 477 So 2d 1180 (La App, 1985); Cornfeldt v Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638 (Minn, 1980); Ladner v Campbell, 515 So.2d 882 (Miss, 1987); Pillsbury-Flood v Portsmouth Hosp, 128 N.H. 299; 512 A.2d 1126 (1986); Cooper v Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, 27 Ohio St.2d 242; 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971). There are several jurisdictions in which conflicting decisions exist, see 54 ALR4th 10, § 7, p 42.

  2. Borkowski v. Sacheti

    43 Conn. App. 294 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 44 times
    Recognizing that patient's conduct did not rise to level of contributory negligence but was relevant in determining defendant's level of liability

    The traditional standard of the sufficiency of the evidence for submitting a medical malpractice case to the jury has required a plaintiff to adduce evidence of a reasonable medical probability that his injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of one or more of the defendants. This meant demonstrating that it is more likely than not that the injury, harm or condition claimed to have resulted from that negligence, was a substantial factor in causing the injury, harm or condition and without which that injury, harm or condition would not have occurred. See Connellan v. Coffey, 122 Conn. 136, 187 A.2d 901 (1936); Gooding v. University Hospital Building, Inc., supra; Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., supra. Where a preexisting condition is involved, a loss of chance plaintiff, in order to meet the traditional standard of causation, must prove that the victim of the alleged negligence probably would have survived had he been treated properly. If, however, the victim probably would not have survived, the cause of his death, if he died, would not have been the defendant's alleged negligence, but the preexisting condition.

  3. Pinnock v. City of New Haven

    553 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Conn. 2008)   Cited 7 times

    "If the chain of causation of the damage, when traced from the beginning to the end, includes an act or omission which, even if wrongful or negligent, is or becomes of no consequence in the results or so trivial as to be a mere incident of the operating cause, it is not such a factor as will impose liability for those results." Grody, 170 Conn. at 448-49 (quoting Connellan v. Coffey, 122 Conn. 136, 142 (1936)); see also Ward v. Greene, 267 Conn. 539, 546-47 (2004). The autopsy performed by Dr. Shah showed that the cause of death was a spontaneous rupture of a berry aneuryism, and the manner of death was "natural."

  4. Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

    CIV. NO. 3:99CV2238 (AHN) (D. Conn. Mar. 12, 2004)

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mather v. Griffin Hospital, 207 Conn. 125, 130 (1988), (quoting Connellan v. Coffey, 122 Conn. 136, 141 (1936), and Pilon v. Alderman, 112 Conn. 300, 301-302 (1930)); see Phelps v. Lankes, 74 Conn. App. 597, 606-07 (2003) (distinguishing Tesler and relying onMather). Accordingly, defendant will provide new responses to Requests No. 1-16, 21 and 35 within ten (10) days.

  5. Parkins v. U.S.

    834 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1993)

    Causation must be removed from the realm of speculation and conjecture. Pisel, 180 Conn. at 341-42, 430 A.2d 1. If defendant's acts are a mere incident to the operating cause of injury, they are not such as would impose liability for ultimately unfavorable results. Connellan v. Coffey, 122 Conn. 136, 142, 187 A. 901 (1936); Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 197, 147 A. 762 (1929). In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence any causal connection between the death of Frederick Parkins and the provision of or the failure to provide proper medical care by defendant's employees.

  6. Powers v. United States

    589 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Conn. 1984)   Cited 27 times
    Applying Connecticut law

    To recover in a surgical medical malpractice action in Connecticut, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant was negligent, that the plaintiff was harmed, and that the "'negligence of the surgeon [or physician was] a substantial contributing factor in producing the injuries complained of.'" Connellan v. Coffey, 122 Conn. 136, 138-40, 187 A. 901 (1936). To establish that a physician was negligent, the plaintiff must prove that the physician failed to exercise that degree of diligence and skill, which other physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same line of practice, ordinarily exercise in similar cases.

  7. Mather v. Griffin Hospital

    207 Conn. 125 (Conn. 1988)   Cited 267 times
    Holding that causation was adequately established and that deficiencies in testimony of plaintiffs' primary expert were filled by testimony of other experts and hospital staff

    "`The meaning of the term "substantial factor" is so clear as to need no expository definition. . . . Indeed, it is doubtful if the expression is susceptible of definition more understandable than the simple and familiar words it employs.' Pilon v. Alderman, [ 112 Conn. 300, 301, 152 A. 157 (1930)]." Connellan v. Coffey, 122 Conn. 136, 141, 187 A. 901 (1936). In a medical malpractice action, expert testimony is required to establish the standard of professional care to which the defendant is held; Shelnitz v. Greenberg, 200 Conn. 58, 66, 509 A.2d 1023 (1986); and that the defendant failed to conform to that standard of care.

  8. Roberson v. Counselman

    235 Kan. 1006 (Kan. 1984)   Cited 56 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Rejecting Cooper, 272 N.E.2d 97

    See Craig v. Chambers, supra ( 17 Ohio St. 25[3] [1867]); Hicks v. United States, supra ( 368 F.2d 626 [4th Cir. 1966]); Neal v. Walker (1968), 426 S.W.2d 476; Rogers v. Kee (1912), 171 Mich. 551, 137 N.W. 260, quoting from Craig v. Chambers, supra; Burk v. Foster, (1902), 114 Ky. 20, 69 S.W. 1096. The following authorities appear to require the establishment of proximate cause by evidence of probability: Harvey v. Silber (1942), 300 Mich. 510, 2 N.W.2d 483; Schuler v. Berger (1967), 275 F. Supp. 120; Walden v. Jones (Ky. 1969), 439 S.W.2d 571 (distinguishing Neal v. Walker, supra); Connellan v. Coffey (1936), 122 Conn. 136, 187 A. 901. "We consider the better rule to be that in order to comport with the standard of proof of proximate cause, plaintiff in a malpractice case must prove that defendant's negligence, in probability, proximately caused the death."

  9. Vetre v. Keene

    181 Conn. 136 (Conn. 1980)   Cited 23 times

    Hofacher v. Fox, 142 Conn. 179, 184, 112 A.2d 217; James Perry, "Legal Cause," 60 Yale L. J. 761. The causal relation between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's injuries must be established in order for the plaintiff to recover damages. Miranti v. Brookside Shopping Center, Inc., 159 Conn. 24, 27, 266 A.2d 370; Lombardi v. J. A. Bergren Dairy Farms, Inc., 153 Conn. 19, 22, 213 A.2d 449; Connellan v. Coffey, 122 Conn. 136, 139, 142, 187 A. 901. See Bogart v. Tucker, 164 Conn. 277, 286-87, 320 A.2d 803. It was for the jury to evaluate the evidence as to the nature of the accident, the damage to the vehicles and the credibility of the medical testimony.

  10. Schenck v. Roger Wllms. Hosp. Flynn

    119 R.I. 510 (R.I. 1977)   Cited 58 times
    Reciting the standard of care that governs a physician's conduct while a patient is under his or her care

    Where negligent diagnosis is alleged, it has generally been held that the plaintiff must produce testimony from which the jury might infer that proper diagnosis and treatment with reasonable probability would have aided the patient. See Connellan v. Coffey, 122 Conn. 136, 139-40, 187 A. 901, 902-03 (1936); Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d at 112. The issue with which we are confronted in the instant case is whether there was sufficient evidence that Dr. Flynn's failure to properly diagnose Mr. Schenck's condition proximately caused Mr. Schenck's injuries.