Opinion
No. HHD CV 09-4045469
May 27, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On July 16, 2009, the plaintiff, the State of Connecticut, brought this action against the defendant, Thomas A. Amato, administrator of the estate of Winston D. Allen, to recover public assistance benefits paid by the state to the decedent. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. The plaintiff made public assistance payments on behalf of the decedent in the amount of $10,072.85, which sum remains due and payable to the plaintiff. On or about October 22, 2008, and on November 20, 2008, the plaintiff, within the time limited by the West Haven Probate Court for the presentation of claims against the decedent's estate, presented the defendant with a statement of the plaintiff's claim against the estate for the unreimbursed public assistance provided on behalf of the decedent. On or about April 24, 2009, the defendant disallowed that claim, after which the plaintiff brought the present action. Pending before the court are cross motions for summary judgment.
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Provencher v. Enfield, 284 Conn. 772, 790-791, 936 A.2d 625 (2007). "In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006). "As the party moving for summary judgment, the [movant] is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits." Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 796, 653 A.2d 122 (1995). Likewise, "[t]he existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible Tract Society of New York, Inc., 78 Conn.App. 865, 871, 829 A.2d 38, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 931, 837 A.2d 805 (2003).
The plaintiff argues that the court should grant its motion for summary judgment because it has the authority to bring this action under General Statutes §§ 17b-93 and 17b-95, and there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the amount owed by the decedent. The defendant first contends that an issue of fact remains as to the liability owed by the decedent because the plaintiff has submitted insufficient evidence to substantiate the claim that it paid $10,072.85 on behalf of the decedent. He further argues that, because the decedent's sole sources of income were social security disability benefits and veterans' benefits, the plaintiff's action is precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) and 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1), and the benefits are exempt from attachment pursuant to General Statutes 52-352b(g).
It should be noted that, throughout his memoranda, the defendant cites to the incorrect statute, 42 U.S.C. § 3101. That statute was amended and renumbered as § 5301 by Department of Veterans Affairs Health-Care Personnel Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-40, title IV, § 402(b)(1), (d)(1), 105 Stat. 238, 239 (1991).
Section 17b-93(a) provides in relevant part: "If a beneficiary of aid under the state supplement program, medical assistance program, aid to families with dependent children program, temporary family assistance program or state-administered general assistance program has or acquires property of any kind or interest in any property, estate or claim of any kind, except moneys received for the replacement of real or personal property, the state of Connecticut shall have a claim subject to subsections (b) and (c) of this section, which shall have priority over all other unsecured claims and unrecorded encumbrances, against such beneficiary for the full amount paid, subject to the provisions of Section 17b-94, to him or in his behalf under said programs . . ."
Section 17b-95 provides in relevant part: ". . . upon the death of any person who has at any time been a beneficiary of aid under the state supplement program, medical assistance program, aid to families with dependent children program, temporary family assistance program or state-administered general assistance program, except as provided in subsection (b) of Section 17b-93, the state shall have a claim against such . . . person's estate for all amounts paid on behalf of . . . such person under the state supplement program, medical assistance program, aid to families with dependent children program, temporary family assistance program or state-administered general assistance program for which the state has not been reimbursed . . ."
Sections 17b-93 and 17b-95 are applicable to the present case, as it is undisputed that the decedent received public assistance from the plaintiff, and the plaintiff therefore has a claim against the decedent's estate for any amount that has not been reimbursed. What remains to be determined is the amount of public assistance at issue, and whether the plaintiff's claim is otherwise barred.
The plaintiff has established that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the decedent's liability to the state. The plaintiff claims that the decedent owes the state a total of $10,118.35. To establish this amount, the plaintiff has submitted the affidavit of Carol Veronick, a reimbursement analyst for the Connecticut department of social services. Veronick attests that the plaintiff paid $10,072.58 in public assistance benefits on behalf of the decedent, which have not been repaid to the plaintiff. She further attests that the decedent owes the state an additional $45.50 in state marshal's fees, resulting in a total debt to the plaintiff of $10,118.35. The plaintiff has also provided to the defendant, pursuant to a request for production, a one-page document, dated October 29, 2008, entitled "SOMA report." The SOMA report lists the names of various medical service providers and the dates of medical services provided by them between March 17, 2007 and March 25, 2007, and lists a balance of $10,072.85.
The SOMA report is attached as Exhibit H to the defendant's affidavit.
The defendant contends that the plaintiff has provided insufficient proof of the decedent's liability. "Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, 269 Conn. 394, 406, 848 A.2d 1165 (2004). "Such assertions are insufficient regardless of whether they are contained in a complaint or a brief." New Milford Savings Bank v. Roina, 38 Conn.App. 240, 245, 659 A.2d 1226, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 915, 665 A.2d 609 (1995).
The defendant asserts that the plaintiff has failed to establish the amount of assistance paid by the state, but he has presented no evidence that contradicts the amount claimed by the state. Instead, he insists that the SOMA report is a self-serving document that is insufficient without receipts from the medical providers to whom payment was made. This bald assertion, unsupported by any evidence or affidavit indicating that payment may not have been made to the medical providers, cannot refute the evidence brought forth by the plaintiff.
The defendant additionally argues that there is a difference of $95.74 between the SOMA report and the sum calculated from the accompanying printouts detailing each of the items on the SOMA report (Exhibit G to the defendant's memorandum in opposition), and that this inconsistency creates a question as to the amount of the liability. In fact, there is no such inconsistency; this discrepancy occurs from the defendant's misreading of Exhibit G to his affidavit.
In his memorandum, the defendant argues that there is a difference of $95.74 between the SOMA report and the sum calculated from Exhibit G to his memorandum, the accompanying printouts detailing each of the items on the SOMA report. This discrepancy occurs from a misreading of Exhibit G. In his memorandum, the defendant created a chart summarizing the data found in Exhibit G. In item 5, labeled "Date of service: March 19, 2007," the defendant lists three allowed amounts of $24.86. In reviewing the appropriate printout, ICN 1007113048070, the physician claim clearly indicates that $170.32 was paid. The defendant's confusion likely results from the claim detail, which includes only three payments of $24.86. This section of the printout appears to be incomplete, however, as the claims detail section includes a caption indicating that an additional page of claims detail. Nonetheless, the summary amount of $170.32 listed as paid is sufficient to support the plaintiff's claim.
Finally, the defendant has failed to provide any evidence to refute the Veronick affidavit; instead, he simply asserts that Veronick's statements are unsubstantiated. In her affidavit, Veronick attests that, as a reimbursement analyst for the Connecticut Department of Social Services, she is authorized and empowered to investigate and collect debts owed to the State of Connecticut, and is therefore familiar with the records relating to the decedent. Accordingly, there is no issue of fact regarding the amount owed to the plaintiff.
The defendant next argues that 42 U.S.C. § 407 (a) and 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1) preclude the plaintiff's claim by virtue of the supremacy clause. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) provides in relevant part: "The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law." 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1) provides in relevant part: "Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law administered by the Secretary shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically authorized by law, and such payments made to, or on account of, a beneficiary shall be exempt from taxation, shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary . . ." The analysis under those statutes is interrelated.
Article VI of the constitution of the United States provides in relevant part: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
In Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413, 93 S.Ct. 590, 34 L.Ed.2d 608 (1973), upon which the defendant chiefly relies, the United States Supreme Court held that, "[o]n its face, the Social Security Act in § 407 bars [a State] from reaching the federal disability payments paid . . . The language is all-inclusive: `None of the moneys paid or payable . . . under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process . . .' The moneys paid as retroactive benefits were `moneys paid . . . under this subchapter;' and the suit brought was an attempt to subject the money to `levy, attachment . . . or other legal process.'" Id., 415-16. In reaching its decision, the Court explained, "[t]he protection afforded by § 407 is to `moneys paid' and we think the analogy to veterans' benefits exemptions which we reviewed in Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co., 370 U.S. 159, [ 82 S.Ct. 1231, L.Ed.2d 407 (1962)], is relevant here. We held in that case that veterans' benefits deposited in a savings and loan association on behalf of a veteran retained the `quality of moneys' and had not become a permanent investment." Id., 416.
In Porter, however, the Court conditioned the applicability of this sort of legislation to cases in which the funds were available for the support and maintenance of the beneficiary. "Since legislation of this type should be liberally construed . . . to protect funds granted by the Congress for the maintenance and support of the beneficiaries thereof . . . we feel that deposits such as are involved here should remain inviolate. The Congress, we believe, intended that [beneficiaries] in the safekeeping of their benefits should be able to utilize those normal modes adopted by the community for that purpose — provided the benefit funds, regardless of the technicalities of title and other formalities, are readily available as needed for support and maintenance . . ." (Citations omitted.) Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co., supra, 370 U.S. 162.
Importantly, both Philpott and Porter concerned living beneficiaries of disability payments, and those funds were available to provide for the beneficiaries' own support and maintenance. In Department of Health v. Davis, 616 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished the holding of Philpott and demonstrated that it does not apply in a case where the beneficiary is unable to use those funds to care for himself. " Philpott is different from this case, however, since there the welfare recipient was capable, at least in part, of providing for his own care, and the state was not acting in loco parentis, as it is here. The beneficiary in Philpott was merely receiving assistance in providing for himself. [This beneficiary], however, determined to be incompetent by the Veterans' Administration since February 21, 1952, has been in confinement until the present because he is apparently incapable of caring for himself to any degree. [This beneficiary] has had no needs during the period he has been in the Florida State Hospital that were not met by the state. Accordingly, the state is seeking to have the guardian, who is responsible for overseeing her ward's care and maintenance, do what is required by Florida law: apply the benefits received by the ward for care and maintenance to reimburse Florida for undertaking his care and maintenance. Thus, contrary to the guardian's argument, Philpott does not control the outcome of this case." Id., 830.
Our own Supreme Court has adopted the reasoning of the Davis decision. "[T]he purpose of the § 407 exemption for social security payments from legal process is to preclude beneficiaries from directing their social security payments away from the seminal goal of the social security system itself: furnishing financial, medical, rehabilitative and other resources to needy individuals . . . As the court held in Davis: In situations where the state is providing for the current maintenance needs of a confined person, [n]either the purpose of the benefits, nor the purpose of the exemption is accomplished by barring [the state] from reimbursement." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Amore, 205 Conn. 104, 113-14, 530 A.2d 582 (1987).
Because the exemption exists specifically for the purpose of protecting funds necessary for the support and maintenance of a beneficiary, and that exemption does not apply when a party is incapable of providing for his own care, it should likewise not apply when the beneficiary is deceased. In In re Vary Estate, 401 Mich. 340, 348, 258 N.W.2d 11 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1283, 55 L.Ed.2d 793 (1978), the most closely analogous case this court has found, the Michigan Supreme Court came to precisely that conclusion: "[T]he Philpott court did not consider or discuss in any part the nature of accumulated social security funds after death of the beneficiary. Philpott is instructive of the legislative purpose, but does not speak to our issue. However, defendants argue that social security benefits are a res which does not change its protected personal characteristic even after death of the beneficiary. We find it presumptuous to read into Philpott an unstated extension of the stated legislative object. Such an extension would go beyond the personal protection of `aged needy individuals.' The protection, being personal to the recipient, dies when that person dies and it no longer inures to his or her benefit."
This court finds this reasoning to be persuasive, and holds that same analysis to be applicable here. The purpose of the funds, to provide for the care and well-being of the recipient, no longer applies. Unlike in Philpott and Porter, the beneficiary here is deceased. Any opportunity for the funds to provide for the care of the decedent has since passed, along with the purpose of the exemption. Accordingly, neither 42 U.S.C. § 407 (a) nor 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1) precludes the plaintiff's claim.
Finally, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's action is barred by General Statutes § 52-352b(g). Section 52-352b provides for the exemption of certain "property of any natural person," from attachment, including "[w]orkers' compensation, Social Security, veterans and unemployment benefits." The plaintiff argues that the decedent is not a "natural person" under the statute. The court agrees with the plaintiff.
"When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered . . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." State v. Ancona, 120 Conn.App. 324, 327 (2010).
"[E]xcept where a word or phrase has a technical meaning or has acquired `a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law,' a statutory word or phrase `shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language.' General Statutes § 1-1(a). Consistent with that rule of construction, `natural person' means `a human being as distinguished in law from an artificial or juristic person.' Webster's Third New International Dictionary." Shawmut Bank, NA. v. Valley Farms, 222 Conn. 361, 367, 610 A.2d 652 (1992). Thus, the sole question is whether an estate constitutes a natural person.
"An estate is not a legal entity. It is neither a natural nor artificial person, but is merely a name to indicate the sum total of the assets and liabilities of the decedent or incompetent." Isaac v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 3 Conn.App. 598, 600, 490 A.2d 1024, cert. denied, 196 Conn. 807, 494 A.2d 904 (1985). See also Prochaska v. Clayman, 2 Conn.App. 430, 437, 479 A.2d 1214 (1984) (" `Estate' is defined as `the sum total of the property formerly owned by the decedent which, after his death, remains subject to administration and distribution'").
The defendant raises the puzzling argument that, because a natural person may serve in the position of a fiduciary, he, as an obviously living and natural person, may assert the exemption provisions of § 52-352b(g). That the defendant himself is a natural person has no bearing on the issue at hand. If the plaintiff had brought suit against the defendant individually, seeking collection out of his own social security benefits, the defendant would be able to claim exemption under § 52-352b(g). The defendant is neither the owner nor the beneficiary of the funds. If the decedent, Winston D. Allen, was living, the defendant would, in his representative capacity, be able to assert this claim on the decedent's behalf. The defendant does not represent Winston D. Allen, natural person, however; he represents the estate of Winston D. Allen, decedent. The defendant has been sued strictly in his capacity as the representative of the estate, the sum total of the property formerly owned by the decedent. As such a representative, he may not personally claim exemption pursuant to § 52-352b(g).
The statute is unambiguous as applied to this case. Taking into account the meaning of "natural person" and "estate," the statute is not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. The social security and veterans' benefits of a natural person are exempt from attachment under the statute. In order for that exemption to apply here, the decedent's estate itself must be a natural person. It is well established that an estate is not a natural person, but simply the name for a collection of property. Therefore, the plaintiff's action is not barred by § 52-352b(g).
CONCLUSION
As discussed herein, the plaintiff has the authority to bring this action under §§ 17b-93 and 17b-95. There is no genuine issue of fact regarding the amount of the liability owed by the decedent; neither 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) nor 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1) precludes the plaintiff's action, and § 52-352b(g) does not exempt the funds from attachment. Accordingly, the court hereby denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment and grants the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.