Connecticut National Bank v. Voog

280 Citing cases

  1. International Strategies Group, Ltd. v. Ness

    645 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2011)   Cited 11 times

    Equitable estoppel in Connecticut has two elements: (1) "the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and (2) "the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury." Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352, 366, 659 A.2d 172 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] person who claims an estoppel must show that he has exercised due diligence to know the truth, and that he not only did not know the true state of things but also lacked any reasonably available means of acquiring knowledge.

  2. Matysiak v. Shamas

    Case No. 3:10-cv-01841-GWC (D. Conn. Aug. 17, 2015)   Cited 3 times

    "[Equitable] estoppel arises if (i) the defendant made a definite misrepresentation of fact, and had reason to believe that the plaintiff would rely on it; and (ii) the plaintiff reasonably relied on that misrepresentation to his detriment." Kavowras v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted); Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Voog, 659 A.2d 172, 179 (Conn. 1995). A defendant may be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations where the plaintiff knew he had a cause of action but the defendant's misconduct caused the plaintiff to delay filing suit.

  3. Johnson v. Walden Univ., Inc.

    839 F. Supp. 2d 518 (D. Conn. 2011)   Cited 13 times
    Applying Connecticut law to breach of contract claim because “[b]oth parties have cited Connecticut law to support their respective positions and therefore accept the application of the law of the forum state”

    The defendant also asserts that there is no evidence that the plaintiff changed his position in reliance on any promise made by Walden. “Under our well-established law, any claim of estoppel is predicated on proof of two essential elements: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury.” Connecticut National Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352, 366, 659 A.2d 172 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff has provided evidence sufficient to support findings that representations were made by and on behalf of Walden that if he successfully completed the Walden Program, he would be qualified to become a practicing psychologist; that he enrolled and continued in the Walden Program in reliance on those representations; and that he incurred financial injury as a result of his reliance on those representations.

  4. Argent Mortgage v. Wyrick

    2007 Ct. Sup. 8645 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007)   Cited 1 times

    The alleged failure of plaintiff to inform defendant of a step necessary to assure that the policy covered the entire mortgage debt clearly relates to defendant's obligation to pay the unpaid portion of the note and plaintiff's right to enforce that obligation by this foreclosure action. In Connecticut National Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352, involving an action on promissory notes, the special defense of equitable estoppel, based on plaintiff's misrepresentations, was held to go directly to plaintiff's right to enforce the note and to arise out of the same transaction that was the subject of the complaint. If such a defense was allowed in an action on a note, it should also be available in an action to foreclose on the mortgage securing the note. If the plaintiff here had taken the insurance proceeds, not applied them to the mortgage debt and brought a foreclosure action, an equitable estoppel defense surely would be allowed against the plaintiff enforcing the note.

  5. Landmark Development Group v. TMK Assoc.

    2002 Ct. Sup. 2826 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002)

    Pacelli Bros. Transportation, Inc. v. Pacelli, supra, 189 Conn. 410. Ordinarily to prove fraud a party must show that there was a representation of a fact; that the fact, if disclosed, was untrue when asserted, that it was known by the speaker to be untrue; that the purpose of the statement was to induce the listener to act on it, and that the listener did rely upon it and act to his injury. Ceferatti v. Boisvert, 137 Conn. 280, 283, 77 A.2d 82 (1950). Fraud in the inducement to enter a contract is an equitable defense. Connecticut National Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352. 367, 659 A.2d 172 (1995). Fraud must be proved by "clear and satisfactory or clear, precise, and unequivocal evidence."

  6. Palsa v. Purdy

    2001 Ct. Sup. 9498 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001)

    A motion to strike is the proper way to challenge the legal sufficiency of a special defense. Nowak v. Nowak, 175 Conn. 112, 116, 394 A.2d 716 (1978), see also Connecticut National Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352, 354-55, CT Page 9499 659 A.2d 172 (1995). In ruling on a motion to strike a special defense, the trial court will "take the facts to be those alleged in the special defenses and [will] construe the defenses in a manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency."

  7. Multi-Unit Services v. Centerbank

    2001 Ct. Sup. 2763 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001)

    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut National Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352. 364, 659 A.2d 172 (1995). In the present case, on April 6, 2000, the defendant requested leave to amend its answer and special defenses, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-60.

  8. Gallimore v. General Insurance Co.

    1999 Ct. Sup. 13725 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)

    "[A] plaintiff can [move to strike] a special defense. Nowak v. Nowak, 175 Conn. 112, 116, 394 A.2d 716 (1973); see alsoConnecticut National Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352, 354-551 659 A.2d 172 (1995). "In . . . ruling on the . . . motion to strike, the trial court recognizes its obligation to take the facts to be those alleged in the special defenses and to construe the defenses in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency."

  9. Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co.

    364 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2004)   Cited 31 times
    Applying Connecticut law and stating that implied contract exists where parties "agreed, either by words or actions or conduct, to undertake [some] form of actual contract commitment" (alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted)

    predicated on proof of two essential elements: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury.Chotkowski, 690 A.2d at 380 (quoting Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352, 659 A.2d 172, 179 (1995)). The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that a claim for breach of implied contract is distinct from a promissory estoppel claim.

  10. R & I Trading of N.Y. v. Exec. Aircraft Interiors

    3:20-cv-00074 (MPS) (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2022)

    “The doctrine of consideration is fundamental in the law of contracts, the general rule being that in the absence of consideration an executory promise is unenforceable.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352, 366 (1995) (citation omitted). “[C]onsideration is [t]hat which is bargained-for by the promisor and given in exchange for the promise by the promisee....