Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers

14 Citing cases

  1. Savings Bank of Rockville v. Wilcox

    117 Conn. 188 (Conn. 1933)   Cited 34 times

    We cannot assume that a legislative enactment is devoid of purpose, and we must seek the object to be accomplished and the purpose to be subserved. Di Biase v. Garnsey, 103 Conn. 21, 27, 130 A. 81; Old Saybrook v. Public Utilities Commission, 100 Conn. 322, 328, 124 A. 33. Sound construction requires that the statute be considered "in the light of its history, its language, the purpose it is designed to serve and the circumstances surrounding its enactment." Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 113 Conn. 14, 25, 154 A. 246. In construing a statute and determining its purpose and scope, every part should, so far as possible, be made operative and harmonious with every other part. Kelly v. Dewey, 111 Conn. 281, 286, 149 A. 840, and citations; Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, p. 44.

  2. Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Comm. of Revenue Servs

    301 Conn. 268 (Conn. 2011)   Cited 118 times
    Rejecting interpretation of General Statutes §§ 12–33 and 12–597 on basis of this rule of construction

    What is now § 12-33 originally was enacted to permit appeals from "action[s] of the state board of equalization," and not from actions of the tax commissioner. Public Acts 1917, c. 186, § 1; see also Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 113 Conn. 14, 15-17, 154 A. 246 (1931) (resolving appeal from state board of equalization brought pursuant to General Statutes [1930 Rev.] § 1124, which is predecessor to § 12-33). At that time, the state board of equalization had the power to equalize property tax assessments by municipalities; see General Statutes (1930 Rev.) § 1108; and to oversee taxes on the gross earnings of certain types of companies, such as the tax on gross earnings of water, gas, electric and power companies.

  3. Perille v. Raybestos-Europe, Inc.

    196 Conn. 529 (Conn. 1985)   Cited 178 times
    Affirming grant of summary judgment based on special defense of workers' compensation being the plaintiff's exclusive remedy

    Savings Bank of Rockville v. Wilcox, 117 Conn. 188, 193, 167 A. 709 (1933). "Sound construction requires that the statute be considered `in the light of its history, its language, the purpose it is designed to serve and the circumstances surrounding its enactment.' Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 113 Conn. 14, 25, 154 A. 246." Savings Bank of Rockville v. Wilcox, supra; State v. Palozie, 165 Conn. 288, 334 A.2d 468 (1973).

  4. State v. Palozie

    165 Conn. 288 (Conn. 1973)   Cited 57 times
    Strapping to a degree that bruises and some scabbing covered a three-inch area of the child's buttocks was sufficient to warrant defendant's conviction, under a penal statute, of the crime of risk of injury to a child

    Reading the statute in its entirety, and in light of its history and purpose, the word "unlawfully" should be construed within the rule of statutory construction that a general word, following a particular enumeration, is intended to apply only to matters of the same general character. Griffin v. Fancher, 127 Conn. 686, 690, 20 A.2d 95; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 113 Conn. 14, 21-22, 154 A. 246; Brown v. Congdon, 50 Conn. 302, 309. Since the statute also condemns the maltreatment or overworking of children under sixteen years of age, the words "unlawfully punishes" must be read to apply to punishment of similar general character. The jury could well find that the defendant's action toward his son as previously recited was "unlawful" punishment as charged in the second and third informations.

  5. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton v. Aetna Casual. Surety

    307 A.2d 169 (Conn. 1972)   Cited 3 times

    The plaintiff cites cases where we have held that a statutory provision making an administrative determination "final" or "conclusive" does not preclude an attack on the ground that an error of law has been committed. See Newington v. Mazzoccoli, 133 Conn. 146, 48 A.2d 729; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Slade, 122 Conn. 451, 190 A. 616; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 113 Conn. 14, 154 A. 246. In the case before us these cases are inapposite.

  6. State v. Vachon

    140 Conn. 478 (Conn. 1953)   Cited 50 times
    Noting that "[i]t is not essential to the constitutionality of a statute which authorizes an administrative board to make orders or grant licenses that it contain a provision for an appeal, in the technical sense, from the board's action," because "[i]f any person claims to be harmed by such an order, his constitutional right to due process is protected by his privilege to apply to a court"

    We have uniformly held that the action of such a board should be final and conclusive unless directly attacked by some established procedure. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 113 Conn. 14, 17, 154 A. 246. To the same effect are State v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 60 Conn. 326, 334, 22 A. 765; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Slade, 122 Conn. 451, 454, 190 A. 616; and Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Rempsen, 124 Conn. 437, 444, 200 A. 348. A review of the action of such a board is not precluded. Newington v. Mazzoccoli, 133 Conn. 146, 153, 154, 48 A.2d 729.

  7. Newington v. Mazzoccoli

    133 Conn. 146 (Conn. 1946)   Cited 49 times
    In Newington v. Mazzoccoli, 133 Conn. 146, 155, 48 A.2d 729, we quoted this statement in connection with the question of suitability of place and we said (p. 156): "An inquiry as to suitability of either person or place presents a question of fact."

    Confronted by somewhat similar situations, we have not hesitated to hold that the words "final" or "conclusive" did not mean that a decision reached by a board or committee was not in any way open to attack by orderly processes of law. In Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 113 Conn. 14, 16, 154 A. 246, we had before us a statute providing that every mutual life insurance company should make a sworn statement to the tax commissioner as a basis for levying a tax upon it, that the board of equalization should examine and correct the statement and that, "so corrected or made," it "shall be conclusive as to the facts required to be specified"; but we held that this provision did not preclude a review of the action of the board under another statute giving generally a right of appeal from its decisions. In Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Slade, 122 Conn. 451, 455, 190 A. 616, we considered a statute concerning the appraisal of mortgaged property for the purpose of a deficiency judgment which provided that the appraisal "shall be final and conclusive as to the value" of the property, and we held that the appraisers' determination of value was conclusive as to matters of fact but that, on a remonstrance, the court could consider whether, in reaching their decision, they had committed

  8. Olechny v. Thadeus Kosciuszko Society

    128 Conn. 534 (Conn. 1942)   Cited 12 times

    The statute enumerates grounds, the existence of which authorizes the interference of the court by the appointment of a receiver and dissolution of a corporation. Having enumerated particular grounds, it is to be assumed that if the legislature intended the general words at the end of the statute to be used in an unrestricted sense, the particular classes of circumstances authorizing dissolution would not have been mentioned, and we must conclude that the legislature intended by these general words to mean other causes of the same general nature as those mentioned and such as are recognized on general equitable principles to be grounds for the appointment of receivers and dissolution of corporations. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 113 Conn. 14, 21, 154 A. 246; Brown v. Congdon, 50 Conn. 302, 309; Wardell v. Killingly, 97 Conn. 423, 433, 117 A. 520; Black, Interpretation of Laws (2d Ed.), 71; Crawford, Statutory Construction, 191. The impossibility of carrying on corporate purposes and objects is a recognized ground for dissolution of a corporation; 16 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations (Perm. Ed.), 8081; and constitutes a "good and sufficient reason" within the language of the statute. "The intent of the lawmakers is the soul of the statute. . . ."

  9. Griffin v. Fancher

    20 A.2d 95 (Conn. 1941)   Cited 14 times
    Recognizing dogs as property and right of action against one who negligently kills or injures them, so long as dog was properly registered

    The plaintiff contends that the words "unlawfully kill or injure," as used in the present statute, apply to one who negligently kills or injures. Reading the statute in its entirety, and in the light of its history, we decide it should be regarded as within the rule of statutory construction that where general words follow a particular enumeration they are intended to apply only to matters of the same general character. Brown v. Congdon, 50 Conn. 302, 309; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 113 Conn. 14, 22, 154 A. 246. As "steal," "confine" and "secrete" imply at the least a conscious purpose, the word "unlawfully" should be given a similar content. See also Dickerman v. Consolidated Ry. Co., supra, 431, as quoted above.

  10. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Rempsen

    124 Conn. 437 (Conn. 1938)   Cited 19 times
    In Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. vs. Rempsen, 124 Conn. 437, 200 A. 348, the plaintiff, the water company, brought an action for condemnation of land.

    Such considerations have led us in other similar situations where the decision of an official or board was in terms stated in a statute to be "conclusive" or "final" to interpret that to mean final or conclusive unless directly attacked by some established procedure. State v. New York, N. H. H.R. Co., 60 Conn. 326, 334, 22 A. 765; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 113 Conn. 14, 16, 154 A. 245; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Slade, 122 Conn. 451, 454, 190 A. 616. The provision of the charter "precludes a renew by the court of the question of value as a question of fact, and limits the inquiry before it to questions of law." Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Slade, supra. So construed the provision in question in no way transgresses constitutional principles.