The commissioner rejected the association's contentions and ordered the insurers and the association to reimburse Simkins for their respective apportionment shares. The association appealed from that decision to the board, which affirmed the decision on the ground that the decision is controlled by Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. State, 278 Conn. 77, 896 A.2d 747 (2006), and Doucette v. Pomes, 247 Conn. 442, 724 A.2d 481 (1999). This appeal followed.

CIGA has appealed. As we find the recent case of Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. State, 278 Conn. 77 (2006) (hereafter "CIGA v. State") dispositive of the issues in this appeal, we uphold the trial commissioner. The commissioner found the following facts.

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. State, 278 Conn. 77, 85-86, 896 A.2d 747 (2006). Indeed, we also have noted that "[i]n general, the legislative objective was to make the [association] liable to the same extent that the insolvent insurer would have been liable under its policy.

American Mutual became insolvent and CIGA became obligated to pay the claimant's benefits to the extent they were "covered claims." Based on those facts the trial commissioner concluded the claimant was totally disabled due to a compensable injury and established a weekly compensation rate. He determined that the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. State, 278 Conn. 77 (2006) places CIGA in the stead of American Mutual by assuming the liability of the defunct carrier. The commissioner rejected CIGA's position that the claim herein is not a "covered claim" and the payment of this claim is for the benefit of an insurer.

In response, the plaintiff contends that such reasoning is inapplicable because the legislature provided a statutory mechanism in § 38a-841 (1) (c) that permits the association to delay payment because of a lack of funds resulting from a sudden increase in liabilities. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that our decisions in Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. State, 278 Conn. 77, 896 A.2d 747 (2006), and Casey v. Northeast Utilities, 249 Conn. 365, 731 A.2d 294 (1999), indicate that we already have rejected similar arguments regarding the nature and purpose of the association. General Statutes § 38a-841 (1) (c) provides in relevant part: "If the maximum assessment, together with the other assets of [the] association in any account, does not provide in any one year in any account an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from that account, the funds available may be prorated and the unpaid portion shall be paid as soon thereafter as funds become available. . . ."

The association is a nonprofit unincorporated legal entity created pursuant to the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association Act (guaranty act), General Statutes § 38a–836 et seq., and its purpose is to provide compensation for policyholders and claimants whose remedy otherwise would be unavailable by virtue of insurer insolvency. General Statutes §§ 38a–839 and 38a–841; see Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. State, 278 Conn. 77, 86, 896 A.2d 747 (2006). In May, 2000, the Drowns filed the underlying medical malpractice action against Health Specialists and two physicians, Frances Bourget and Richard Holden.

"It is established well beyond the need for citation that parties are free to contract for whatever terms on which they may agree." Connecticut Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. State , 278 Conn. 77, 84–85, 896 A.2d 747 (2006) (quoting Holly Hill Holdings v. Lowman , 226 Conn. 748, 755, 628 A.2d 1298 (1993) ); see alsoTjong v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. , 2006 WL 1574079, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 9, 2006) (holding, in case involving similar rental agreement provision that explicitly set forth the applicable state limits, that "[a] provision in a rental contract that clearly limits the self-insurance obligation of the rental company is enforceable when the rental agreement provides for the statutory minimums."). The Court finds instructive a decision by the Fifth Circuit interpreting a different FMCSA regulation.

The question of whether the statements contained in the written opinion satisfy the “detailed basis” requirement of § 52–190a (a) is one of statutory construction. See, e.g., Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. State, 278 Conn. 77, 82, 896 A.2d 747 (2006) (application of particular statutory provision to undisputed facts gives rise to issue of statutory construction). We therefore begin our analysis with the language of the statute, which provides in relevant part: “No [medical malpractice] action ... shall be filed ... unless the ... party filing the action ... has made a reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant.

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. State, 278 Conn. 77, 82, 896 A.2d 747 (2006). The relevant provisions of P.A. 04-100, which is a substantive law governing the rights to support of children of unmarried parents, have an effective date of October 1, 2004, but the public act does not state explicitly whether it applies only to support orders rendered after that date.

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. State, 278 Conn. 77, 82, 896 A.2d 747 (2006). The following additional facts are relevant to this appeal. The declaration filed by Stamford Holdings included a series of maps of the property, which included a certificate of completion signed by a licensed surveyor, certifying that unit A did not contain any buildings and, therefore, was substantially completed.