spute that plaintiff in error did not have the financial ability to comply with the order, and hence, if we assume, for the purpose of argument, that the statute is valid, as against the objections stated above, the question still remains whether the present order can be sustained. Discussing: Cattaragus Board of Trade v. Erie R.R. Co., N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm., December 2, 1914; St. Johnsbury v. Boston Maine R.R. Co., Vermont Pub. Serv. Comm., P.U. Rep., 1915 A, p. 641; Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm., December 16, 1912, Reports, 1912; Report of Pub. Util. Commrs. of Connecticut, 1912, p. xlvii; Iowa Board of Railroad Commrs., Report 1913, p. 43; Erie R.R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commrs., Supreme Court of New Jersey, April, 1915 (not reported); Houston c. R.R. Co. v. Dallas, 98 Tex. 396[ 98 Tex. 396]; Northern Central Ry. Company's Appeal, 103 Pa. 621; Pennsylvania c. R.R. v. Philadelphia Reading R.R., 160 Pa. 277; Cleveland c. Ry. Co. v. State Public Utilities Comm., 273 Ill. 210; Connecticut Co. v. Stamford, 95 Conn. 26; Chicago Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Ochs, 249 U.S. 416. The foregoing authorities show that the element of expense is an important one; if it is found to be unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular case, that fact will usually suffice to demonstrate that the order is arbitrary.

The regulation must not be an arbitrary and unreasonable interference with the rights of individuals. In re Anderson, 69 Neb. 686; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133; Connecticut Co. v. Stamford, 95 Conn. 26. Police power means the power of the State to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety or welfare of the community.

Meriden v. West Meriden Cemetery Asso., 83 Conn. 204, 207, 76 A. 515. And all property, too, is held upon the implied promise of its owner or user that it shall not be used against the public welfare." Connecticut Co. v. Stamford, 95 Conn. 26, 29, 110 A. 554. It is pursuant to these principles that the State may regulate one's use of his property.

However, where the value of property of an individual is seriously affected by a zoning regulation especially applicable to it, this fact imposes an obligation carefully to consider the question whether the regulation does in fact tend to serve the public welfare and the recognized purposes of zoning. Connecticut Co. v. Stamford, 95 Conn. 26, 33, 110 A. 554; Village of Terrace Park v. Errett, 12 F.2d 240, 242; State Bank Trust Co. v. Wilmette, supra, p. 319; and see State v. Hillman, supra, p. 107. We are not here confronted with the validity of a comprehensive ordinance excluding business as a whole from a residential area, which ordinarily would be sustained as within the police power.

While this is a matter which should have been, and doubtless was, taken into consideration by the city council, it is also a circumstance to be considered by the court, and when so considered the public need for the expenditure here required should be urgent before so serious a burden is imposed upon the defendant. Connecticut Co. v. Town of Stamford, 95 Conn. 26, 110 A. 554. It is not altogether clear from the evidence that the present grade of the crossing conforms to the permanent grade adopted by the city.

The question on appeal to the Superior Court, therefore, was whether the facts proven before it afforded reasonable grounds, within the limits of its powers, for action of the board. Root v. New Britain Gas Light Co., 91 Conn. 134, 135, 99 A. 559; Connecticut Co. v. Stamford, 95 Conn. 26, 31, 110 A. 554. The grounds inconclusively indicated by the expressed opinion of the single member would, in our judgment, be quite insufficient when balanced against the other obvious considerations. Even though the appearance of the particular property in question would be improved, this is of slight importance compared to the preservation of the essential objects and purposes of the scheme of the Zoning Act, and the effect of the conditions contemplated thereby as regards the property of others in the neighborhood.

We have consistently sustained the view that the application of the underlying principle must be made in the light of existing conditions, to the end that the great purposes for which the police power may be invoked may be promoted. Connecticut Co. v. Stamford, 95 Conn. 26, 30, 110 A. 554; Cotter v. Stoeckel, 97 Conn. 239, 244, 116 A. 248; Young v. Lemieux, 79 Conn. 434, 65 A. 436, 600; New Haven Water Co. v. New Haven, 106 Conn. 562, 576, 139 A. 99; Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114; Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325, 47 Sup. Ct. 594; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 Sup. Ct. 143; Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 529, 37 Sup. Ct. 190; Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176, 35 Sup. Ct. 511; Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120; Spector v. Building Inspector of Milton, 250 Mass. 63, 145 N.E. 265; Providence v. Stephens, 47 R. I. 387, 133 A. 614. Counsel for the accused argued the appeal upon three claims: (1) that the regulations do not justify the Board of Appeals in directing The City Barrel Company to discontinue its business and remove its stock from its premises on Beardsley Street, (2) that if the regulations be construed to afford such justification they are not authorized by Chapter 242 of the Publi

Appeal of Allyn, 81 Conn. 534, 71 A. 794 ( Sup. Ct. 1909); Van Winkle v. State, 4 Boyce 322, 91 A. 385 ( Sup. Ct. Del. 1914); Welch v. Coglan, 126 Md. 1, 94 A. 384 ( Ct. App. 1915); Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal, 232 Pa. 141, 81 A. 148 ( Sup. Ct. 1911). All property is subject to the exercise of the State's police power. Connecticut Co. v. Stamford, 95 Conn. 26, 110 A. 554 ( Sup. Ct. 1920); Woods v. Perkins, 119 Me. 257, 110 A. 633 ( Sup. Jud. Ct. 1920); Schultz v. State, 112 Md. 211, 76 A. 592 ( Ct. App. 1910); Mansfield Swett v. West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145 ( Sup. Ct. 1938); Hourigan v. North Bergen, 113 N.J.L. 143 ( E. A. 1934). As I have stated, the plaintiff acquired the premises in question on October 11, 1951.