Id., at 651–54, 974 A.2d 669. To the extent this court stated in Associated Builders & Contractors that “the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to decide whether the plaintiffs had established a colorable claim that the [PLA] requirement had undermined the integrity or objective of the competitive bidding process”; (emphasis added) Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. at 182, 740 A.2d 813; or declared in the companion case of Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Anson, 251 Conn. 202, 740 A.2d 804 (1999), that “the evidentiary showing for standing ... was [the association's] burden to make”; id., at 214, 740 A.2d 804; we now clarify that, in most cases involving competitive bidding on public contracts, the allegations alone should provide a sufficient factual basis for deciding the jurisdictional issue of whether the plaintiff made a colorable claim of injury. Because the parties in the present case agreed, however, that the trial court could consider the materials and documents they had filed in federal court, all future references to the record in this case include that documentation as well as the facts alleged in the complaint.

Id., 65154.To the extent this court stated in Associated Builders & Contractors that ''the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to decide whether the plaintiffs had established a colorable claim that the [PLA] requirement had undermined the integrity or objective of the competitive bidding process''; (emphasis added) Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 182; or declared in the companion case of Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Anson, 251 Conn. 202, 740 A.2d 804 (1999), that ''the evidentiary showing for standing . . . was [the association's] burden to make''; id., 214; we now clarify that, in most cases involving competitive bidding on public contracts, the allegations alone should provide a sufficient factual basis for deciding the jurisdictional issue of whether the plaintiff made a colorable claim of injury. Because the parties in the present case agreed, however, that the trial court could consider the materials and documents they had filed in federal court, all future references to the record in this case include that documentation as well as the facts alleged in the complaint.Third, to the extent the trial court and the nonstate defendants regard the court's discussion of cost in Associated Builders & Contractors as resolving the issue of whether a PLA requirement is discriminatory, and thus dispositive of the standing issue in the present case, they misconstrue the court's analysis and fail to consider the subsequent evolution of Connecticut

Standing for purposes of bringing an action differs from the aggrievement requirement for appellate review under § 52-263. A party who fails to establish standing and to pursue the action before the trial court; e.g., Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc . v. Anson , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV-98-0579841-S (October 26, 1998) (23 Conn. L. Rptr. 1, 5, 1998 WL 779563 ) (trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate requisite conditions for standing), aff'd, 251 Conn. 202, 740 A.2d 804 (1999) ; is aggrieved by the trial court's determination and can then seek review of that judgment on appeal. See, e.g., Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Anson , 251 Conn. 202, 206, 740 A.2d 804 (1999) (plaintiffs appealed from judgment of trial court dismissing claims for lack of standing).

I join in Justice Berdon's dissent. I expressed my view that the plaintiffs have standing to assert that their first amendment rights have been violated in Connecticut Associated Builders Contractors v. Anson, 251 Conn. 202, 740 A.2d 804 (1999) ( McDonald, J., dissenting), and, accordingly, I dissent in this case as well. We presume that the plaintiffs' complaint refers to Hartford Municipal Code, c. XXVIII, § 28-185, as referenced in their brief.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Okada Trucking Co. v. Board of Water Supply, 101 Haw. 68, 74, 62 P.3d 631 (2002); see Connecticut Associated Builders Contractors v. Anson, 251 Conn. 202, 205 n. 4, 740 A.2d 804 (1999) (pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46-91 and 46-92, public building contracts shall be awarded to the "lowest responsible and qualified bidder; defined as a bidder "whose bid is the lowest of those bidders possessing the skill, ability and integrity necessary to faithful performance of the work . . .") "A responsible bidder is one who possesses adequate capital resources, skill, judgment, integrity, moral worth and is accountable and reliable." CT Page 12740 Dellwood Foods, Inc. v. Board of Education, 97 Misc.2d 751, 753, 412 N.Y.S.2d 247, 250, (1978). "

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Associated Builders Contractors v. Anson, 251 Conn. 202, 209, 740 A.2d 804 (1999). As to count one, the court finds that the union satisfies the three-pronged test; however, as to count two, because the union claims damages for the individual members, the union fails to satisfy the third prong of the test for representational standing.

Because standing implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction, it is a proper basis for granting a motion to dismiss. Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education , 303 Conn. 402, 413, 35 A.3d 188 (2012) ; Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Anson , 251 Conn. 202, 205–206, 740 A.2d 804 (1999). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must presume "the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader."

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Associated Builders Contractors v. Anson, 251 Conn. 202, 214, 740 A.2d 804 (1999); see also Connecticut Associated Builders Contractors v. Hartford, 251 Conn. 169, 180, 740 A.2d 813 (1999) ("Our policy to limit standing so as to deny some claims brought by unsuccessful and precluded bidders is designed to protect twin goals that serve the public interest in various, sometimes conflicting, ways. The standing rules aim `to strike the proper balance between fulfilling the purposes of the competitive bidding statutes and preventing frequent litigation that might result in extensive delay in the commencement and completion of government projects to the detriment of the public'"). Accordingly, we conclude that, because the department was not under a statutory or regulatory mandate to conduct a hearing with respect to the plaintiffs allegations, there was no agency determination in a contested case.

" (Citation omitted.) Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v . Anson, 251 Conn. 202, 209, 740 A.2d 804 (1999). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."

The task of the court in a case such as this is to determine whether the facts, as stated in the complaint and taken as true, demonstrate that the injuries, on one hand, are direct or, on the other hand, are indirect, remote or derivative. In doing so, however, we are not constrained by the parties' characterizations of them as direct or indirect, because whether a party has standing, based upon a given set of facts, is a question of law for the court; Connecticut Associated Builders Contractors v. Anson, 251 Conn. 202, 209, 740 A.2d 804 (1999); and in this respect the labels placed on the allegations by the parties is not controlling. See, e.g., Allard v. Liberty Oil Equipment Co., 253 Conn. 787, 800, 756 A.2d 237 (2000) ("[defendant] cannot . . . convert its apportionment claim against [third party defendant] into something other than a product liability claim simply by alleging only negligent misconduct").