Accordingly, except in limited circumstances, "it is not within the power of appellate courts to resuscitate the mortgagor’s right of redemption or otherwise to disturb the absolute title of the redeeming encumbrancer." Barclays Bank of New York v. Ivler, supra, 20 Conn. App. at 166-67, 565 A.2d 252; see also Connecticut National Mortgage Co. v. Knudsen, 323 Conn. 684, 687 n.5, 150 A.3d 675 (2016) ("an appeal from a judgment of strict foreclosure is moot when the law days pass, the rights of redemption are cut off, and title becomes unconditional in the plaintiff" (internal quotation marks omitted)); DXR Finance Parent, LLC v. Theraplant, LLC, supra, at 372, 309 A.3d 347 ("once title has vested absolutely in the mortgagee, the mortgagor’s interest in the property is extinguished and cannot be revived by a reviewing court" (internal quotation marks omitted)). "[O]ur Supreme Court and this court have recognized that [courts possess] inherent powers to provide limited forms of continuing equitable relief after the passage of the law days in 'rare and exceptional’ cases …."
Our Supreme Court previously has held that a trial court's denial of a motion to open is an appealable final judgment that gives rise to a twenty day appeal period following the resolution of that motion. See Connecticut National Mortgage Co . v. Knudsen , 323 Conn. 684, 687 n.8, 150 A.3d 675 (2016) ("[t]he denial of a motion to open a judgment of strict foreclosure is an appealable final judgment itself and distinctly appealable from the underlying judgment"); see also Practice Book §§ 61-11 and 63-1. Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1) governs the creation of new appeal periods and provides in relevant part that, "[i]f a motion is filed within the appeal period that, if granted, would render the judgment, decision or acceptance of the verdict ineffective, either a new twenty day period or applicable statutory time period for filing the appeal shall begin on the day that notice of the ruling is given on the last such outstanding motion.
In fact, both our Supreme Court and this court consistently have described the right to an automatic stay as arising out of a timely filed appeal. See, e.g., Connecticut National Mortgage Co. v. Knudsen , 323 Conn. 684, 689, 150 A.3d 675 (2016) ("the defendant's filing of [an] appeal within twenty days of [the ] judgment continue[s] the stay 'until the final determination of [the appeal]' " [emphasis added] ); Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan , 216 Conn. 341, 347, 579 A.2d 1054 (1990) (holding that "[t]he seasonable filing of a notice of appeal ... operates as a stay of further proceedings under a judgment of foreclosure" [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted] ); Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pardo , supra, 170 Conn. App. at 653 n.11, 155 A.3d 764 (recognizing purpose of automatic stay in foreclosure proceedings is protection of defendant's right to "file a timely appeal and to redeem" and that rule exists to "provide that proceedings to enforce or carry out the judgment or order shall be automatically stayed until the time to file an appeal has expired " [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted] ); Brooklyn Savings Bank v. Frimberger , 29 Conn. App. 628, 631, 617 A.2d 462 (1992) (holdi
This court has reached the same conclusion. See Connecticut National Mortgage Co. v. Knudsen , 323 Conn. 684, 687 n.5, 150 A.3d 675 (2016) ("an appeal from a judgment of strict foreclosure is moot when the law days pass, the rights of redemption are cut off, and title becomes unconditional in the plaintiff" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Argent Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas , 288 Conn. 568, 574–75, 953 A.2d 868 (2008). General Statutes § 49-15 (a) (2) sets forth the following exception: "Any judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may be opened after title has become absolute in any encumbrancer upon agreement of each party to the foreclosure action who filed an appearance in the action and any person who acquired an interest in the real estate after title became absolute in any encumbrancer, provided (A) such judgment may not be opened more than four months after the date such judgment was entered or more than thirty days after title became absolute in any encumbrancer, whichever is later, and (B) the rights and interests of each party, regardless of whe
Id. "Simply put, once title has vested absolutely in the mortgagee, the mortgagor’s interest in the property is extinguished and cannot be revived by a reviewing court." Id.; see also Connecticut National Mortgage Co. v. Knudsen, 323 Conn. 684, 687 n.5, 150 A.3d 675 (2016) ("an appeal from a judgment of strict foreclosure is moot when the law days pass, the rights of redemption are cut off, and title becomes unconditional in the plaintiff" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Our Supreme Court previously has held that a trial court's denial of a motion to open is an appealable final judgment that gives rise to a twenty day appeal period following the resolution of that motion. See Connecticut National Mortgage Co. v. Knudsen, 323 Conn. 684, 687 n.8, 150 A.3d 675 (2016) ("[t]he denial of a motion to open a judgment of strict foreclosure is an appealable final judgment itself and distinctly appealable from the underlying judgment"); see also Practice Book §§ 61-11 and 63-1.
"The denial of a motion to open a judgment of strict foreclosure is an appealable final judgment itself and distinctly appealable from the underlying judgment." Connecticut National Mortgage Co. v. Knudsen, 323 Conn. 684, 687 n.8, 150 A.3d 675 (2016).In the present case, there is no dispute that the defendants did not file their motion to open within twenty days of the court's rendering the judgment of strict foreclosure.
Although the trial court had rendered a judgment of foreclosure in 1994, that judgment has been opened and modified several times over the years."Connecticut National Mortgage Co. v. Knudsen, 323 Conn. 684, 685-86 (2016). The defendant has also appealed various trial court judgments to the Appellate Court on multiple occasions.
It is this court’s hope to avoid perpetual litigation among the Bongiorno family. First Connecticut Capital, LLC v. Homes of Westport, LLC, 112 Conn.App. 750, 762, 766 (2009), Connecticut National Mortgage Company v. Knudsen, 323 Conn. 684, 687 (2006). The court hereby restates the decision rendered in this Memorandum of Decision and finds the issues on all counts, Count One through and including Count Seventy-Two in favor of all of the defendants including the entity defendants and the defendants, Frank R. Bongiorno and Maurice A. Nizzardo, as against the claims by the plaintiffs, Marie Bongiorno and Bridjay Capone.