Opinion
23-CV-3272 (LTS)
01-11-2024
JEREMY L. CONLIN, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
TRANSFER ORDER
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Petitioner Jeremy L. Conlin paid the $5.00 filing fee to bring this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the following reasons, this action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from Petitioner's submissions and publicly available court records. In 2005, Petitioner pleaded guilty to a sex offense in Montgomery County, Texas, for which he was sentenced to ten years in prison. See Conlin v. Quaterman, No. 07-CV-1578 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2008) (adopting report and recommendation, denying habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and denying a certificate of appealability), aff'd, No. 07-20730 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2009). In 2019, Petitioner was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender, in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). United States v. Conlin, No. 19-CR-00029 (W.D. Tx. Oct. 18, 2019) (entering judgment and imposing 8-month prison term). On April 7, 2021, Petitioner's supervised release was revoked, and a 6-month prison term imposed, because he violated the terms of his supervision. Id., Docs. 54, 69.
Petitioner appears to allege that SORNA registration requirements are unlawfully infringing on his ability to work and travel in Maryland, New Jersey, and New York.(ECF 1 at 8.) When Petitioner filed this action, he provided a mailing address in Jerrell, Texas, which remains his address of record for this case. He claimed, however, to be living in Maryland, “on [a] commuter basis to prevent any potential life threatening harm of vigilantes.” (ECF 1 at 31.)
Attached to the petition is part of a complaint filed by the Alliance for Constitutional Sex Offense Laws on behalf of the organization and individuals in California whose state convictions have been expunged. See Doe v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 22-CV-855 (C.D. Cal. filed May 3, 2022). Invoking the Administrative Procedures Act, the Doe plaintiffs allege that a 2021 Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Rule, Registration Requirements Under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 86 Fed.Reg. 69,856 (Dec. 8, 2021), requires them to register as sex offenders even if their convictions have been expunged and they are no longer required to register under state law. (ECF 1 at 6-29.). Petitioner does not allege that his conviction has been expunged, or that a California challenge to the 2021 DOJ rule would apply to registration requirements imposed upon him in connection with his Texas conviction.
Petitioner has filed other documents in this case. First, Petitioner filed a “motion for partial summary judgment,” citing: (1) a California state court decision, People v. Thai, No. G060963, 2023 WL 2885162 (307 Cal.Rptr.3d Apr. 11, 2023) (holding that “insufficient evidence supports the trial court's conclusion [that] community safety would be appreciably increased by requiring Thai to continue to register [as a sex offender] for five years”); and (2) decisions from a federal class action lawsuit challenging Michigan's Sex Offenders Registration Act. See Doe v. Snyder, No. 12-CV-11194, 101 F.Supp.3d 672 (E.D. Mich.) (ECF 7.)
Second, Petitioner filed a “Mini-Supplemental Brief in Support of Petitioner's Amended 2241 & motion for summary judgment for removal from SORNA supervision and publication).” (ECF 9.)
Third, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Join a Defendant and Motion Letter Show Cause Order to Tx, USA,” claiming that he has “complied with Texas Law.” (ECF 11 at 2.)
In that submission, Petitioner states that he is detained in Midland County, Texas on a “retaliatory warrant,” and the motion shows the address for the Midland County Detention Center, and also an address in Maryland.(ECF 11 at 3, 4.) In an “Application for temporary protection order with brief in support,” filed December 27, 2023, Petitioner lists an address in Washington, D.C. (ECF 12.)
Petitioner recently filed two Section 2241 petitions in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. See Conlin v. United States, No. 23-CV-175 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2023) (granting motion for voluntary dismissal of Section 2241 petition); Conlin v. United States, No. 23-CV-184 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2023) (dismissing for failure to exhaust grounds raised in a Section 2241 petition seeking to be “prosecuted federally under SORNA and not through the State of Texas.”) Petitioner also removed a state court criminal matter to federal court. See United States v. Conlin, No. 23-CR-198 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2023) (remanding to state court proceedings arising from Petitioner's alleged failure to register as sex offender).
DISCUSSION
A. Habeas corpus relief
In order to entertain a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a court must have jurisdiction over the custodian. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973) (writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seek relief, but upon his or her custodian). Thus, the jurisdiction of a habeas petition challenging a petitioner's physical confinement generally lies in the district of his confinement. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004).
It appears that Petitioner is currently detained at the Midland County Detention Center, which is located in the judicial district of the United States District Court for Western District of Texas. 28 U.S.C § 124. Therefore, in the interest of justice, this Court transfers this petition to the Western District of Texas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
On April 21, 2023, the Court issued a sua sponte order transferring this action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, because there were no facts in the petition suggesting that this District was a proper venue for Petitioner's Section 2241 petition. (ECF 2.) On May 8, 2023, the Court vacated that order in response to Petitioner's “amended petition and objections” to the transfer order. (ECF 4.) For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court has determined that transfer is proper.
B. Other relief
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), even if a case is filed in a jurisdiction where venue is proper, a court may transfer the case to any other district where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following ten factors:
(1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum's familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff's choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances.Keitt v. N.Y. City, 882 F.Supp.2d 412, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). A plaintiff's choice of forum is accorded less deference where the plaintiff does not reside in the chosen forum and the operative events did not occur there. See Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001).
Even if Petitioner is no longer in custody, or if his submissions could be construed as seeking relief that is not available under Section 2241, transfer of his claims appears to be appropriate. Petitioner's claims arise out of his Texas conviction and registration requirements stemming from that conviction. He has recently filed three other actions in the Western District of Texas arising from related events. It is therefore reasonable to expect that relevant documents and witnesses would also be located there. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas appears to be a more convenient forum for these claims. Accordingly, this Court transfers the action to that court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”).
The Court takes no position on whether Petitioner's filing should be adjudicated as a Section 2241 petition or construed in some other way.
CONCLUSION
The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and § 1406(a), to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Any pending matters will be determined by the transferee court. No summons or order to answer shall issue from this court. This order closes this case.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.