See 7/7 BR Order at 1-2. Under California law, a co-tenant who pays more than his or her share of the common expenses of the property may recover the overpayment from the other co-tenants. Conley v. Sharpe, 136 P.2d 376, 381-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943). The overpaying co-tenant is entitled to a lien against the interests of the noncontributing co-tenants, see id. at 382, but the co-tenant is "not entitled to a personal judgment in the absence of an agreement to the contrary."
Accordingly, a person who owns an undivided interest in the property is not such an owner of all the undivided parts of the parcel. [5] Another contention made by respondents is that because the payment of property taxes by one cotenant inures to the benefit of the remaining cotenants and discharges the tax lien against the entire parcel as assessed ( Willmon v. Koyer, 168 Cal. 369, 374 [ 143 P. 694, L.R.A. 1915B 961]; Conley v. Sharpe, 58 Cal.App.2d 145, 155-156 [ 136 P.2d 376]), if appellants, as owners of undivided interests in tax-sold or tax-deeded property, paid that portion of the delinquent taxes which their respective interests in the property bore to the entire property, these payments would have to be credited to the benefit of all the cotenants. The cases upon which respondents rely for the principle that the payment of taxes by one cotenant inures to the benefit of the remaining cotenants all involve situations where the property which is owned by several persons as cotenants is assessed as a unit.
Once the court determined that Kati had โpaid a debt or obligation for the benefit of the joint property, โ the court was within its discretion to direct Robert to contribute his proportionate share of those expenses as a cotenant. (Conley v. Sharpe (1943)58 Cal.App.2d 145, 155; see alsoJamison v. Cotton (1933) 136 Cal.App. 127, 131 [regardless of โwhat gave riseโ to payment of expenses, the defaulting cotenant received the benefit and plaintiff cotenant had the โcorresponding right to recoveryโ].) III.
The purchaser, having in effect paid off the entire encumbrance, would be entitled to contribution from the other tenant or tenants (in this case the wife). ( Conley v. Sharpe (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 145, 155-156 [ 136 P.2d 376]; Jamison v. Cotton (1933) 136 Cal.App. 127, 129 [ 28 P.2d 39].) We recognize that under the procedure we have outlined severe limitations are placed on the situations in which a sale of property held in cotenancy between the judgment debtor-homestead claimant and another party could be ordered.
( Jamison v. Cotton, 136 Cal.App. 127, 130 [ 28 P.2d 39].) (7) While a probate court has no general equity jurisdiction, it has the power to apply equitable and legal principles in aid of its functions as a probate court. ( Security First Nat. Bank v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.2d 749, 757 [ 37 P.2d 69].) It follows from this that if appellant Marsh is determined to be an heir, in the heirship proceedings in the probate court, entitled to an interest in the land as a tenant in common with other heirs or transferees of heirs of Ella S. Stoddard, deceased, and if it is determined in such proceeding that he has paid more than his share of the taxes assessed against the land for the protection of the entire property, he will be entitled to judgment against his cotenants, and to a lien on the property in an amount equal to his cotenants proportionate share of the taxes so paid. ( Conley v. Sharpe, 58 Cal.App.2d 145, 155, 156 [ 136 P.2d 376]; Southern Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Nelson, 230 Cal.App.2d 539, 541 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 148].) Thus, in the heirship proceedings in the probate court, appellant Marsh, upon proper proof, will be entitled to the relief which he seeks here.
We observe here that the effect of the court's ruling is not a declaration that defendant is not entitled to reimbursement for unilateral expenditures made on commonly held property under principles which permit a coowner to recover for such expenditures against the other coowner. (See Conley v. Sharpe, 58 Cal.App.2d 145, 154-156 [ 136 P.2d 376]; Southern Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Nelson, 230 Cal.App.2d 539, 541 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 148]; Combs v. Ritter, 100 Cal.App.2d 315, 320 [ 223 P.2d 505]; Higgins v. Eva, 204 Cal. 231, 238 [ 267 P. 1081]; Mercola v. Chester, 97 Cal.App.2d 140, 143 [ 217 P.2d 32].) Nor is it a holding that such offset in a proper case may not be urged under Code of Civil Procedure section 440 (See Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609].)
The original interlocutory judgment was correct. This principle is established in Willmon v. Koyer, 168 Cal. 369 [ 143 P. 694, L.R.A. 1915B 961]; Garcia v. Venegas, 106 Cal.App.2d 364, 369 [ 235 P.2d 89]; see also Rich v. Smith, 26 Cal.App. 775, 784 [ 148 P. 545]; Conley v. Sharpe, 58 Cal.App.2d 145 [ 136 P.2d 376]; Palpar, Inc. v. Thayer, 115 Cal.App.2d 333 [ 252 P.2d 51]. The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court to enter judgment to conform with this opinion.
( Schott v. Schott, 168 Cal. 342, supra; Lavely v. Nonemaker, 212 Cal. 380, supra. See, also, Conley v. Sharpe, 58 Cal.App.2d 145 [ 136 P.2d 376], and Dalbkermeyer v. Rader, 96 Cal.App. 23 [ 273 P. 600].)
The purchaser, having in effect paid off the entire encumbrance, would be entitled to contribution from the other tenant or tenants (in this case the wife). (Conley v. Sharpe (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 145, 155-156; Jamison v. Cotton (1933) 136 Cal.App. 127, 129.). . . Under the facts which have been determined in this case, the property cannot be sold if it is held in joint tenancy; the husband's interest does not exceed the sum of the joint encumbrance and the homestead exemption.
When such payments are made by one cotenant for the benefit of the property, that cotenant is entitled to a lien against the interests of those cotenants who do not contribute their share. In re Fazzio, 180 B.R. at 269; Higgins v. Eva, 204 Cal. 231, 238 (1928); Conley v. Sharpe, 58 Cal. App. 2d 145, 156 (1943); Miller & Starr at ยง 11.10 ("The cotenant who pays the common expenses is entitled to a lien against the interests of the noncontributing cotenants that may be enforced by foreclosure against their interests in the property[.]"). Thus, even without the judgment lien which may or may not be valid depending on the outcome of the Sangers' appeal, the Amended TIC Agreement and California law provided the Sangers with a lien against Ahn's interest in the Property as a matter of law due to the Shared Mortgage payments they made, and continue to make, on her behalf.