The buyer contends that he was entitled to secure a release of property, measured by the amount of principal paid in on the loan, despite the facts that prior to his request he was in default in the payment of taxes and assessments, and that immediately following his request for a release, he defaulted in the payment of the 1974 installment of principal and interest and the seller declared the entire unpaid balance due. ( San Diego Construction Co. v. Mannix (1917) 175 Cal. 548, 553, 554 and 556-558 [ 166 P. 325]; Conley v. Poway Land Inv. Co. (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 22, 25-28 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 636]; Houtz v. Beeman Investment Corp. (1935) 6 Cal.App.2d 645, 647-648 [ 44 P.2d 660]; and Sacramento S.F.L. Co. v. Whaley (1920) 50 Cal.App. 125, 134-138 [ 194 P. 1054]. Cf. Rubin v. Fuchs (1969) 1 Cal.3d 50, 53-55 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 373, 459 P.2d 925]; and Kimball v. Snyder (1932) 215 Cal. 66, 68-70 [ 8 P.2d 133].

or not entitled after default to enforce provision for releases proportionate to down payment); see also, e.g., Empress Homes v.Levin, 201 So.2d 475, 477 (Fla. 1967) (holding mortgagor not entitled after default to enforce provision calling for partial releases "without additional consideration"); Moriello v. MatrixProduction Realty, Ltd., 53 A.D.2d 931, 385 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (App.Div. 1976) (holding mortgagor not entitled after default to enforce provision requiring partial release without consideration beyond down payment); Clason's Point, supra,262 N.Y.S. at 757-60 (holding mortgagor not entitled to exercise release provision where releases were partially paid but not demanded before default); Fulton v. Jones, 167 A.D. 765,153 N.Y.S. 87, 89 (App.Div. 1915) ("Assuming that there was a sufficient tender, and that it was kept good, I am of opinion that the privilege of obtaining a release was lost by the failure to duly demand it before default in payment of the principal."). But see Conley v. Poway Land Inv. Co., 232 Cal.App.2d 22, 42 Cal.Rptr. 636, 640 (1965). Cases in which courts determined that the mortgagee's promise to grant partial releases was dependent on the mortgagor's obligations under the mortgage — and thus that the right to releases did not survive default — can be explained by the underlying purpose of partial-release provisions.

This view is in accord with the decisions of those courts which have considered the matter. See, e.g., Conley v. Poway Land and Investment Company, 232 Cal.App.2d 22, 42 Cal.Rptr. 636, 639 (1965); Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Louisiana Pur. Corp., 297 So.2d 772, 779 (La. App. 1974); Park Investment Development Co. v. Vanderzee Bros. Bldg. Co., 119 N.J. Eq. 1, 180 A. 838, 839 (1935); Cook v. Leslie, 59 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.Civ.App. 1933). See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 7 (1972).

In the absence of any words to the contrary found in the mortgage agreement itself, the right to enforce a partial release covenant does not terminate with default in the payments due under the mortgage. Vawter v. Crafts, 41 Minn. 14, 42 N.W. 483 (1889); Turner v. Schuh, 297 Ill. App. 317, 17 N.E.2d 517 (1938); Conley v. Poway Land Investment Co., 42 Cal.Rptr. 636 (D.C.A. 1965). We believe that the reasons behind this position are compelling.