The decision of the board must be based upon the evidence directed to the specific charge, and the burden was on the board to allege and prove the specific ground for termination. See Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 496, 123 A.2d 747 (1956). On the basis of the record before us, we conclude that absent a specific "rule" of the board, the statutory ground for the termination of the plaintiff's contract of employment under 10-151 (b)(2) did not exist, and the court did not err in its decision to that effect.

From the foregoing, the commissioner concluded that the plaintiff violated the provisions of 14-64 in that a false statement was made to Ewbank concerning the mileage of the vehicle purchased by him. The conclusion reached by the commissioner must be upheld if it is legally supported by the evidence which was presented before him. Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 492 123 A.2d 747; see Jaffe v. State Department of Health, 135 Conn. 339, 353, 64 A.2d 330. It is not the function of the trial court, nor of this court, to retry the case. The commissioner's function is that of an administrative agency, although he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.

To render a decision, he must weigh evidence and reach conclusions. See Dan M. Creed, Inc. v. Tynan, 151 Conn. 677, 679, 202 A.2d 239; Brookledge, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 145 Conn. 617, 619, 145 A.2d 590; Conley v. Board of Education, . . . [ 143 Conn. 488, 492, 123 A.2d 747]; Adam v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 137 Conn. 535, 537, 79 A.2d 350." Balch Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra.

The local board, as an administrative agency, is charged with the responsibility of requiring the production of sufficient evidence and of conducting the necessary investigation so that it may have adequate facts for a fair appraisal of the petitioners' request. See Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 495, 123 A.2d 747, and cases cited. The local board had its own reasons for refusing the transportation requested, and those reasons appear in the transcript of its hearing.

On appeals from a decision of the Board of Education on the discharge of a tenure teacher the appealing teacher has the burden of proof to show that the Board's action was arbitrary. Conley v. Bd. of Education, 143 Conn. 448, 123 A.2d 747. Under the teacher-tenure law the school board is the trier of the facts.

" The question is not whether the trial court would have reached the same conclusion, but whether the record before the agency supports the decision reached." Calandro v. Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 439, 440, 408 A.2d 229 (1979) (citing Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 492, 123 A.2d 747 (1956)). General Statutes § 4-183(j) provides, in pertinent part, the following: " The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

The presiding officer had a duty to ensure that the plaintiff's cross-examination was relevant to the proceedings before the defendant. See Conley v. The Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 495 (1956). The plaintiff has also asserted as grounds for this appeal the lack of reliable and substantial evidence to support the defendant board of education's decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment.

A board has the right to demand that a teacher know his subject and that he be capable of arousing and holding the interest of his pupils and maintaining discipline." Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 497. A board of education has the power to exercise a sound and reasonable discretion in carrying out its duties. Board of Education v. Ellington, supra, 10.

In addition, the Solomon court's reasoning that the contract violated public policy was predicated on the law of corporations. Although Defendants attempt to draw a parallel between a Board of Education and a corporate board, the Court is not persuaded that such a parallel is appropriate. It is well established and common place for a board of education to employ individuals on a “lifetime basis” through teacher tenure. Further Connecticut courts have held that pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 10–151 and 10–220 “[w]ide discretion is customarily vested in school boards with regard to employment of teachers, and courts should not interfere as long as that discretion is exercised in good faith ... When that discretion is exercised in good faith, the courts should not interfere.” Harhay v. Board of Educ. of the Town of Ellington, 44 Conn.App. 179, 187, 687 A.2d 1313 (1997) (citing Conley v. Board of Educ., 143 Conn. 488, 495, 123 A.2d 747 (1956)). Although the Plaintiff was not a teacher, this Court sees no reason why these provisions don't similarly vest the board of education with wide discretion with regard to employment of all school personnel.

O'Donnell v. Police Commission, 174 Conn. 422, [426] 389 A.2d 739; Balch Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 165 Conn. 559, 563, 345 A.2d 520. The question is not whether the trial court would have reached the same conclusion, but whether the record before the agency supports the decision reached. Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 492, 123 A.2d 747." Calandro v. Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 439, 440, 408 A.2d 229 (1979); accord Primerica v. Planning Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 85, 96, 558 A.2d 646 (1989); see also Goldberg v. Zoning Commission, 173 Conn. 23, 26, 376 A.2d 385 (1977) (legislative action of zoning commission should be upheld if "even one" of commission's stated reasons is sufficient to support decision).