Conley et al. v. Mervis

62 Citing cases

  1. Valles v. Peoples-Pittsburgh Tr. Co.

    339 Pa. 33 (Pa. 1940)   Cited 32 times
    In Valles v. Peoples Pittsburgh Trust Co., 339 Pa. 33, two employees of an independent contractor were injured when pipes in the basement of the defendant's building broke, releasing ammonia gas.

    One element in the transaction was that elicited by the first question, whether he had shown Mr. DeGiovanni the place where the work was to be done and the pipes; another element was whether he had told him what the pipes contained, and informed him of the danger incident to the work. For applications of the rule see Felski v. Zeidman, 281 Pa. 419, 422, 126 A. 794; Smith v. Traction Co., 202 Pa. 54, 57-58, 51 A. 345; Haun v. McCabe, 308 Pa. 431, 438, 162 A. 906; Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, 580 et seq., 188 A. 350. No witness called by the plaintiffs testified that DeGiovanni was not fully informed. Justice requires that we review the record on the footing that DeGiovanni, in his examination of the locus, preparatory to submitting his bid, was informed of the conditions and risks incident to the performance of the contract.

  2. Kline v. Kachmar

    360 Pa. 396 (Pa. 1948)   Cited 38 times

    [398-407] 14. Remaining decisional point in Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, overruled (see DeWaele v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 358 Pa. 574). [400-3] Before MAXEY, C. J., DREW, LINN, STERN, PATTERSON, STEARNE and JONES, JJ.

  3. DeWaele v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

    58 A.2d 34 (Pa. 1948)   Cited 14 times

    [576-7, 578-9] 3. Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, overruled, in part. [579-84]

  4. Miller v. Gault

    345 Pa. 474 (Pa. 1942)   Cited 7 times
    Distinguishing "a โ€˜darting outโ€™ case where a person suddenly leaves the curb and runs into or ahead of a car" from one in which "the pedestrian, already engaged in making the crossing, was justified in believing that passing motorists would have due regard for her safety"

    Cf. Readshaw v. Montgomery, 313 Pa. 206, 209, 169 A. 135, 137. See Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, 587, 188 A. 350, 355. The judgments are reversed and here entered for defendants.

  5. Morgan et al. v. Heinel Motors, Inc.

    197 A. 920 (Pa. 1938)   Cited 10 times

    2. Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, explained. 3. An innocent construction of a transaction is to be preferred to one involving a violation of law. [364-6]

  6. Havasy v. Resnick

    415 Pa. Super. 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)   Cited 24 times
    Upholding "mistake of judgment" instruction and explaining that "instruction was appropriate because of expert testimony that compartment syndrome is often difficult to diagnose early"

    The general rule is that cross-examination must be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting credibility of the witness. Kline v. Kachmar, 360 Pa. 396, 61 A.2d 825 (1948); Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, 188 A. 350 (1936); Pascone v. Thomas Jefferson University, 357 Pa. Super. 524, 516 A.2d 384 (1986), appeal dismissed, 517 Pa. 320 EQD, A.2d 338 (1988); Commonwealth v. Lobel, 294 Pa. Super. 550 EQD, A.2d 602 (1982). The reason for this rule, as stated by the Supreme Court in Conley v. Mervis, supra, is as follows:

  7. Copper Plumbing Inc. v. Macioce

    310 A.2d 411 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973)   Cited 4 times

    One of the most important functions of cross-examination is to develop and to point up for the jury just such an inference. In Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, 188 A. 350 (1936), the plaintiffs had been injured by a truck bearing tags owned by the defendant, so that a rebuttable presumption arose that the truck belonged to the defendant and was driven by his servant in the scope of his employment. In holding that the defendant's counsel should have been permitted to cross-examine the defendant, who had been called as a witness by the plaintiffs, with respect to whether the tags had been loaned to anyone and whether in fact the truck had been driven by the defendant's servant in the scope of his employment, the court approved counsel's argument that "cross-examination [may] embrace any matter touching upon or connected with the question of ownership of the tags, including all the inferences arising therefrom . . ."

  8. Franklin Plastics Corp. v. Department of Environmental Resources

    657 A.2d 100 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1995)   Cited 3 times

    Furthermore, the Administrative Agency Law requires that an aggrieved party be permitted reasonable direct and cross-examination. 2 P. S. ยง 505; Callahan v. Pennsylvania State Police, 494 Pa. 461, 431 A.2d 946 (1981). In Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, 188 A. 350 (1936), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged the broad principle that cross-examination should be confined to matters testified to in chief, but stated that cross-examination may in some instances reach beyond the facts elicited on direct examination and embrace new matters. The Court concluded that "it may be regarded as definitely settled that cross-examination may embrace any matter germane to the direct examination, qualifying or destroying it, or tending to develop facts which have been improperly suppressed or ignored by the plaintiff" Id. at 582, 188 A. at 353.

  9. United States v. Howard

    432 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1970)   Cited 13 times
    Concurring opinion of the majority

    The case of Kline v. Kachmar, 360 Pa. 396, 61 A.2d 825 (1948) is an example. In Kline, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined to reconstruct the record as requested, although, in refusing, it was obliged to overrule an earlier Pennsylvania case, Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, 587, 188 A. 350 (1936). The windfall acquittal which the defendant might well have received as a result of the trial court's first error, would have had no relation to the merits of the case.

  10. Sabo v. Reading Co.

    244 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1957)   Cited 3 times

    Bailey v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 1908, 220 Pa. 516, 69 A. 998, 999; Buxton v. Baltimore Ohio R. Co., 1923, 81 Pa. Super. 490 . The testimony of decedent's fellow worker, Jones, given on behalf of plaintiff, indicated that decedent Scott was walking within the overhang area of the main track. This dissipated decedent's presumption of due care and rendered a nonsuit appropriate by Pennsylvania law. Conley v. Mervis, 1936, 324 Pa. 577, 188 A. 350, 355, 108 A.L.R. 160. The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.