(Emphasis ours.) See also Tostenson v. Ihland, 147 N.W.2d 104 (N.D. 1966). Estoppel to deny Geering's authority requires reliance of the Bank on the acts or admissions of the principal, Massey-Ferguson. Conklin v. North Am. Life Cas. Co., 88 N.W.2d 825 (N.D. 1958). Under these circumstances, unless the Bank relied upon Massey-Ferguson's alleged culpable conduct in dealing with its agent, Massey-Ferguson is estopped neither by its alleged negligence nor by the ostensible or implied authority allegedly given to its agent. Cf. Smith v. Courant, 23 N.D. 297, 136 N.W. 781 (1912).

The majority rule is that waiver and estoppel cannot operate to extend coverage. Wangler, at ¶ 12; see also Conklin v. N. Am. Life &Cas. Co., 88 N.W.2d 825, 830-31 (N.D. 1958) ("[W]aiver or estoppel may not be successfully urged as a method of bringing within the terms of the policy risks expressly excluded therefrom, or as a means of extending the coverage of the policy."). The rationale for the rule is that courts should not rewrite parties' insurance contracts to force an insurer to cover a loss for which the insured did not pay.

[¶ 12] This Court has said the doctrines of waiver and estoppel will not operate to create an insurance contract that never existed. See National Farmers Union Prop. Cas. Co. v. Michaelson, 110 N.W.2d 431, 438-39 (N.D. 1961); Conklin v. North Am. Life Cas. Co., 88 N.W.2d 825, 831 (N.D. 1958). This is the majority rule.

Neither is there any merit to the defense of estoppel urged by the defendants. This court has held that estoppel arises where, by the conduct or acts of another, a party has been induced to alter his position or to do something, to his prejudice, which he otherwise would not have done. Sailer v. Mercer County, 75 N.D. 123, 26 N.W.2d 137 (1947); Woodside v. Lee, 81 N.W.2d 745 (N.D. 1957); Grand Forks County v. City of Grand Forks, 123 N.W.2d 42 (N.D. 1963); Conklin v. North American Life Casualty Co., 88 N.W.2d 825 (N.D. 1958); Knauss v. Miles Homes, Inc., 173 N.W.2d 896 (N.D. 1970). The defendants have wholly failed to show any act on the part of any of the plaintiff counties which induced the defendants to alter their position, to their prejudice.

This court has held that estoppel arises where, by the conduct or acts of another, a party has been induced to alter his position or to do something, to his prejudice, which he otherwise would not have done. Sailer v. Mercer County, 75 N.D. 123, 26 N.W.2d 137 (1947); Woodside v. Lee, 81 N.W.2d 745 (N.D. 1957); Grand Forks County v. City of Grand Forks, 123 N.W.2d 42 (N.D. 1963); Conklin v. North American Life Casualty Co., 88 N.W.2d 825 (N.D. 1958). One cannot successfully plead estoppel in the absence of reliance upon acts claimed to operate as an estoppel which changed the position of the one claiming estoppel, to his prejudice.

" Conklin v. North American Life and Casualty Company (N.D.), 88 N.W.2d 825; Persellin v. State Auto Insurance Association, 75 N.D. 716, 32 N.W.2d 644; Beauchamp v. Retail Merchants Association, 38 N.D. 483, 165 N.W. 545. The stipulation of facts contained some interesting language which for the purpose of this action we must take literally.

Schmitt v. Paramount Fire Insurance Company, supra. Thus if the language used reasonably raises a doubt as to its meaning, that doubt will be resolved against the insurer who wrote the contract. Conklin v. North American Life Casualty Company, N.D., 88 N.W.2d 825; Schmitt v. Paramount Fire Insurance Company, supra; Tennefos v. Guarantee Mutual Life Company, N.D., 136 N.W.2d 155. If the language of the policy is ambiguous and will as reasonably support an interpretation which will impose liability as one which will not, the former interpretation will be adopted. Persellin v. State Automobile Ins. Ass'n., 75 N.D. 716, 32 N.W.2d 644; Beauchamp v. Retail Merchants' Ass'n., 38 N.D. 483, 165 N.W. 545; Schmitt v. Paramount Fire Insurance Company, supra. This is a sound rule.

Section 9-07-06, N.D.C.C.; Delzer Construction Company v. New Marian Homes Corporation, N.D., 117 N.W.2d 851; Larson v. Wood, 75 N.D. 9, 25 N.W.2d 100; Hutchinson v. Bohnsack School Dist., 51 N.D. 165, 199 N.W. 484; Alden v. Central Power Electric Cooperative, D.C., 137 F. Supp. 924. All of its parts shall be considered together and every clause, sentence, or provision should be given effect consistent with the main purpose of the contract. Conklin v. North American Life Casualty Company, N.D., 88 N.W.2d 825; Delzer Construction Company v. New Marian Homes Corporation, supra. The intention of the parties to a written contract must, if possible, be ascertained from the writing alone.

All of its parts shall be considered together and every clause, sentence or provision, should be given effect consistent with the main purpose of the contract. Conklin v. North American Life Casualty Co., N.D., 88 N.W.2d 825. The intention of the parties to a written contract must, if possible, be ascertained from the contract alone.

Thus if the language used, reasonably raises a doubt as to its meaning, that doubt will be resolved against the insurer who wrote the contract. Conklin v. North American Life and Casualty Company, N.D., 88 N.W.2d 825. If the language of the policy is ambiguous and will reasonably support an interpretation which will impose liability as well as one which will not, the former interpretation will be adopted. Persellin v. State Auto Ins. Ass'n, 75 N.D. 716, 32 N.W.2d 644; Beauchamp v. Retail Merchants Ass'n, 38 N.D. 483, 165 N.W. 545. In the instant case, rain water seeped through the insulation around a steam pipe which had no purpose other than to furnish steam for heating plaintiff's house.