Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-3858.
September 7, 2004
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM ORDER
AND NOW, this 7th day of September, 2004, upon consideration of the Motion of Defendants, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") and Bernard Cohen, for Summary Judgment (Document No. 11, filed March 1, 2004), Plaintiff's Response Opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 14, filed March 26, 2004), and Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 17, filed April 9, 2004), IT IS ORDERED that the Motion of Defendants, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") and Bernard Cohen, for Summary Judgment is DENIED on the ground that the submissions of the parties present genuine issues of material fact including, but not limited to, issues relating to SEPTA's reasons for not promoting plaintiff to the position of Chief Bus Operations Officer.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a scheduling conference will be conducted in due course.
MEMORANDUM
I. BACKGROUNDPlaintiff, Rosemary Conine, brought this action alleging gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), against defendants, SEPTA and Bernard Cohen (Count I); a claim of gender discrimination against the same defendants under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 P.S. § 951 et seq (Count II); and, a claim against defendant Cohen based on alleged violation of the PHRA by abetting, inciting, and compelling intentional sex discrimination (Count III).
SEPTA hired plaintiff in April of 1988 as a Manager of Program Development. Since then, plaintiff has received several promotions and was elevated to Senior Director of SEPTA's Northern Bus Operations in 1997. In November 2001, plaintiff learned that SEPTA was accepting applications for the position of Chief Bus Operations Officer and submitted an application for the position. The Chief Bus Operations Officer had responsibility for managing approximately 2,200 transportation employees and 700 maintenance employees. There were 27 applicants for the position of Chief Bus Operations Officer. Plaintiff was among 11 of the candidates selected for interviews. The interviews were conducted by an all-male panel. Plaintiff was ranked eighth among the 11 candidates who were interviewed, and she was not awarded the position.
II. DISCUSSION
Title VII and the PHRA both prohibit an employer from discriminating against an employee based on gender. Goosby v. Johnson Johnson Medical, Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 2000). The legal standard of analysis is the same under both Title VII and the PHRA for the purpose of determining summary judgment. Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1999).
To analyze intentional discrimination cases involving a failure to promote, courts perform the burden-shifting analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and refined in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Under the first step of this analysis, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in an employer's employment decision process.Goosby, 228 F.3d at 319. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the employer then bears the burden of responding to the plaintiff's allegations by proffering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.Id. Finally, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving that the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason is actually pretext for discrimination. Id.
When a defendant in a Title VII gender discrimination case answers a plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination with a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision and then files a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff can defeat the motion by "point[ing] to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a fact-finder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons, or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). A plaintiff who presents sufficient evidence of pretext does not need to present additional evidence of discrimination beyond his prima facie case to proceed to trial.Id. The court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2002).
The parties met their respective burdens imposed by the first two stages of the Burdine burden-shifting framework. Plaintiff presents a prima facie case of employment discrimination because (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) her background — plaintiff has worked for SEPTA for over ten years in a series of managerial and supervisory positions and holds an Ed.D. degree — appears commensurate with the minimum qualifications SEPTA described in the position opening announcement for the Chief Bus Operations Officer position, and (3) SEPTA ultimately awarded the position to a male individual who possessed arguably the same qualifications as plaintiff. E.g., Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (listing elements of prima facie case of employment discrimination); see also Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that courts should resolve issue of employee qualifications at second or third stages of Burdine burden-shifting framework). SEPTA has met its burden under Burdine of producing a legitimate reason for not promoting plaintiff by presenting evidence, Def. Mot. at 17, that the decision not to promote plaintiff to the Chief Bus Operations Officer position was based on plaintiff's lack of familiarity with maintenance issues. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763 (noting that employer's burden of producing legitimate reason for adverse employment decision is a light one).
Because SEPTA articulated a legitimate reason for its decision not to promote plaintiff, plaintiff can defeat SEPTA's Motion for Summary Judgment by producing evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that SEPTA's proffered reason for not promoting her was pretext. Id. at 764. The Court concludes that plaintiff has done so. Specifically, plaintiff has presented evidence that she has an understanding of the close connection between transportation and maintenance with respect to bus operations and possesses the necessary expertise with respect to maintenance issues.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Motion of Defendants, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") and Bernard Cohen, for Summary Judgment.