Accordingly, contrary to Tiismann's assertion, justifiable or reasonable reliance is an essential element of his FBPA claim. Condon v. Kunse, 208 Ga. App. 856, 859 (5) ( 432 SE2d 266) (1993). Moreover, although Tiismann claims that there was a jury question as to reasonable reliance because not all of the representations in the sales contract disclaimed liability for code violations, any representations not related to the code violations would not implicate the FBPA.

Accordingly, justifiable reliance is an essential element. Condon v. Kunse, 208 Ga. App. 856, 859 (5) ( 432 SE2d 266) (1993). Consequently, "the claimant is not entitled to recover if he had an equal and ample opportunity to ascertain the truth but failed to exercise proper diligence to do so."

The "passive concealment" doctrine, applied to controversies between residential homeowners and residential builder/sellers, was created as an exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor. Condon v. Kunse, 208 Ga. App. 856, 858 ( 432 S.E.2d 266) (1993). Prior to the closing, the Stocks walked through the house on several occasions, a professional house inspector hired by the Stocks inspected the house, and a pest control company inspected the house for termite damage.

That doctrine establishes an exception to the general rule of caveat emptor in real estate transactions, however, application of the doctrine has been limited to controversies between residential homeowners and residential builder/sellers, and it does not apply to commercial transactions. See Crotts Enterprises v. John Payne Co., 219 Ga. App. 173, 174(2) ( 464 S.E.2d 844) (1995); Armstrong Transfer c. Co. v. Mann Constr., 217 Ga. App. 538, 539(1) ( 458 S.E.2d 481) (1995); Condon v. Kunse, 208 Ga. App. 856, 858(2) ( 432 S.E.2d 266) (1993); Toys 'R' Us v. Atlanta Economic Dev. Corp., 195 Ga. App. 195, 198(1)(C) ( 393 S.E.2d 44) (1990). But see Holman v. Ruesken, 246 Ga. 557, 558(2) ( 272 S.E.2d 292) (1980).

Any essentially private transaction falls outside the protection of the FBPA, because the FBPA seeks to prohibit public conduct in the market that is unfair or deceptive, that has actual or potential harm to the consumer public, and that encourages consumer transactions as a consequence of such prohibited conduct. Medley v. Boomershine Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 214 Ga. App. 795, 796 (2) ( 449 S.E.2d 128) (1994); Condon v. Kunse, 208 Ga. App. 856, 859 (5) ( 432 S.E.2d 266) (1993); Rivergate Corp. v. McIntosh, 205 Ga. App. 189, 192 ( 421 S.E.2d 737) (1992); Borden v. Pope Jeep-Eagle, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 176, 178 (1) ( 407 S.E.2d 128) (1991); Waller v. Scheer, 175 Ga. App. 1, 4 (1) ( 332 S.E.2d 293) (1985); Zeeman v. Black, supra at 83. Absent a showing of actual or potential harm to the plaintiffs, as consumers, by the practice of the discount to Mercury, there is no standing to bring an action under the Act on the basis of non-disclosure.

Furthermore, the sale of the building to Morris was a private transaction having no characteristics sufficient to bring it within the ambit of the FBPA's protection against acts and practices injurious to the consuming public. Condon v. Kunse, 208 Ga. App. 856, 859 ( 432 S.E.2d 266) (1993); Nims, supra at 517-518. 3.

]" (Emphasis omitted.) Condon v. Kunse, 208 Ga. App. 856, 857-858 (1) ( 432 S.E.2d 266) (1993). Stargate was not justified in relying upon any representation of Orion or Rumph's hope and expectation to reach an agreement in the future.

(Punctuation omitted.) Condon v. Kunse, 208 Ga. App. 856, 858 (2) ( 432 S.E.2d 266) (1993). See also Toys `R' Us v. Atlanta Economic Dev. Corp., 195 Ga. App. 195 (1) ( 393 S.E.2d 44) (1990).

Consequently, justifiable reliance is an essential element. Condon v. Kunse, 208 Ga. App. 856, 859 (5) ( 432 S.E.2d 266)." Allen v. ReMax North Atlanta, 213 Ga. App. 644, 647 (4) ( 445 S.E.2d 774). Lack of justifiable reliance would constitute an additional reason for barring a FBPA claim.

Representations concerning expectations and hopes are not actionable. See Condon v. Kunse, 208 Ga. App. 856, 857-858 (1) ( 432 S.E.2d 266) (1993). Even if an intentionally false promise were shown, there is no justifiable reliance on such a promise, as the trial court noted. Building a house in reliance on such a promise is unreasonable; some formalization of an ownership interest must first be made.