Conde v. City of New York

22 Citing cases

  1. Brandes v. City of New York

    2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 52173 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)

    In the instant case, the City has demonstrated, prima facie, that it is immune, as a matter of law, from any liability claims based upon its alleged negligent response to the 911 calls placed by Brandes. It is well settled that "[a]s a general rule, a municipality may not be held liable for injuries resulting from a simple failure to provide police protection" ( Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255, 260; accordEtienne v New York City Police Dept. , 37 AD3d 647, 648["[A] municipality may not be held liable to a person injured by the breach of a duty to the general public, such as a duty to provide police protection, fire protection or ambulance services"]; see also Kircher v City of Jamestown, 74 NY2d 251, 256; Euell v Inc. Village of Hempstead, 57 AD3d 837, 838; Conde v City of New York , 24 AD3d 595, 596). "A narrow exception to the rule exists where a special relationship exists between the municipality and the injured parties" ( Conde, 24 AD3d at 596).

  2. Brown v. City of New York

    73 A.D.3d 1113 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 19 times

    The gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint is the alleged failure on the part of the defendant, the City of New York, to provide adequate police protection. "Generally, a municipality may not be held liable for the failure to provide police protection because the duty to provide such protection is owed to the public at large, rather than to any particular individual" ( Conde v City of New York, 24 AD3d 595, 596; see Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255, 260). A narrow exception to the rule exists where a special relationship exists between the municipality and the injured party or parties ( see Mastroianni v County of Suffolk, 91 NY2d 198, 203; Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d at 260; Conde v City of New York, 24 AD3d at 596; Basher v City of New York, 268 AD2d 546, 547). The elements required to prove the existence of a special relationship are (1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured, (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm, (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party, and (4) the injured party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking ( see. Mastroianni v County of Suffolk, 91 NY2d at 204; Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d at 260).

  3. Saldana v. City of N.Y.

    28 Misc. 3d 1222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)

    Neither was the duty imposed by law upon the Police Department “to arrest criminals ... disperse unlawful assemblages ... and protect victims of crimes enacted for the special benefit of ... [any particular person] or [those] members of the general public who may become [the] victims of crimes” ( id. at 268;see Lauer v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 95 [2000] ). The rationale for this principle is easily stated, i.e., that the duty to provide protection is owed to the public at large, rather than to any particular individual ( see Davis v. New York City Tr Auth, 63 AD3d 990 [2nd Dept 2009]; Conde v. City of New York, 24 AD3d 595 [2nd Dept 2005] ). Therefore, the government is held to be immune from torts arising out of the performance of its police officers, even if otherwise negligent, unless the plaintiff can show the presence of a “special relationship” or a “special duty” ( see Taebi v. Suffolk County Police Dept, 31 AD3d 531 [2nd Dept 2006]; Conde v. City of New York, 24 AD3d at 596;Basher v. City of New York, 268 A.D.2d 546 [2nd Dept 2000] ).

  4. Saldana v. City of New York

    2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 51434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)

    . . and protect victims of crimes enacted for the special benefit of. . . [any particular person] or [those] members of the general public who may become [the] victims of crimes" ( id. at 268; see Lauer v. City of New York, 95 NY2d 95). The rationale for this principle is easily stated, i.e., that the duty to provide protection is owed to the public at large, rather than to any particular individual (seeDavis v. New York City Tr Auth , 63 AD3d 990 [2nd Dept 2009]; Conde v.City of New York , 24 AD3d 595 [2nd Dept 2005]). Therefore, the government is held to be immune from torts arising out of the performance of its police officers, even if otherwise negligent, unless the plaintiff can show the presence of a "special relationship" or a "special duty" (seeTaebi v. Suffolk County Police Dept , 31 AD3d 531 [2nd Dept 2006]; Conde v. City of New York, 24 AD3d at 596; Basher v. City of New York, 268 AD2d 546 [2nd Dept 2000]).

  5. Coleman v. Cnty. of Suffolk

    192 A.D.3d 857 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)   Cited 1 times

    We affirm, albeit on other grounds. "Generally, a municipality may not be held liable for the failure to provide police protection because the duty to provide such protection is owed to the public at large, rather than to any particular individual" ( Conde v. City of New York, 24 A.D.3d 595, 596, 808 N.Y.S.2d 347 ). "A narrow exception to the rule exists where a special relationship exists between the municipality and the injured parties" ( id. at 596, 808 N.Y.S.2d 347 ; seeCuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937 ).

  6. Davis v. N.Y. City Transit Authority

    63 A.D.3d 990 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)   Cited 5 times

    The City defendants established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them by demonstrating that the facts, as testified to by Davis, failed to establish the existence of a special relationship. The police officer's statement to Davis that he should not go into the adjacent car of the train was not an assumption of an affirmative duty to protect him ( see Khalil v Guardino, 300 AD2d 360; Figueroa v New York City Tr. Auth., 213 AD2d 586). Davis's testimony also failed to show that he justifiably relied on the police officers' protection, as the officers left the train before the assailant entered Davis's subway car ( see Conde v City of New York, 24 AD3d 595; Blanc v Cityof New York, 223 AD2d 522). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to submit evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to the existence of a special relationship ( see Conde v City of New York, 24 AD3d at 595).

  7. Hussey v. City of New York

    24 A.D.3d 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)

    Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs. For the reasons stated in our decision and order on the companion appeal, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint ( see Conde v. City of New York, 24 AD3d 595 [decided herewith]). Luciano, J., dissents and votes to reverse the order and deny the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

  8. Gonzalez v. City of New York

    2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 31752 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)

    The defendants assert that the 911 operators' statements regarding the expediency of the arrival of the ambulance, contrary to plaintiff's claim, cannot constitute a promise sufficient to establish a special duty, as the statements that an ambulance is "on its way" and will "be there as soon as possible" are akin to what were considered "vaguely-worded statements" in Dinardo v City of New York, 13 NY3d 872, 873 [2009], which the Court of Appeals considers "not definitive enough to generate justifiable reliance" for special duty purposes. The defendants also state that the government can have no liability when it does what it says it was going to do, citing Conde v City of New York, 24 AD3d 595 [2d Dep't 2005], which in this case was dispatching an ambulance.

  9. Estate of Sauickie v. City of N.Y.

    17 Civ. 2662 (ER) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 29, 2018)

    To satisfy this element, Plaintiffs must sufficiently allege that the assurance "actually lulled [them] into a false sense of security, induced [them] either to relax [their] own vigilance or forego other avenues of protection, and thereby placed [them] in a worse position than [they] would have been had the City never assumed the duty." Brown, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 596 (citing Conde v. City of New York, 808 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2005)). Such allegations are absent from the FAC.

  10. Hernandez v. City of N.Y.

    147 A.D.3d 821 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)   Cited 2 times

    the infant plaintiff was no longer in their custody or under their control and was, thus, outside the orbit of their authority (see Pistolese v. William Floyd Union Free Dist., 69 A.D.3d 825, 895 N.Y.S.2d 125 ; Stagg v. City of New York, 39 A.D.3d 533, 833 N.Y.S.2d 188 ; Bertrand v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 272 A.D.2d 355, 707 N.Y.S.2d 218 ; Winter v. Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 270 A.D.2d 343, 704 N.Y.S.2d 142 ; see also Johnson v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 101 A.D.3d 1641, 956 N.Y.S.2d 370 ; Marcano v. City of New York, 305 A.D.2d 223, 762 N.Y.S.2d 28 ). Nor is there a basis to impose liability upon the defendants for the injuries sustained by the infant plaintiff or her father for failure to provide adequate security, since the defendants demonstrated that they did not affirmatively assume a duty to protect either plaintiff from criminal activity which occurred off the school premises (see Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937 ; Conde v. City of New York, 24 A.D.3d 595, 808 N.Y.S.2d 347 ).Accordingly, the defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint.