Under TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-11-112(a), these sworn statements must be filed "within ninety (90) days after building or structure or improvement is . . . completed . . . or the contract of the lienor expires . . ., prior to which time the lien shall be effective as against such purchasers or encumbrancers without such registration. . . ." Although the language of this statute is not entirely clear, the Tennessee courts have construed this provision as providing the lienholder two different ninety-day periods in which to file a lien notice: the ninety days after the contract expires and the ninety days after the building is completed. Concrete Supply Co. of Oak Ridge, Inc. v. Union Peoples Bank, 540 S.W.2d 250, 251 (Tenn.App. 1976) (citing First State Bank v. Stacey, 37 Tenn. App. 223, 261 S.W.2d 245 (1952)); Southern Blow Pipe Roofing Co. v. Grubb, 36 Tenn. App. 641, 260 S.W.2d 191, 194 (1953). See also Davis v. Smith, 650 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tenn.App. 1983) (recognizing that TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-11-112 gives lienholder ninety days after completion of building to assert claim, regardless of when last work performed); Barnett, 5 U. MEM. L. REV, at 363 (noting dual periods).
Brown v. Brown Co., 25 Tenn. App. 509, 160 S.W.2d 431 (1941); see also Tindell Home Center, Inc. v. Union Peoples Bank, 543 S.W.2d 843 (Tenn. 1976); Concrete Supply Co. v. Union Peoples Bank, 540 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn.App. 1976). The proof showed that work on lot 303 was completed more than 90 days before Evans Lumber Company was paid for the materials.
The prescribed periods of time for the filing of the notice of lien to preserve it against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers is "ninety (90) days after the building or structure or improvement is demolished, altered and/or completed, as the case may be, or the contract of the lienor expires or is terminated or he is discharged, . . ." And if the owner/builder does not complete the improvements but abandons them, the materialman must file his notice of lien within ninety days from the completion or termination of his contract for it to be effective against subsequent bona fide encumbrancers or purchasers. Concrete Supply Company of Oak Ridge, Inc. v. Union Peoples Bank, et al., Tenn. App., 540 S.W.2d 250, cert. denied August 16, 1976; First State Bank v. Stacey, supra. Cf. Bird Bros. v. Southern Surety Co., 139 Tenn. 11, 15-16, 200 S.W. 978 (1918). As heretofore noted, the parties stipulated the Bank was "a good faith encumbrancer for a valuable consideration."